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Summary
Since the 1970s securities markets in the EC have 
undergone significant reforms. The use of new information 
and communication technologies and above all the 
envisaged integration of the Community f inano i a 1 markets 
have been strong driving forces behind the developments. 
Considerations of competition between the national 
securities markets in the emerging single space of the EC 
have also motivated the reforms and, not least, better 
investor protection has been a point of considerable 
importance not to be neglected in a progressively bigger 
and complex market.
The thesis analyses and assesses new legislation in 
three of the currently 12 member states (France, Italy 
and the United Kingdom) in terms of the impact of self- 
regulatory and statutory rules and bodies on financial 
intermediaries with investor protection in mind.
Before referring to the background of securities
regulation in the selected three member state, the thesis
examines, with, whenever relevant, reference to the 
situation in the USA, the notions of self-regulation, 
regulation with transition to deregulation, re-regulation 
and lastly "new regulation". Professional deontology is 
discussed as a regulatory element in the practice of the 
intermediaries, again with investor protection in mind.
Dealing with the newly established regulatory 
bodies in the selected three member states, the thesis 
analyses the respective functions and effectiveness of 
the COB in France, CONSOB in Italy and the SIB in the
United Kingdom. The last two chapters of the thesis
concentrate on the quest ion of investor protection in the 
light of the new regimes with regard to self-regulatory 
and statutory standards.
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C h a p t e r  1
Introduction : Purpose, Contents and Method
Since the 1950s securities markets in the EC have 
undergone, in the wake of reforms, significant and quite 
outstanding changes in their history and development. As 
important factors, new information and communication 
technologies, the progressive integration of Community 
financial markets, access by tens of thousands of new 
participants in stock market transactions, involving 
highly respectable numbers of and not always
knowledgeable small investors, have transformed the
existing markets into increasingly multidimensional and 
growing I y complex ones. Investor protection, particularly 
the protection of small investors, has been a 
preoccupying point to consider and promote. The functions 
and responsibilities of hitherto existing regulatory and 
supervisory bodies have had to be correspondingly 
re-assessed. New approaches had to be shaped in the light 
of various self-regulatory and statutory standards or a 
mixture of them with the need for reliable standards of 
professional conduct and practice applicable to new
financial intermediaries as important participants, if 
not pillars, In the proper functioning of stock markets. 
Delimiting the topic with due regard to available 
space, the present thesis concentrates on developments in 
three of the 15 EC member states : France, Italy and the
United Kingdom, and looks at investor protection and as 
related thereto the regulation of the new financial 
intermediaries in the light of self-regulatory and
statutory standards. It looks at the situation in terms 
of the following basic questions :
y - ; . " " " , . y, -. >ysÿ, ■ ; T' \y.
(i) How adequate has been, after reforms initiated in
the 1900s, the respective regulation of the conduct 
and responsibilities of the intermediaries ? Which 
bodies are entrusted with their supervision and 
control 7
Cii) What assumptions and principles characterise the 
respective regulatory and supervisory systems 
affecting the intermediaries ? To what extent are 
they based in a dominantly centralised state or 
governmental, or self regulatory approach, or 
varyingly on a coordination of both approaches ? 
(iii) How do the respective regulatory systems promote 
and maintain the trust and confidence of the 
investing public, not least of small investors 7 
In the thesis reference is made to EEC/EC
legislation. While national regulation of stock markets 
in EC member states may deal with the structure and 
adequate functioning of supervisory bodies, EG 
legislation is in charge of promoting the progressive 
integration of the national markets with standards of 
fair and workable competition between them.
After the (present) introductory Chapter 1, the
background of stock exchanges in France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom is surveyed in chapter 2, with some 
reference to the situation in the USA for comparative 
purposes. Chapter 3 focuses on a discussion of the
notions of se If-regulation, deregulation, re-regulation 
and "new regulation". The discussion is based on the
consideration that regimes and the regulation of 
securities markets are inspired also from philosophies of 
centralised government regulation, or of liberal self­
regulation, or of total deregulation, or of a mixture and 
individually adopted balance between them, A mixed 
approach to regulation may be due to historical reasons 
or deliberate choice decisions. Whatever the outcome, the
_________  ___
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different notions of regulation can be helpful for a 
realistic assessment of the way securities markets are 
currently regulated in France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom. Professional deontology, as a non-neg Iig ib1e 
regulatory element in the operation of the securities 
markets, particularly in regimes resting dominantly on 
standards of se If-regulation (as in the United Kingdom in 
the past), is referred to in Chapter 4, concluding
therewith Part 1 of this thesis.
Chapters 5-7 in Part II survey the new regimes of 
securities regulation respectively in France, with the 
COB; Italy, with the CONSOB; and the United Kingdom with 
the SIB, which since its inception has been the subject 
of an ongoing debate and suggestions for improvements. 
With the materials of Chapters 5-7 as a background, 
Chapter 8, concluding Part II of this thesis, looks at 
investor protection in the EC .in a comparative light.
The comparative approach serves the purpose of greater
emphas i s
as to the merits and possible weaknesses and
characteristics ■ of each of the (in a way mutually 
competing) national regimes in France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom.
In Part 111, conclusions In Chapter S assess the
lessons that can be extracted from the new developments 
in the selected three EC member states, not least with
the interests of the' investor, particularly the small
investor, in mind.
As for the method underlying the contents of the
thesis, it obviously involves a comparative approach 
supported by reference to primary as well as secondary 
legislative sources and literature by leading authors or 
experts.
:_,o.y,vvy :y y > -y  . .
C h a p t e r  2
Historical Background
Stock Exchanges in France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom
Depending on the definition of stock exchanges or 
stock markets, their beginnings may be traced in Europe
in the light of available historical sources and
documents, up to ancient Rome,^ while stock markets in 
the sense and functions attached to them in current 
economic and financial life are to be treated as 
creations of the commercial and industrial age in
approximately the last 150-200 years.% The notion and
function of intermediaries are also of relatively recent 
development. They have developed in the wake of the 
increasingly more and more complex functions of 
securities markets with more and more participants as 
investors and investment users. Lastly, the regulation of 
securities markets and the role of intermediaries played 
therein have not least been influenced by a centralistic 
or governmental or very markedly statutory regulation, 
for example in France and Italy, and a hitherto 
dominantly self-regulatory approach in the United 
Kingdom. This makes an understanding of the principles 
Cor philosophy) which underlie debate on and reforms of 
securities markets In the slowly emerging singly EC
financial markets easier.
Stock markets have become however more than a simple 
meeting place for investors and borrowers. In modern
times the complex structure and system of available
shares and stocks, the different types and categories of 
investors and borrowers (small investors, institutional 
investors; corporate bodies, governments, as examples), 
the diversity of transactions and operations involve the
____________
participation of a large number of persons with expertise 
and correspondingly allocated functions, and, not least, 
trust invested in them. Most important among them are, 
for the purpose of the present thesis, the intermediaries 
whose functions necessitate not only an essential amount 
of expertise, but also and no less importantly elements 
of personal integrity and professional conduct deserving 
the trust of investors. It is noteworthy how the
standards of professional expertise and conduct
applicable to intermediaries have in the last 150 years 
become more and more complex and increasingly demanding, 
particularly in large and complex markets as those in the 
USA, the emerging single market of the EC and in other 
financially leading countries of the world. The stock 
market fulfils a public function for the benefit of 
investors, on the one hand, and admitted or listed
corporate bodies or companies which are authorised or 
approved to issue shares, bonds, debentures etc, on the 
other. Therewith the economic and commercial system 
benefits by attracting available capital resources to 
where they are needed; investors benefit with returns on 
their lent or invested capital and the recipients of
investment benefit by having access to investment
resources needed for their financial activities. Francis 
Bacon, in his book on a Decalogue for Travellers,
recommends to discover a visited country all the more by 
visiting also its stock markets and exchanges.=
While in English, "securities market", "exchange 
market", "stock market" are used, in many European
languages the word "bourse" (in French) or its
equivalents are used ; "borsa" in Italy, "hours" in
Belgium and The Netherlands, "bors" in Scandinavia,
"Borse" in Germany etc. The root of this continental
European word has been traced to the 13th century, to the
medieval Flemish town of Bruges (now in Belgium), to the
"'yyiV-y:;' ' ÿ - y y :
6house of a certain merchant Van de Buerse. There, then a 
prosperous centre of the Low Countries, merchants
gathered in front of the Van de Buerse family house to 
engage in trading, lending and borrowing transactions, 
for which certificates Cor titles) were issued.^
The name of the family subsequently became
identified with the name where similar transactions were 
effected: a "bourse" or stock exchange. The first
"bourse" as such is that of Avers (1549), followed by
those of Lyon, Toulouse, Paris, Rouen and Bordeaux
between 1549 and 1571,® Amsterdam in The Netherlands can 
claim to have historically the first building used
exclusively as the seat of an stock exchange, built, in 
the form of a cloister in the first years of the 17th 
century.6 From similar roots in trade and industry, the 
institutional beginnings of stock exchanges appeared in 
Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries in other important 
trading centres in Europe : the British Isles, Denmark, 
Germany, as examples. It may be assumed therewith that 
also the origins of the functions of intermediaries or 
brokers emerged, but historical sources are short on 
information in this respect, particularly as to their 
specific duties and responsibilities as well as 
liabilities, if any.
In Renaissance Italy, approximately from the 14th to 
the 16th centuries, also noteworthy economic developments 
took place. Great commercial and monetary activities
induced leading bankers like the Medicis in Florence to 
promote stable arrangements facilitating financial 
transactions. At the Rialto market in Venice, as one
among many other examples, already in the 15th century
public debits certificates were largely negotiated with a 
sufficiently continuous stability in values and 
quotations. A century later, as a marked development,
exchange fairs organised in France in the first place by
___________'  :____ ]________________ I__________' _ _
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Genoese and Milanese merchants became comparable to 
modern exchange markets when transactions in them assumed
an exclusively financial or monetary nature with lending
and frequent exchanges of "papiers valeurs" as
title certificates concerning public bonds.? As
professional standards in accounting and auditing are
also related to the interests of investors and their 
protection, it is historically relevant to mention that
the Italian monk Faciola wrote the first known treatise 
on accounting based on double entry bookkeeping. SEC 
President Richard C, Breeden, at a conference on November 
13, 1992, at the University of Bocconi in Milan, said,
"without Faciola?s innovative achievements wo would not
have an accounting alphabet or language /.../ nor a
system of dealing in shares or the organisations which 
deal with shares."® In passing it may be noted that the 
Catholic Church did not welcome stock market transactions 
and prohibited them as usury in the guise of profit- 
making through the exploitation of capital. Merchants and 
financial transactors on their part found ways of by­
passing the prohibition which did not exclude any
possible voluntary "donations" or "gifts" added by the 
debtor to the repayment of the borrowed capital as a 
gesture of appreciation for "benefits" derived from the 
borrowed capital used for commercial transactions exposed 
to possible risks. This may remind one of the strict 
Islamic approach to financial transactions. It bans 
profit making from lending money at interest.*
With intor-European as well as overseas trade the 
need for banks and insurance was generated. In emerging 
secular and national states, governments sought new 
modern sources of monetary funds, A combination of 
expanding activities and intermittent (if not chronic) 
capital shortages stimulated governments, banks,
insurance companies, and some joint stock enterprises,
'id: tf'T: __
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particularly the great trading companies, to issue 
stocks. From the existing exchanges for commercial bills 
and notes, it was a relatively logical and uncomplicated 
transition to the establishment of stock exchanges for 
securities. By the early 1600s, shares of the Dutch East 
India Company were being traded in Amsterdam.
In 1773, London stock dealers, hitherto accustomed 
to meeting in coffee houses, moved into a building to be 
used as their own, and by the 19th century, trading in 
securities was common on a more or less formalised basis 
in the emerging industrialised countries.
The reforms and regulation of securities markets in 
the EC in general, and in France, Italy and the UK in 
particular for the purposes of the present thesis, are 
situated and move, for theoretical purposes, between the 
two poles of , (i) central or centralised or statutory
regulation, in which the central state authorities pi ay a 
predominant role, and Cii) self-regulation, in which the 
professional bodies and their members enjoy an extensive 
margin for establishing and maintaining standards of
professional integrity, efficiency and reliability.
Centralised regulation has been historically
characteristic of continental European legal systems, 
whereas self-regulation is closely and successfully
linked with the history of the securities markets in the 
UK. That is, both approaches have been historically 
cond i t i oned.
1n France, as an expression of central authority, 
Philip the Fair (1268-1314), in order to regulate the
incipient stock exchangeCs), instituted the profession of 
courratier as the forerunner of the agent de change 
(exchange a g e n t ) . A l r e a d y  since 1141 exchange agents
(changeurs) had established their meeting or working
place on the Font-au-Change in Paris for regularising 
their transactions between buyers and sellers, in
7:31
exchange for the payment of a commission for their 
services.‘^
The Royal missive (lettre de Chartres) of 1141,
legitimising exchange transactions on the Grand Pont in 
Paris, and later ordinances and edicts gave the slowly 
emerging exchange market in France some characteristic 
traits still surviving in our days in France ; trading at 
an approved place, the compulsory participation of 
specialised/expert intermediaries; commercially neutral 
professional conduct by intermediaries in transactions.*= 
As yet, as to be expected, standards of professional 
ethics, conduct and integrity had to wait, for their 
detailed articulation, until developments in the 20th
century, except for a professional monopoly.
In March 1720 the monopoly of exchange agents was 
instituted for trading in public stocks. Decrees on 
September 24 and October 14, 1724, confirmed the
exclusive professional rights of stock agents to trade
and sanctioned the use by them of the Bourse in Paris,
The Bourse, officially recognised by the French royal 
government, was subject to the authority of the 
lieutenant general of police. During 10-13 stock trading 
hours, only professional agents as intermediaries and 
private persons with a known and regular domicile had 
access to the Bourse, Access by foreigners was dependent 
on authorisation; women were e x c l u d e d . A t  one time, 
there were three securities markets in Paris: an official 
one known as the Parquet (the floor); a semi-official 
market "la coulisse" (the wing), "the corridor"; and the 
"Hors Cote" (non-listed) outside the first two. As to 
intermediaries participating in them, they were
distinguished in terms of a category with access to the
Parquet and a further category for intermediaries with
access to thé other sections of the market. This
distinction prevailed until 1967, Relations between the
1 0
categories were not always smooth, because the 
distinction between them was in terms of (i) official and 
public agents and (II) non-official agents, more of a 
private nature. Official change agents acted as 
intermediaries and only as such. The coulissiers, later 
integrated into a single professional association, were 
authorised to act solely as intermediaries for 
establishing contact between buyers and sellers. To this 
extent they were comparable to stock exchange agents, but 
the latter were in addition empowered to acquire and sell 
stocks on their own account, that is, to operate as a 
"marche en banque". Both professional groups in time 
achieved a modus vivendi under the patronage of the 
ministry of finance.is The Ministry from time to time 
introduced new statutory rules affecting the profess!ona! 
groups and their relationship. For example, the 1 aw of 
February 14, 1952, amending the Ordinance of October 18,
1945, re-confirmed the privileged position of the 
exchange agents, but it instituted a second category of 
trading privileges in favour of a new professional 
association, the "courtiers on valeurs mobilières" 
(security agents) consisting of old bankers. In time the 
dualistic system involving agents and courtiers pointed 
to the necessity of having an arbiter to deal with 
possible litigation between members of the two 
professional groups. For this purpose, the law of 1953 
had provided for the creation of a Committee of Stock 
Exchanges to act basically as an arbiter between the two 
groups. Its function was extended after 1961 to include 
the various markets related to the authorisation and 
distribution of French securities for official listing.** 
When reforms on July 29, 1961, integrated the Paris
stock markets, the category of courtiers of securities 
was abolished parallel to the creation of a "hors cote"
h i e ___________
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("non-listed") market. The powers of the Committee of the 
Stock Exchange were strengthened; the principle of a
unitary system of listings was confirmed with the
complementary rule that officially quote stocks may not 
be offered in more than one stock exchange in France.*? 
The same law sanctioned the professional monopoly of the 
agents de change. The reform of 1967 initiating the 
establishment of the Commission des Operations de Bourse 
(COB), the current stock exchange supervisory body (see 
below, Chapter 5), integrated all associations of stock 
exchange agents into a single national body and made
authorisation to act as an stock exchange agent dependent
on a decree of the Ministry of Finance subsequent to
approval by the COB. On March 31, 1975, there were 113
stock exchange agents in France, of whom one was a woman.
In Italy, after the establishment of the first stock 
exchange, the Borsa di Commercio di Milano, in 1808 by a 
Vice-Royal Decree of January 16, the exchange agents did 
not have a monopoly recognised by the state as in 
France. The right of access to the stock exchange was the 
object of a long controversy which ended with an 
extraordinary measure of policing or controlling ; the
nomination in 1856 of a governmental commissioner. It
should be added that the stock exchange in Milan did not 
enjoy autonomy either; it was attached to the Milan 
chamber of Commerce. These characteristics of the Italian 
securities market were comparable to those of the German 
securities markets. Owing to the relative backwardness of 
the economy prior to national unification in the 1660s 
the stock exchange in Milan was put under the control of 
the Chamber of Commerce. After the unification of Italy, 
the Milan stock exchange was re-constituted as a body 
consisting of a director (slndaco) and four associate 
directors nominated by the Chamber of Commerce for a
_ _ A
1 2
period of one year. The decree of March 10, 1860,
provided in Art. 43 that, according to the procedure of 
the Chamber syndacaie des Agents de change in Paris, two 
associate directors should be then selected by each of 
the two professional categories (brokers and exchange 
agents) of the stock exchange, but the application of 
this rule was blocked by the minister of interior affairs 
on the grounds that it was incompatible with Art. 4 of a 
preceding Decree. As to members of the stock exchange
professional association, they were nominated by the
association Itself among persons not classified as 
exchange agents but as persons belonging to the class of 
merchants, provided that such a nomination "would not
entail any inconvenience,"*®
In and after 1865 new provisions were included in 
the Italian Code of commerce, concerning also the 
establishment of some institutions of fundamental 
importance ; the stock exchange council, appointed by the 
Chamber of Commerce; the quotation of bonds of public 
debt; guarantees and basic fees; a clearer procedure for 
the admission of stocks to the exchange; a system of 
authorisation for the quotation of non-Italian (foreign) 
stocks. Meanwhile the Italian economic situation 
developed rapidly and by 1906 the Bank of Italy reserves 
exceeded those of the Bank of England.** In 1907, the 
"diritto di sconto," a legal institution of French 
origin, translatable as the I aw on financial
transactions, was adopted. It regulated in addition to
the administration of stocks for official listing, to the 
control of stock values, the monopoly of brokers (agenti 
di canibio) confirmed by the basic 1 aw of March 30, 1813.
The figure of the exchange agent as a public person was
abolished by Lav; Mo. 1 of January 2, 1991, and
substituted by that of a juridical person, a company.
_________
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In the United Kingdom, as characteristic of a system 
based on a self-regulatory approach, the creation of the 
London Stock Exchange on March 27 1802 was by a "deed of 
settlement", a contract. This legal act, v;ith notable 
changes in 1875, had been in force for quite a long time. 
The beginnings of a stock exchange in the UK go 
naturally much further back; first tradings of stocks 
have been traced back to 1568.^®
They were concentrated in the Royal Exchange founded 
by Sir Thomas Gresham in 1586, financial councillor to
King Edward VI and Queen Elizabeth I. The pattern of
operation followed that of the stock exchange in
Amsterdam in The Netherlands. The London Royal Exchange 
moved to a new building in 1669 after the great fire in 
1666 had destroyed the old building.
The supply of traded stock and securities was
promoted by the formation of stock companies and later, 
towards the end of the 17th century, by an increase in
public borrowing and debt. Joint participation in
commercial ventures was already known in medieval
England, whereby possibly a few sleeping partners
contributed with capital and left the management of the 
commercial ventures to the other partner(s). Such 
"sleeping" participation was advantageous for those who 
wanted to have their capital exploited but at the same 
time wanted to avoid any accusation of usury for profits 
on lent money.
Another familiar institution was the corporation. 
With a. marriage between the form of a company with
participatory shares and that of a corporation there
emerged in the middle of the 17th century the form of 
stock companies with its essential characteristics,
whereof the oldest stock company was the Russia company 
while the more known is the East-India company.
After the establishment of the Bank of England in
_________ __________
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1694 the stock trading transactions took place in a 
nearby coffee house. The first quotation list dates back 
to 1697, related to the name of John Castaing and Sons 
as b r o k e r s . 22 In the same year, relevant to the topic of 
the present thesis, a law was enacted for checking
malpractices by brokers and stock-jobbers. It prescribed
the grant of a broker’s licence by the mayor and the
tribunal of Aldermen.2®
In 1876 the London Stock Exchange was considered by 
A, Ellis "the most highly organised market in the
world",3 4 but !t was not the only securities market in
Britain in the 19th century,?® In 1836 stock exchanges in 
Liverpool and Manchester had opened their doors, followed 
by Sheffield, Leeds, Glasgow and Edinburgh, and further
regional stock exchanges in 1845, In 1973 all stock
exchanges in the UK, Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
were merged into the London Stock Exchange.
With relevance to the topic of the present thesis, 
the London Stock Exchange, hitherto the largest in the 
world and having to compete more and more with other 
centres in terms of the number and variety of domestic 
and international securities traded, has traditionally
been an independent (self-regulated) institution not 
subject to governmental or central regulation. It has
resembled a private club with its own constitution and 
operating rules, administered by a council whose now 
members, except for the government broker as an ex 
officio non voting member, were elected by the existing 
members. Operating responsibility was vested in a 
secretary and his staff, with no possibility for the 
government to participate in the operations and 
administration of the exchanges.
As to trading on the London Stock Exchange, it was 
carried through a unique system of brokers and jobbers, 
A broker acted as an agent for his clients while a jobber
____________________
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or dealer transacted business on the floor of the 
Exchange without dealing with the public directly. A 
client’s order given to a brokerage house was relayed to 
the floor for execution, A broker’s income was from a 
commission received from the client as compensation for 
services rendered. The jobbers sought to maximise 
profitable business by adjusting stock buying and selling 
prices. As the ultimate dealer in the London market, the 
jobber with his activities provided a stabilising factor 
in many respects. Unlike the specialist on the floor of 
the New York Exchange, the jobber was under no obligation 
to help support the quotations.?*
To become a member of the London Stock Exchange, an 
individual had to secure a nomination from a retiring 
member at a price varying with demand and supply. Every 
applicant had to be approved by at least three members of 
the Stock Exchange Council. A member could be a broker, 
dealing as an agent of the public, or a jobber dealing 
for his own account with other jobbers or brokers.?? The 
distinction between a broker and a jobber had emerged in 
1012, but not before 1908 was a member of the London 
Stock Exchange held to declare formally whether he was a 
broker or a jobber. Members of the exchange did not have 
to obtain a licence which legislation in 1058 prescribed 
for the prevention of fraud in the sphere of investment 
activities. This last point indicates how in the wake of 
complex developments and expansion both at the level of 
activities and investors consideration for better 
standards for supervision as well as for investor 
protection were moving to the fore.
The historical background of stock exchanges in 
France, Italy and the United Kingdom shows that in France 
and the United Kingdom the structure, organisation and 
membership of stock exchanges emerged from the initially 
free association of its members. While this development
■ ' y : y  y. ____ _______
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lasted longest in the United Kingdom, in France the 
central authority of the state in due time asserted its 
influence as a factor of regulation. In Italy, the 
organisation and operation of the stock exchange was from 
the beginning influenced by the tradition of the Bourse 
du Roi in France, founded in 1724 by the will of royal 
authority. Consequently, the Milan Stock Exchange was
different from the French and UK models in two important 
respects ; Cl) the exchange agents did not succeed in 
achieving a professional monopoly that the French and 
London agents enjoyed for trading in the stock exchange, 
the French agents enjoying such a monopoly initially in 
self-regulation and later in a form sanctioned by central 
state authority; (2) in Milan the right of quotation was 
the object of a long controversy ending with an 
extraordinary measure of policing or monitoring when a
Commissioner of the government was appointed in 1856; and 
lastly (3) the Milan stock exchange was not autonomous; 
it was linked to the Chamber of Commerce. As a marginal 
remark it can be said that the characteristics of the 
Milan stock exchange as the model of the Italian system
was comparable to the status of the German stock
exchanges.
N o t e s
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C h a P t 0 r 3.
Se 1f-ReguI at ion. Regulation, Deregulation, Re-Regulation
and Co-Regulation, "New Regulation”
The removal- of all barriers in the EC to the free 
movement of goods and persons, supply of services and the 
free movement of capital within the completed internal 
market of the EC has, as from January 1st 1993, 
generated a number of new regulatory issues for 
securities markets. Some of them are due to Community 
law and others are conditioned by the transnational 
dimensions and communication technologies affecting the 
operations of securities markets. Markets which in the 
past have developed their activities under different 
national systems with in practice, insulated national 
regulatory structures and standards, are now expected to 
operate within (a ) a broad regulatory framework anchored 
in primary as well as secondary EC lav^ , and (b) a system 
with transnational dimensions both within and outwith the 
EC legal system. This exposes the markets to competition 
and puts the national securities markets and thereto 
related forms and standards of regulation under pressure 
pointing towards nev/ developments and not least towards 
coordinated regulatory standards with due regard to 
competitiveness, reliability and, eminently, the
protection of the investor, more particularly the small 
i nvGstor.
Traditional systems of (1) self-regulation, Cii) 
regulation, more recent approaches of (iii) de-regulation 
and/or (iv) re-regulation and Cv) co-regulation have to 
be assessed and re-assessed in the light of new 
realities, challenges and demands, even if they are 
capable of assuming variable or varied meanings and
  ___ __.
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shadings in the socio-economic, legal and cultural
environment in which they are expected to operate. From a 
combination of these notions and associated systems a 
’’new regulatory” approach may emerge for promoting the
proper functioning of financial markets and access to 
investment capital. This "new regulatory” approach or 
"new regulation” is largely a product of the 
internationalisation of capital markets; in the case of 
the EC, it is a necessity generated by the transnational 
character of the emerging Community single market with no 
internal barriers. Both at international and intra- 
Community levels the pluralist and complex nature of the 
new dimensions of the capital markets is accompanied by a 
realisation that beside the legal standards, values or
standards of professional ethics have to be necessarily 
considered as constitutive elements of a system of stable 
and reliable regulation.
The question of professional ethical standards is 
reflected in the notion of deontology, with origins in 
professional self-regulation. Such self-regulation
implies, in ongoing changes and consolidation, a division 
of competences of regulatory powers between central 
governmental or administrative authorities, on the one 
hand, and members of the professions involved in the 
operations of stock markets on the other. In more legal 
terms, the search for the best new regulation concerns 
the search for a system involving central administrative 
as well as decentralised control standards, wherewith 
central administrative elements of the regulatory system 
are combined or coordinated with professional self- 
regulatory elements. In this process a so to speak 
osmosis between the state administrative authorities and 
professional bodies may take place, if capital and 
investment resources are not to move to other stock 
markets with detrimental effects for the national stock
■ r - , K W  y.;r-S'’Vt '‘U: ' / A ' x \ .-'y.
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exchange of the state concerned.
Obviously, the 1 rnpor tance of deontology should 
neither be over- nor under-estimated. According to one 
leading opinion, it is an element which together with 
other factors contributes to implement a complex 
regulatory system relating to financial activities.^ It 
is additionally accepted that Cin our translation) "the 
firmness, at least as far as the financial sector is 
concerned, of such constructions based on a principle of 
sharing between governmentai/centra 1ised and self- 
regulatory systems, in traditional legal systems, have 
emphasised the development of novel approaches, 
solutions, as part of the expansion of the influence of 
law in essence generated by non-governmental 
organ!sations
Thus, the new regulatory systemCs) are marked by 
diversification, both as to contents as well as origins; 
They are no longer the result of an authoritarian 
control; they are the result of a regulatory approach 
aiming at the promotion, development and optimal
functioning of the markets.
The "new regulatory approach” , based essentially on 
a deontology uses, for achieving its goals, most diverse 
systems such as that of self-regulation, regulation, de­
regulation, re-regulation, co-regulation. This is
justified by a desire to avoid a centralised government 
system which may be heavy, slow, rigid, stifling and as 
such inadequate for the rapid transformation of financial 
mar ke t s,
In the light of the above sketched development, in 
which a number of terms play a role, it is appropriate to
deal with the content of the associated notions as
concepts underlying the challenges of regulating the 
securities markets within a broad regulatory framework 
and EC legislation.
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Self Regulation
For civil law jurists, self-regulation implies a 
philosophy of action, sounding almost like a magic word. 
It may be a key notion for unlocking entrance to the 
world of common law. It concerns not so much the 
objectives to be achieved as the means, the instruments 
to be applied to reach given objectives. Its basic 
elements are those of flexibility, clarity, simplicity, 
rationality, involving the application of detailed rules 
in internal regulatory texts as instruments of control 
from within. At the same time, the term self-regulation 
is an ambiguous one, because it can lend itself to 
multiple interpretations and definitions.
Normally, self-regulation is contrasted with 
statutory regulation, that is, with control enshrined in 
legislative or statutory texts, and sometimes with non- 
self-regulation.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1981) 
defines self-regulation as "regulation of or by oneself 
or itself; control or supervision from within," The Bank 
of England, in evidence to the Wilson Committee, defined 
se 1 f-regulation as originating
"in the realisation by a group of individuals or 
institutions that regulation of their activities is 
desirable in the common interest, and their acceptance 
that rules for the performance of functions and of duties 
should be established and enforced. Typical of such 
arrangements are those to which members of professional 
bodies subscribe in order to establish appropriate 
standards of profess iona1 conduct and competence. In some 
cases the enforcement of such standards is entrusted to a 
commi ttee of a profession or of practitioners in a 
market, Frequent 1 y , however, the enforcement of the 
regulations may be entrusted to an authority outside the 
group, which is or becomes customarily recognised and
Tib  :
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obeyed and which may also become the initiator of new 
regulations ... In both cases the system can be described 
as self-regulation, the first intrinsically so, the
second by common consent.
In the financial sector too, self-regulation
confirms its vocation to outline the configuration of a
complex phenomenon of legal nature that does not exhaust 
its scope solely in an ethical dimension. On the 
contrary, it may stand for articulating itself through 
institutions and organisational structures affecting 
matters belonging to categories normally related to 
internal matters.
Self-regulation has long been common in professions 
like those of law, medicine, accountancy, with
characteristics common to them.* If a profession is self- 
regulating, in the sense that its members, as the sole 
suppliers of a certain type of professional service, are 
free to determine in one way or another whether or not to 
admit an applicant to the profession, then it might prima 
facie seem that such a profession could be regarded as a 
monopolistic supplier and seller of the service in 
question. If a negative effect is associated with such a 
monopolistic position, then the effects of the given 
self-regulation may appear to involve some loss for the 
public or society affected by it. The whole rationale of 
self-regulation rests however, on the notion that it 
provides a vehicle through which the quality of the 
service may be maintained in markets where the client or 
consumer may not be capable of assessing readily and/or 
measurLngthe quality of the monopolistic service offered. 
Gower explains that "the British experience has been made 
of three distinct methods of self-regulation î the first 
(of which the stock exchange and Lloyd’s are examples) is 
where a professional organisation acts as a self-
  _ ____
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regulatory body over the activities of its members; the 
second (of which' the CBI CSI and the Panel are examples) 
is when a professional association or a number of 
professional bodies voluntarily set up a distinct self- 
regulatory agency over the members of that body or bodies 
and, where practicable, over those dealing with those 
members. The third (of which the Insurance Brokers 
Registration Council is an example) is where a 
professional body or bodies promote by legislation the 
establishment of an agency to regulate the practices and 
conduct of its members," The first of these, the "club" 
type of self-regulation, has the advantage that moral 
persuasion may work at its most powerful and it may be 
easier to enlist high-powered executives to play an 
active role in regulation.% Gower observes that in the UK 
there exists "sometimes self-regulation; sometimes 
statutory and sometimes non-statutory ; and sometimes a
mixture of all or some of these."*
Non-statutory regulation is not synonymous with 
self-regulation. Statutory and non-statutory forms of 
regulation may seem to be mutually inconsistent ; there 
is, however in effect, something of a continuum linking
them, on one side, most forms of non-statutory
regulation, even of the self-regulatory type take place 
within some kind of statutory framework. On the other 
side, extreme statutory supervision of financial 
institutions may be invariably supported by non-statutory 
arrangements of one form or another. The issue is not 
therefore whether statutory or non-statutory methods of 
supervision are preferable in some absolute or mutually 
exclusive sense, but whether the existing balance between 
the two is appropriate for the particular circumstances 
and, one might add, tradition. The continuum between
statutory and non-statutory regulation is well 
exemplified by the important regulatory form of internal
______________________________________________________ 4
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codes of good practice. Statutory and non-statutory
internal codes may exist. They are much more flexible 
than statutory law and can be readily revised to respond 
to new circumstances.’
The status of such a code is considered to be, in
some ways, similar to that of the UK Highway Code
approved under Section 38(7) of the Road Traffic Act
1988, or to the codes of practice approved under Section 
25(2) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987,
BoveyG notes that se If-régulât ion exists as an 
exception or reaction to two elements in the
constitutional structure; the sovereignty of Parliament
and the Independence of the judiciary in the UK, He adds 
that pre-reform England was largely governed by Boards 
and Offices, They were not accountable to Parliament. As 
Parliament reformed itself, and thereby attained 
democratic legitimacy, this pattern changed. The Boards 
became the Ministries (Departments) and secretaries and 
ministers became accountable to Parliament, Thus, self- 
regulation is "what happens when some body or 
organisation successfully acquires power independently of 
Par 1 lament.
The independence of judges from the executive arm of 
government but their subordination to Parliament is v/orth 
noting in the following context ; "The effective coming 
together of the executive and the legislature in a 
sovereign Parliament with the growth of a two-party 
system and party discipline left no checks or balances in 
the constitution other than the judges. There was no room 
for the growth of a system of administrative 1 aw on the 
continental or even the UK model because it would offend 
against the idea of the sovereignty of Parliament. 
Instead, the courts adopted a different role. It was that 
while Parliament has absolute power, and the judges would 
accept and respect the will of Parliament whatever it
-----
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did, if it conferred power on anyone else, notably any 
part of the Executive, the courts v/ould ensure that the 
power was exercised strictly in accordance with
Parliamentary instructions."^® It should be noted that 
the current structure of stock exchange regulation in the 
UK is derived largely from the Gower R e p o r t , T h e
contents of Gower’s and particularly the corresponding 
Committee’s terms of reference reflect two basic premises; 
Cl) All financial services require regulation, and
(2) Self-regulation is generally superior to 
statutory regulation,
Lobuono (Italy) has commented that (in our 
translation) "evidently the most significant limit of
se If-regulation can be ascertained in terras of protecting 
investors and, particularly, providing for the efficacy 
of rules of conduct in relation to third parties, that 
is, clients with contracts/agreements of investment 
concluded with the financial operators. The therein
involved problems emerge above all in relation to forms
of auto-(self-)regulation in a strict sense, that is, in 
circumstances with respect to which no reference can be 
made to statutory or administrative provisions. (One may 
think in this context of the integral or practice code 
set up by a profess iona1 body of French
intermediaries)."12
Self regulation is not necessarily characterised by 
simple or comprehensive rule books. With such a point in 
mind, it may be said that, as has been universally
admitted, the original SIB rules book was a little
complicated. The competent Minister has said in the House 
of Lords that compared with the old Stock Exchange rules 
book, the SIB book read like Enid Blighton.
Another possibility to consider when establishing 
self-regulatory books is that self-regulation can best 
operate, or can only operate in a field untrammelled by
V' , : -
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statutory or legal controls. Gower’s suggestions and 
conclusions indicate that for him self-regulation could 
operate only with a vertical dividing line between it and 
statutory regulation, A horizontal division may destroy 
it and self-regulating organisations operating thereunder 
and under the Financial Services Act are not good or 
workable examples of self-regulation.
The m a in advantages of self-regulation can consist 
in flexibility, ability to deal with infringements of the 
spirit as well as the letter of conduct rules and thus to 
ensure high standards of reliability as to personal 
integrity and expertise in the matters to be regulated; 
the ability to take decisions speedily and lessen demands 
on the public purse.
In terms of main disadvantages, self-regulation may 
risk dependence on imprecise and vague rules, 
difficulties of effective enforcement over non-members, 
possible insulation from the public as opposed -to 
professional opinion, and in particular danger that self- 
interest may outweigh public interest or may appear to do 
so and therewith may sap or undermine public confidence 
in the profession.
"The main disadvantage, however, is the risk of 
corruption and capture ; regulators may be captured by the 
firms they attempt to regulate.
Advantages and disadvantages of governmental 
regulation have been seen as largely the converse of 
those of self-regulation. According to Gower, the two 
types of regulation should not be regarded as being 
antithetical but rather as complementary.’* "It is now 
generally accepted, I think that gaps in the regulation
need to be filled ---- and filled, to the same degree at
any rate, by governmental regulation." "The ideal would 
be to weld self-regulation and governmental regulation 
into a coherent statutory framework which would cover the
___________________ 1...... ..................
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whole field that needs to be regulated; in which each 
would perform the role it does best, working harmoniously 
together,^®
It is noteworthy that in France, with a civil law 
tradition, concerning the organisational aspects of the 
financial/securities markets, also after the reforms of 
1980 and 1989, no elements of se If-regulation have 
emerged in a strict sense or in any case no professional 
bodies comparable to the self-regulatory
organisations(SROs) established in the United Kingdom. 
However, financial operators and in particular those 
employed under various titles in the sphere of investment 
activities have contributed no less than others to define 
the nature and structure of the market in which they 
operate. In fact, intermediaries in France are called 
upon to draft internal procedural codes for the market 
and above all have the possibility to designate, 
alongside other professional groups operating in the 
financial markets, their proper representatives at the 
level of central authority dealing with professional 
matters, such as the Conseil des Bourses de Valeur, the 
Conseil du Marche a Terme (futures market), etc, The 
functions of these centralised regulatory bodies involve 
aspects ranging from powers of control to drafting 
general rules for the market. These institutions, 
operating in an area intermediary between statutory 
regulation on the one hand and se If-régulât ion for the 
activities of intermediary bodies on the other, compete 
to contribute to the efforts of the state to create a 
mixed regime governing financial activities,
A similar strategy of decentralised approach to 
traditional functions exercised by central government 
bodies manifests, itself also with respect to control 
powers. The actors active on the markets are co-involved 
in the administrative processes affecting the market
V- 'ht ~i-
■'j-
30
through a system of synergy between financial
institutions, on the one hand, and professional groups of 
market intermediaries on the other. In securities markets 
like those 1n France, in which control activities have to 
face extreme difficulties, that is, to cope with 
substantial delays affecting the process of financial 
innovation,^* the desirable objective is in substance to 
introduce successfully at (1) a first and lower market 
level standards of control applied directly by the 
organisations involved in it, as standards intended to 
be more successful and as such desirable to achieve
systematic effectiveness, and C2) at a second level,
measures of an external control, tending to be exercised 
more indirectly, that is, as a mechanism of verification 
applicable to the validity of procedures applied to 
internal controls.
The above remarks suggest a first conclusion on the 
role of self-regulation in French financial markets : de­
regulation processes, quite far from leading to total 
liberation from state intervention, involve rather a deep 
reorganisation of the markets. This involves a transition 
from a system of centralised to a decentralised
administrative system with elements of both
administrative as well as professional decentralisation. 
Therewith financial operators have a guarantee to 
fulfill, under the control of the market authorities, 
functions of growing responsibility. It may be generally 
asked, whether self-regulation or statutory regulation 
can respectively be a better method for guaranteeing the 
proper functioning and reliability of financial services 
markets; or is a combination of both essential and hence 
inevitable? Or does the answer to these questions lie in 
specific historic factors which have shaped traditions, 
more self-regulatory in the UK and more statutory in 
France or Italy? Or is the nature and technicalities of
'M::#tj
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current financial services markets such that a radical 
break with tradition may have to be envisaged? Chapters 
5-7 may cast some light on these points by discussing the 
way financial services markets in France, Italy and the 
United Kingdom are organised and regulated and what 
critique and weaknesses they involve. Philip Bovey,^’' 
says that the term self-regulation is bandied about, 
sometimes as something to be aimed for, sometimes as a 
term of abuse to be contrasted with real or statutory 
regulation. For him, good regulation may be achieved with 
or independently from s e if-reg u 1 ation. ‘ ° One has to agree 
with him that the virtues of a good regulatory system are 
: (i) it is clear in its contents; Cii) it is clear as to
its targets, and Ciii) it is enforceable with 
effectiveness and benefit for all market participants.
The differences between self-regulation and no 
self-regulation lie not in their regulatory aims; these 
may be assumed to be the same for securing the proper 
functioning, reliability and optimal immunity of the
financial markets against fraud and manipulation, but in 
how the aspired objectives are achieved and maintained.
Re g u 1 a t i on
Regulation literally means the "laying down of 
rules".
"Regulation exists because certain groups in society 
benefit from their existence at the expense of the rest 
of society - that is why the process of regulatory reform 
is a painstaking one with potent political forces pulling 
in different directions"'?
"Regulation, particularly in the USA - at least 
"economic regulation" broadly conceived - typically 
refers to governmental efforts to control individual 
price, output, or product quality decisions of private 
firms, in an avowed effort to prevent purely private
decision making that would take inadequate account of the
Vi? ' V-' .IV'
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public interest."2 0
In the USA regulation is a distinct type of policy- 
making and its study has been elevated to the status of a 
sub-discipline. In Europe the situation is different: 
despite the intensity of ongoing debate about 
deregulation at national and EC levels, research on the 
economics and politics of public regulation is still a 
relatively new area. Paradoxically, the study of de­
regulation has preceded the theory, if not the practice 
of regulation.2 1
Majone underlines that "There are several reasons 
why European social scientists have not developed 
anything comparable to the American theories of 
regulation. To begin with, the term itself is often used 
differently on the two sides of the Atlantic, In Europe 
there is a tendency to identify regulation with the whole 
realm of legislation, governance and social control. This 
broad use of the term makes the study of regulation 
coextensive with law, economics, political science and 
sociology, and thus impedes the development of a theory 
of regulation as a distinct kind of policy-making.
In the USA, regulation has acquired the more
specific meaning of a control exercised by a public 
agency. As to securities markets, of direct relevance to 
the contents of the present thesis, the art of regulating 
them requires knowledge of -details of its operations, 
ability to shift requirements as the changing conditions 
of the market may indicate, the pursuit of energetic 
measures upon the appearance of an emergency, and the
power, through enforcement, to generate realistic
conclusions as to policy.
Differences in meaning applicable to the notion of 
regulation reflect significant ideological and
institutional differences between the USA and European 
approaches to the p o 1itical control of market processes.
—or-
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The long tradition of regulation in the USA, at the 
Federal level going back to the 1067 Interstate Commerce 
Act regulating the railroads and the corresponding 
commission set up to apply it, expresses a widely held
belief that the market works well under normal 
circumstances and should be interfered with only in 
specific cases of "market failure" such as under the 
negative impact of monopoly, negative externalities or 
inadequate information. Thus, the primary rationale for 
regulation, along with other elements of public policy 
towards industry, is to remedy various kinds of market 
failure.23
With, particularly, focus on financial systems and 
their markets, information problems provide the chief
rationale for much regulation and are essential to 
understand the relationship between a regulatory agency
and the firm or firms or professional bodies it 
regulates. Normally, the Government will be involved in 
regulation, either directly or indirectly. Indirect 
involvement may involve a quasi-governmenta1 body, such 
as a regulatory Agency, for example, the BIB in the UK.2* 
Regulation can be often regarded as a substitute for 
competition. One purpose of regulation may be to promote 
and maintain conditions for effective competition:
liberalisation may alter the kind of regulation that is 
needed, not the need for regulation.
Regulators may be concerned with the way in which a 
market is organised. This is known as structura I 
regulation. Regulators may also be concerned with the 
behaviour within the given market, dealing in a such a 
case with conduct regulation.
It is significant and curious that there has 
seemingly been so little regulatory response to Black 
Monday on 19 October 1967.2=
Finally, "some USA economic theorists have argued
"-"-'■I- ' ' --"3".3:,. '■
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that Regulation is a. means whereby powerful coordinated 
interest groups often (perhaps usually) the main 
establishment companies in the industry can transfer
wealth from the less well co-ordinated, usually
consumers, to t h e m s e l v e s . "26
Deregulation
The term "deregulation" too carries different 
meanings, depending on the particular kind of regulation 
it concerns. The amb iguity of deregulation has been
emphasised by Y. G u d o n . 2 2  Deregulation has been a key 
element of both Thatcherism in the UK and Reagonomics in 
the USA,
In Europe in the 1980s and 1990s as in the USA in 
the 1960s and 1970s, traditional structures of regulation 
and control have been in the 1980s and 1990s breaking 
down under the pressure of powerful ideological,
technological, economic and even pragmatic forces, and
are being dismantled or considerably, if not radically 
transformed. This is often referred to as "deregulation", 
but this is a misleading term, because as often as not 
new and more explicit and also subtle regulatory 
structures are simultaneously generated and applied in 
place of what went before under the label of regulation.
The term "deregulation" is also used to indicate or 
qualify the "Big Bang" of 1986 in the City of London, as 
the provocative beginning of a gradual deregulation of 
the securities market in the 1980s, Therewith the United 
Kingdom has become the centre of an international process 
of regulatory reform. Older, informal as well as formal 
structures had started breaking down under the pressure 
of strong economic, technological, ideological and cross- 
border or transnational forces, and were being officially 
dismantled. This process is qualified as being one of 
"deregulation".
Deregulation may also mean, however, less
____________ ________
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restrictive or rigid regulation. Thus, the rationale for 
public intervention has seldom been challenged in the 
increasingly important area of "social regulation" with
environment, health, safety, consumer protection as
examples. Thereby the important issue has not been so 
much deregulation as the challenge of achieving the 
relevant regulatory objectives by less burdensome methods 
of governmental intervention or participât i o n . T h u s ,  
neither in the USA nor in Europe has deregulation been a 
pure process for ending all regulation. In Europe,
particularly in the UK, privatisation of natural
monopolies as a process of deregulation has been followed 
by price regulation. "History might not judge Margaret 
Thatcher as having effected substantial deregulation of 
the British economy. Her major conservative
accomplishment has been in the fields of privatisation 
and increasing inequality rather than deregulation. There 
is a tendency to confuse privatisation and deregulation 
as the same issue when indeed privatisation is often 
accompanied by an increase of regulation.
The absence of a. significant body of theoretical and 
empirical literature on regulation explains a certain 
confusion about the mean ing of deregulation in the 
European context, and its relationship to other measures 
of liberalisation or to privatisation. In Europe, as in 
the USA, the dismantling of traditional structures of 
regulation and control and their replacement with new 
patterns is misleadingly qualified as "deregulation". 
Such a statement would be justified if the market
concerned as "deregulated" were free of or not affected
by any regulatory measures or rules. On the contrary, the 
market has never been as regulated and monitored. In 
reality it has been a matter of choice as to the method 
or regulation intended to replace a centralised
administrative system with one which is decentralised but
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is administrative and professional. The deregulation is 
characterised by the presence of systems of specialised 
control fulfilling a function of establishing standards 
for the market operators governed by their own authority 
and subject to their own authority.
The phenomenon of "deregulation" includes a 
substantial paradox concerning economic policy with 
respect to which "deregulation" does not result, as 
already pointed out above, in the total liberation of the 
market from any regulatory standards, but has to do
rather with a transformation in the modality of defining 
the market structure and control of the markets. This is 
effected by resort to a series of innovations providing 
for the direct or indirect involvement of financial 
operators through the activities of professional
organisations, for example, self-regulating bodies and
recognised professional bodies. These may invoke
professional authority, for example, the Conseil des
Bourses des Valeurs in France, and sometimes may involve 
the financial operators themselves, for instance with
respect to the code of internal procedure which the
French associations of intermediaries are called upon to 
draft.3 0 "Even the United States, after 8 years of an 
administration with a stronger idealogical commitment to 
deregulation than any in the history of the western world 
(the only competitor for this title being the Thatcher 
government) has hardly the balance away from state
reguI at i o n . ^
It is difficult to conclude that the Regan
presidency was an area of deregulation.
Re-Re g u 1 at 1 on
Re-regulation generally means the promulgation of a 
new set of rules.
Re-regulation may be better understood as a
necessary effort to make the deregulated markets function
_____
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competitively. This means that there is in practice no 
total deregulation, but rather a comb inat ion of 
deregulation and re-regulation. The apparent paradoxical 
comb i nat ion of deregulation and re-regulation, most 
clearly evident in the financial services industry, is 
what actually amounts to a regulatory r e f o r m , the
same time it should be remembered that a regulatory 
reform does not need, in the best interest of the markets 
and those involved in them, a reform effected with a 
single stroke: it may best emerge through some
evolutionary process in which deregulation and 
re-regulation may have important functions to fulfill. 
Deregulation should really be called re-regulation since 
it is not the scrapping of regulations which is at issue, 
but the replacement of one set of regulations with
another (albeit more liberal) code,
Co-Regu1 at 1 on
Co-regulation stands for a form of regulation based 
on international bilateral or multilateral agreements 
concluded between respective governmental authorities in 
charge of the control of financial services markets. 
Competition at a global or internati o n a 1 level is not 
capable of developing and emerge solely with the 
abolition of internal state regulations. For promoting 
the dimension of compatibility of international 
competition and render it keener through the proper 
functioning and evolution of the international financial 
system, it is indispensable to set up new forms of
internal cooperation. Co-regulation has been defined (in
our translation) as "the complex interp1 ay/interaction of 
bilateral or multilateral agreements between national 
authorities entrusted with the supervision of various 
market operations in various countries."3= (’M e  jeu 
complexe d ’accords bilatéraux ou multilatéraux entre les 
autorités chargees de surveiller la marche des marches
_________________ m m
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divers dans les pays différents")
New ReguI at ion , .
The challenge of "deregulation" in the USA meant for
Europe adopting legislative, administrative and '
regulatory measures inspired from the American model
consisting in its essence of the three-tiers approach.
This development seems to offer the most suitable 
instruments for regulating the activities of financial 
markets across frontiers and continents.
It offers for European Stock markets, as indicated 
above, the best possibilities to compete with the
standards of efficiency in the USA,
The result of all the theoretical as well as applied 
developments has been that distinctions have been blurred 
between governmental (centralised) regulation, on the one 
hand, and self-regulation on the other, as well as 
between statutory and non-statutory regulation.
The New Regulation will inevitably be a sort of 
symbiosis between state regulation and se If-regulation. 
It should remember, however, that "policies that secure 
the advantages of an evolution of cooperation between
regulatory agencies and industry are policies that also 
run the risk of an evolution of capture and 
corruption",^ ^
In the chapters which follow below there will be 
direct or indirect reference to the way the regulation of 
the financial markets in France, Italy, and the United 
Kingdom is based on self regulation, central regulation 
or a combination of both approaches.
_________________________
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Professional Deontology as a 
Regulatory Element of Securities Markets 
The Regulatory Agencies
The deontology of the professions involved in 
financial services is a very important pillar in the 
system of the new regulation of the markets. The term 
deontology, first used by Bentham,' refers to all the 
duties which are borne by those active in a profession. 
In modern socio-economic systems, deontology is part of 
the basis on which the new application of competences 
between governmental administrative authorities and 
professional bodies is effected. Besides fulfilling a 
normative function at the level of legal thinking, 
deontology has also a so to speak moralising impact.
Reference to a moralising effect, implied by the use 
of the term deontology, raises some questions, for 
example, how to strengthen the sense of professional 
honour among those active in the given profession; how to 
strengthen professional honour and integrity, loyalty and 
reliability.2 Or otherwise, is there an endeavour to 
achieve other unrevealed objectives? Whatever the answer 
to this last question may be, it is admitted that the 
maintenance of high professional moral standards is an 
objective in itself, a.nd a desirable or even necessary 
one as such, as hinted by a simple definition of the term 
deontology, or may be it is a means subordinated to the 
imperatives of achieving a different objective.
The answer to those and related questions is given 
by the way the reform of the financial markets in France 
has been envisaged, by using deontology as an instrument 
for restoring order in the financial markets to the 
extent of restoring faith among investors in relation to
«-.I
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the markets. Restoring trust among investors toward the 
market is indeed an essential objective in an environment 
in which substantial amounts of capital have to be 
attracted for new economic and commercial ventures, 
products, services and the reliability of the thereof 
effected transactions has to be secured. This may suggest 
that the purpose of deontology is consequently a purely 
economic one. Such an assumption may in no way be 
surprising; the reform of the financial services in 
France, as an example, has aimed at re-invigorating and 
strengthening the markets, and the ideological component 
in it, suggested by the term deontology, has been 
considered necessary for re-assuring investors within the 
overall framework of economic policies and objectives,
Deonto 1o gica1 standards differ from penal standards, 
because they are generated by an administrative authority 
of a professional nature, by an authority serving higher 
political and economic objectives. In addition,
deontology is destined to maintain an equilibrium between 
diverse categories of interests. The categories in 
question are represented internally within and between 
different professional groups and bodies. Deontology 
functions additionally as a factor of self-regulation in 
the financial sector through groups associated together 
on the basis of common interests relating to the
establishment of rules and standards affecting all of
them.
The system of implementing and operating standards 
of self-regulation depends on self-discipline as an 
.important element in the notion of deontology. Therefrom
the question may arise, whether the deontology of
financial activities and services is in its nature 
similar to that underlying standards applicable to other 
organised professions or whether it assumes a new 
significance specific to the financial sector. It is
r.: ________________________ ______________________
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submitted that deontology in the financial sector 
involves a significance specific to that sector, because 
it does not simply reflect the will of a professional 
category to Insure the interna 1 cohesion of its members 
within the category. It has had and may again rather have 
to meet the challenge of a crisis o f legitimacy and 
public confidence in financial services in times of 
changing and evolving economic structures related to 
financial markets. The deontology of the financial 
professions aims at harmonising relations between 
investors, on the one hand, and financial intermediaries 
on the other under a canopy of public authority. Maybe 
this is the most specific and original aspect of 
deontology in its relation to financial services.<
In substance, professional deontology in the 
financial sector has assumed a new profile by overcoming 
classical patterns of corporate thinking and by assuming 
for its development new operational approaches with so to 
speak transverse dimensions. The association of different 
categories of interests, in financial markets, in the 
form of professional bodies and organisations, confirms 
in fact the view that deontology fulfils a series of 
functions extending well beyond that of merely organising 
all those concerned into one single professional body. 
Such a body pursues the purpose of acting as an 
instrument of "open" regulation keen to coordinate 
internally interests which may initially be conflicting 
in nature. In contrast, rules of Cdeonto1o g i c a 1) conduct 
do not have a point of reference, or a defined character 
of operators, but rather segments of profess iona1
activity to be regulated by affecting, so to speak 
diagonally or transversally, different exigencies and 
objectives.
Hannouin is of the opinion that the deontology of 
financial services constitutes one of the elements of the
recently expounded neo-corporate model.° The neo- 
corporate approach points to a system of representing 
group interests within organisations charged with the 
responsibility of securing reconciliation between given 
group interests under the aegis of quasi-administrative 
institutions.* With the application of the neo-corporate 
approach the proliferation of bodies qualified as 
commissions, councils or committees is in fact confirmed, 
as they aim at regulating a given sector of activity by 
associating together various categories of given 
interests, such as the COB and the Conseil des Bourses de 
Valeurs in France. These bodies, considered to be 
independent administrative authorities ( IAA)(French: 
autorité administrative indépendante (AAI)> provide for 
the maintenance of a specific or particular relationship 
between the state and the public. As a model of 
coordinated economic system that of neo-corporatism seems 
to set up a new model of decentralisation ; the model of 
an "auto-regulated" or "self-regulated economy"? aiming 
at achieving an optimal economic system reconciling the 
logic of two systems, namely, that of a (free) market and 
that of a public service. This can be achieved by
applying standards of self-regulation and self-discipline 
in the sector of financial services.
Self-regulation within the ambit of deontology does 
not mean that therewith the market will find as if an 
invisible hand is effecting a level of spontaneous
equilibrium. The application of a deontology acts as an 
agent for bringing the state and the public or the 
society at large nearer to one another.
The first sign of deontology as to its specific
originality is its value as an educational and normative
factor affecting and conditioning in a positive sense 
attitudes and professional standards of conduct. In the 
light of a theory of emerging law, deontology may be
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defined as a de facto authority possibly involving 
compulsory or peremptory rules which may in form include, 
whenever necessary, the imposition of severe sanctions. 
Paradoxically, it cannot be submitted that deontology 
carries with it the type of authority which law does; it 
belongs to the sphere of infra-judicial concepts.”
Deontology definitely addresses itself to members of 
the professional group concerned, but its range of 
validity stretches beyond the sphere of such a group, 
because its roots reach deeper than those of professional 
ethics, it is more comprehensive and more complex.
in relations between financial intermediaries and 
their clients deontology can assume various forms. The 
intermediary as operator will be subject to a certain 
number of specific duties in accordance with an 
administrative or management contract as a regulated 
professional act. Self-regulation and deontology do not 
mean that the market is definitively governed by the
forces of total freedom. The market functions rather in a 
new environment in which a new normative dimension 
emerges. In it a closer relationship between the 
individual and the legal rules or rules adopted by the 
authority in charge of the financial markets exist. 
Decentralised self-regulation, involving deontology, 
aspires to render the organisation of the financial 
markets more efficient. This may involve a form of 
administrative and professional dirigisme motivated by an 
essential purpose: to secure the trust and confidence of
investors as an essential condition for the satisfactory 
development of financial activities.
The new state of affairs finds its inspiration and 
justification in a desire shared by the quasi-totality of 
operators of the market: to avoid and avert a
centralised, governmental statutory regulation considered 
to be inadequate for the market, to be stifling and
■
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exposed to the need of fast overhauling in the wake of 
fast transformations and changes on the markets. In such 
a context, if statutory or governmental regulation should 
limit itself to the adoption of general guiding 
principles to be applied, the self-disciplinary 
regulation is then called upon to formulate for the 
profession deontological rules recognised and accepted by 
the profession.
It does not appear that standards of professional 
deontology can be assimilated to self-regulation and as 
such be clearly contrasted with statutory regulation;* it 
is undeniable that the notion of deontology is wider and
cannot be reduced to the concept of self-discipline;
equally, It cannot be doubted that standards concerning 
professional conduct may be found in internal sources as 
well as in legal provisions. In this respect reference 
may be made, as an example, to the law reforming the 
French stock markets ; it contains provisions relating to 
deontological matters.
Deontological self-regulation is based on the 
existence of regulatory agencies and independent
administrative authorities (lAAs). It may even be said 
that both terms, deontological self-regulation and lAA
condition or imply each other. For this reason and with 
their logical interdependence in mind, some attention 
will be focused below on the regulatory agencies.
The term "regulatory a g e n c y " , a p p l i e d  to the
situation in the USA, refers to a type of federal
regulatory organ which has no equivalence in civil I aw 
and the English legal systems. In the USA such a body is 
called upon to supervise a particular economic sector.
For such a purpose it has at its disposal a vast series 
of powers of diverse nature ; it can issue regulatory 
standards, insure their implementation and application
and deal with thereto relative controversies. In the USA,
4 6
perhaps owing to a lack of historical tradition for
centralised bureaucratic administration, the system
relies, when settling administrative policies, less upon 
the judgement of highly trained "professional" civil 
servants than on the use of adversarial court-type 
procedures.
The first USA regulatory agency was the Interstate 
Commerce Commission created in 1867 by the USA Congress 
to control railroad rates, with powers to stabilise
tariffs, grant concessions etc, thus securing the 
implementation of the relevant directive decisions of the 
Congress. In 1914 the Federal Trade Commission was
created and in 1934 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). In 1940 it was observed that operating 
as private-ownership associations,, exchanges had always 
administered their affairs in much the same manner as 
private clubs. For a business so vested with the public 
interest, this traditional method had become archaic. ^ '■ 
By the 1960s government regulation of "prices" or 
"entry" was commonplace in the transportation,
communications and utility industries. Federal or state 
regulatory bodies exercised control over trucking,
airlines, telephone services, radio, television and
natural gas. The federal government regulated the safety 
of products or production methods in the transportation, 
food, and drug industries as well as in the sphere of 
banking and issuing securities for protecting depositors 
and investors. In the 1960s and ’70s, the scope of
regulatory activities had expanded still further. The 
federal government had begun to regulate oil prices, to 
impose controls on environmental pollution, and to 
regulate the safety of the wo r kpI a c e , on the highways, 
and of consumer products. It then also increased 
regulatory efforts to protect investors, including 
pensions holders and commodities traders.
49
From what has been outlined above it is evident that 
regulatory agencies can be part of a quite vast category 
of administrative agencies. Some describe regulatory
agencies as acting like "little courts" and "little
legislatures". Maybe a regulatory agency could be 
considered to be lying in the middle of the distance 
between nationalisation and complete laissez-faire. In 
Europe, as noteworthy, popular acceptance of the market 
ideology is a relatively more recent phenomenon.
For most of the period between the great deflation 
of 1873-96 and World War II (1939-1945), large segments 
of political opinion were openly hostile to the market 
economy and sceptical about the capacity of the then 
existing system to survive recurrent crises. Hence, in 
industrial sector after industrial sector the response of 
most European governments to perceived cases of market 
failure was not regulation but nationalisation, 
industrial reor gan i sat i on and p 1ann ing, and other forms 
of corporate intervention. Moreover, even when regulatory 
instruments like price controls, standard-setting or
licensing were used, there has been a general reluctance
to rely on specialised, single-purpose agencies. Instead, 
regulatory functions have been assigned to traditional 
ministries or inter-ministerial committees. The absence 
of independent regulation, the preponderance of informal 
procedures for rule-making and the diffuseness of various 
corporatist arrangements of se If-regulation have all been 
factors that can help to explain the low profile of 
regulatory policy-making in Europe.
Gower has emphasised that "Since joining the 
[European] Communities [the UK] is no longer free to 
maintain or institute regulatory systems without regard 
to the Directives and Regulations of the [EU] Council [of 
Ministers]. Any system of regulation which [the UK] 
maintainCs] or introduces must be harmonised with that of
:Mx
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[the other member states] in the Community. To comply 
with EEC Directives and Regulations some increase in 
statutory, as opposed to non-statutory, regulation, seems 
inevitable in the long term."  ^^  It may be wandered 
whether some of the critique aimed by the financial 
market participants at the statutory regulation of the 
financial services by the corresponding act of 1986 can 
be better understood and explained in the light of the 
relevant remarks of Gower. On the other hand, it has been 
remarked that experiences with self-regulation In the UK 
have not been encouraging and that there has been 
sufficient ground for doubt in the UK experience to make 
one wary of enthusiasm for self-regulation.’  ^ Whatever 
the objective view may be, there has in the last years 
(1990s) been a tendency to encourage the creation of new 
self-regulatory agencies, such as the Panel, C S I , the 
Insurance Brokers Registration Council, and to assign 
(se If-)regulatory tasks to them, either wholly or partly, 
either by statute or by persuasion. With respect to new 
statutory self-regulatory agencies, the statutes have 
provided for a measure of governmental control and 
supervision, for example, through the appointment of 
members of the agencies and approval of agency rules. 
This development has blurred distinctions between 
governmental regulation and self-regulation, and between 
statutory and non-statutory regulation.’”
Thus the roots of regulatory agencies are to be 
found in the notion of centralised state control, with 
due regard to respective legal cultures in civil law 
countries and traditions of self-regulation typically 
identifiable in common law culture in the UK. Regulatory 
agencies in substance promote that which Gower has 
favoured: "The ideal would be to weld self-regulation and
governmental regulation into a coherent statutory 
framework which would cover the whole field that needs to
 :
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tae regulated and in which each part would fit
harmoniously t o g e t h e r . T h e  practice and experience of 
regulatory agencies in civil law systems as in France and 
Italy are promoting the adoption and application of self- 
regulatory approaches as elements typical of common law 
tradition, while in the UK with its common law 
environment resort is being made to elements of
governmental regulation as a typical tool of civil law 
trad i t ion.
In conclusion it can be said that the COB in France, 
CONSOB in Italy and SIB in the UK as regulatory agencies 
are the products of a synthesis between self-regulation 
traditionally predominant in common law environment, on 
the one side, and centralised control typical of civil 
law systems on the other. This process of rapprochement 
as a means of integration has not least been promoted by 
the benefits of experience in the USA where the specific 
political and federal structure has favoured the
integration of standards of common as well as civil law.
In Italy, the "ammin istrazioni indipendenti", 
administrative bodies exclusively governed by statutory 
standards, are bodies not closely studied while being 
part of the legal system. The very well known example 
thereof is the CONSOB CCommissione Nazionale per le 
Societa e la Borsa) (Nationa1 Commi ssion for Compan i es 
and the Stock M a rket) These bodies, atypical but 
generally permanent, are marked not so much by a 
responsibility to pursue public interests of
administrative nature as, somewhat similar to a judicial 
function, to protect the interests of citizens, 
particularly in situations of confrontation with 
particularly strong and influential economic entities. In 
fulfilling such a function, the organs entrusted with it 
are assumed to have a high standing as to impartiality and
Ta _____________
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objectivity comparable to that of a judicial authority. 
This comparison is verifiable in the light of the fact 
that these agencies are not governed by a system of 
exclusive hierarchy. They are subject solely to the 
law,’? Their existence as a model lends itself to their 
multiplication in other sectors such as that of the 
housing market, data protection, sanctity of the sphere 
of privacy of citizens etc. In the research literature on 
the topic, "independent" administrative agencies are 
treated by some as "atypical administrative" bodies,,’” 
while others try to subsume them under the general 
heading of standard administrative functions.’?
In France the novelty and particularly of
independent administrative agencies is shown by decisions 
of the Conseil d ’Etat, which while being part of the
executive arm of state authority has but quite a tenuous
link with the government hierarchy. Their independent 
status is not affected by the way they are financed or 
are related to judicial organs.
The freedom of action of independent administrative 
agencies has been underlined also by a French author.
He considers them as bodies expressing a polycentrism 
which is replacing the old unitary approach to
administrative organisation. They assume a public 
character by the fact that (in our translation) "they 
concern public liberties the protection of which can be 
assured but by the state, but which have at the same time 
to be defended against intrusions by the executive power; 
their statutory independence is intended to enable them 
to do justice to this challenging equilibrium".^^ "The 
administrative authority of an independent agency is 
definitively dependent on the personal credibility of
those to whom their tasks are codified", as stated by the 
Conseil d ’Etat. The selection of the appropriate persons 
for office weighs as much as the quality of structures
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and legal formulations. ’^” The attribution of ample powers 
to administrative agencies may be comparable with those 
exercised by judicial authorities, in that we have to do 
with a sphere which is normally allocated to judges but 
is entrusted to an agency of public administration. This 
particular aspect of state administration generates 
questions. The independent agencies in question, with 
highly professional and specialised officials, substitute 
themselves in a way for so to speak legislative inertia 
and may generate the risk of setting up special legal 
s tandards, This and other points are, with particular 
reference to independent administrative agencies as a 
burning question, are abundantly discussed in the 
relevant research literature, in which the limits and the 
dangers related to such agencies which while on the one 
hand are not quite part of the executive arm of 
government are also partly not caught by the control of 
par I lament.24
Developments, particularly in France as a civil law 
country, evidently show that the law regulating the 
financial markets is now dependent for its effectiveness 
on the functions of a plurality of agencies which 
together with the legislator provide the organisational 
structure of the markets and have at their disposal means 
for protecting the i n v e s t o r s . I n  the way the law in 
question manifests itself se If-régulât ion also is a 
market regulatory factor to which state authorities 
entrust a role of increasing relevance for guaranteeing 
adequate standards of efficiency and reliability on the 
financial markets. Se If-regulation is, however,
"controlled" in the sense that it is not generated by a 
spontaneous initiative of the markets operators 
themselves, but is deployed by them within a framework 
laid down by the state be it with respect to self- 
regulatory powers or se If-regulatory supervision or
_________
5 4
disciplinary competences. Thus, in the financial markets 
too self-regulation confirms its vocation as a complex 
phenomenon including judicial attributes which do not, 
however, make redundant ethical dimensions.
The implication of a self-regulatory system in 
financial markets points to the existence of problems of 
varying nature dependent on the characteristics of 
national legal systems and tradition. It is evident that 
a most significative aspect and limits of self-regulation 
concern the protection of investors and rules of conduct 
in relation to third parties, that is, clients who 
conclude contracts of investment with financial 
operators. Problems emerge particularly with forms of 
se 1f-regulation in a strict sense there where legal or 
administrative standards may not exist in the form of an 
internal code of procedure, for example, by a firm of 
French intermediaries.
A survey of self-regulatory experience shows that it 
has its part to contribute, but without an exaggerated 
emphasis on it. Developments in France show that 
protection guarantee mechanisms applicable to the 
activities of intermediaries can be made more efficient 
by means of a coordinated intervention by the legislator 
and forces operative in the m a r k e t s . S e l f - r e g u l a t i o n  
can generate within the markets a new area of creating 
binding standards which may be closer to the individual 
than legal and administrative standards would be. In such 
a sense, it has a potential to contribute, where central 
legislative effectiveness may be eroded, to the 
development of an authentic process.of legislative legal 
plural ism.2?
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The Stock Exchange Commission ; La Commission des 
Operations de Bourse (COB)
The EEC in the1T Establishment and Development_______________________
USA as a mode I
In 1967 the French government under President Ch, de 
Gaulle proceeded to create the COB for promoting the 
trust of Investors in the securities markets for the
purpose of attracting investment capital for the French
economy.’ Inspired by the SEC in the USA as a model,? the 
COB was initially a control agency of the stock markets, 
without any financial autonomy. Currently, the COB 
supervises all types of financial products. It can in
other words be said that the COB controls, with a few 
exceptions, the totality of the financial markets and 
protects ail forms of investment.”
Since its birth, the COB has seen, as an independent 
administrative authority (lAA), its powers grow 
enormously. Favard observes that the COB has benefited 
from all the ensuing reforms for expanding its powers, 
The expansion in question has been justified with 
reference to the necessity of market reforms, the 
européanisation and internationalisation of the financial 
markets in France. As a result in 1991 the Paris stock
exchange ranges as the fourth in the world after New 
York, Tokyo and London.” After having been one of the 
most centrally regulated markets of the world, it has 
undergone profound changes in the wake of five years of 
reforms and development between 1984 and 1989. This has 
involved a fast process of deregulation to whicfî various 
measures of privatisation and the abolition of most 
measures of exchange controls have contributed. To them 
should be added the revival of the entrepreneurial spirit
______________
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of the French financial establishment.'’
Among major initiatives to activate and develop the 
financial markets has been that of opening the futures 
market (marche a terme) (MATIF) in February 1866,
considered in 1989? the "third In importance in the world 
after the Chicago Board of Trade and the Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange, having overhauled the corresponding 
LIFFE in London.”” In July 1989 the French stock market 
abolished commission charges applied to small
transactions, with results similar to those reported 
after the 1975 Mayday in the USA and the 1986 Big Bang in 
the UK. The results concerned (i) lower commission 
charges for institutional investors ; (ii) elimination of 
the smallest and vulnerable firms in the wake of lower 
competitive commission charges; and (iii) no reduction or 
higher commission charges for private investors.
In the wake of consolidation measures, on January 
1st 1991 a I 1 regional exchanges were closed and a 1 1 
transactions were concentrated in the Paris stock 
exchange. The regional stock exchanges did not have more 
than three per cent of the volume of transactions 
effected at the Paris stock exchange.? For the 
representation of regional Interests, Regional
delegations were formed within the COB and 22 delegates 
were nominated.’”
With further measures on August 2, 1989, the
assimilation process of the COB with the SEC in the USA 
could be considered as complete, in the sense that the 
powers of the GOB become more similar to that of the SEC, 
with due reference to a few exceptions,’’ A particular 
point of difference was the fact that whereas the SEC was 
under an obligation to refer a case to the US Department 
of Justice, the COB v;as given a margin of discretion to 
refer or not refer to the French Ministry of Justice, 
Further differences between the two institutions
 : '  '
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concerned the exercise of disciplinary and administrative 
competences : the SEC may threaten members of the
relevant professions, natural or legal persons with
disciplinary sanctions like censure, suspension or
withdrawal of licence; in France, in contrast,
disciplinary measures are exclusively applied by the
professional bodies, that Is, le Conseil des Bourses de 
Valeur, Conseil du Marche a Terme, Conseil do Discipline 
des OPCVM; the COB may request solely a second (review) 
decision. Lastly, while the SEC is not empowered to 
impose administrative sanctions but may effect penal 
proceedings, the COB is empowered to impose 
administrative sanctions but has no powers to initiate 
penal proceedings. In conclusion, the relatively recent
reforms affecting the COB have acted as a noteworthy 
impulse for bringing the COB to the normative standards 
of the SEC, with due reference of course to unchanged and 
maintained aspects typical of French legal tradition, for 
example, the exercise of disciplinary competences by 
professional bodies.
2, Legal Nature of the COB
It has been said that the COB, inspired in its 
creation by the SEC, has introduced in the French 
financial markets system "an element of Anglo-Saxon 
exotism".’2 Therewith is meant a new form of 
administration which can be defined as an agency of 
control and protection. Yves Le Portz has as President-of 
the COB said it is "an autonomous public institution",’” 
while D u c o u l o u x - F a v a r d ’ 4 notes that we have to do with an 
"administration de mission", that is, an agency of public 
control endowed with a certain autonomy in relation to 
the state and with an uncomplicated structure for 
avoiding bureaucratisation while being able to exercise a 
rigorous control with speedy intervention methods. The 
COB itself is defined as an "independent public
_____________________
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regulatory authority" (authorite publique de regulation 
indépendante").’” It may also be said that the COB is a 
body with sources in the executive p o w e r . However, the 
constitutive law of 1967 is silent on the legal nature of 
the COB.’? Decree No. 60-23 of January 3, 1968 on the
administrative and financial structure of the COD limits
itself to a definition of the COB as a specialised agency
of public nature, the finances of which are borne by the
state.
In 1980 Nicole Decoopman’” referred to the COB as a
public body with no legal personality but acting as a
state agency, that is, a simple administrative entity 
acting on behalf of the state but not on its own behalf. 
Some authors assert’? that legal personality has in fact 
been implicitly given to the COB. In spite of the 
considerable expansion of the C G B ’s institutional and 
financial autonomy, legislation on August 2, 1989, does
not acknowledge the COB as a body endowed with legal 
personality, in contrast to the Conseil des Bourses de 
Valeurs (Stock Exchange Council) to which explicit legal 
personality has been granted. It should be noted that the 
conferment of legal personality is considered to be a 
valuable tool for ascertaining criteria of
independence.?” A ! pa argues that the riddle of the legal 
personality of the COB has been resolved with the 
promulgation of, Law No. 84-16 of January 11, 1984 on
functions and • competences under public law.?’ It 
regulates the "specialised administrative agencies". (See 
Art, 3, para. 3,) He concludes that the COB is a body
governed by public law (Commercial Tribunal of Paris,
1987, somm. coram, 305). Tunc
no legal personality has been 
it has obtained its financial 
of 1989.2? It may however be
July 28, 1986, in D
submits that even if 
conceded to the COB, 
autonomy under the law
countered that acceptance of an "administration de
_-r:: _ . ___________________
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mission" is not tantamount to the (legal) personification 
of the given agency. As has been underlined, the absence 
of legal personality bars the COB from becoming a direct 
interlocutor in international agreements,?”
Gavalda is of the opinion that the legal nature of 
the COB as an Autorité Administrative Independents (AAI) 
has not been modified even if it has been endowed with 
new competences. It continues to be a hybrid belonging to 
the category of AAI. It has not yet been given legal 
personality and hence it has a sort of jurisdiction. The 
attribution of legal personality supplemented with the
attribution of the right to act as a party under civil
law would have excluded the capacity to apply sanctions. 
This capacity constituted in reality, in spite of other 
circumstances, the fundamental purpose of the reform of 
1989.24
With Art. 10 of the Law of August 2, 1989, the
legislator had considered it opportune to extend to the 
President of the COB the right to have locus standi under 
civil law, "deposer des conclusions, intervenir ou 
exercer des droits reserves a la partis civile en ce qui 
concerne, d ’une part, les infractions au titre II de la 
loi No. 66-537 du 24 juillet 1988 sur 1 es sociétés 
commerciales, d ’autre part, les infractions prévues par 
les articles 10, 10-1 et 10-3," Such a capacity to act
would have amounted to a most noteworthy amplification of 
the possibilities of the COB to intervene before judicial 
authorities, but the Conseil Constitutionnel
(constitutional court) with Decision No. 09-260 DC of 
July 28, 1989, (JO August 1989) declared Art, 10 of the
Law of August 2, 1989 to be unconstitutional by being
incompatible or in conflict with the autonomous
sanctioning powers given to the COB by the same Law. The 
right to sue under civil 1 aw has in fact been recognised 
for consumer associations. These may statutorily
undertake the defence of investors.?” It may in 
conclusion be said that the COB as the "watchdog of the 
stock exchange" has been transformed into a "judicial 
authority" or "judge" after having again put on the 
mantle of the "legislator"?*
3. Composition and Financial Autonomy
What follows below is a bare outline. It serves the 
purpose of linking C O B ’s structure and financial autonomy 
to the questions of Ci) its independence from political 
influence and (ii) its functions as an objective, 
autonomous authority called upon to supervise the markets 
not least in the interest of investor structure.
Compos i t ion
The president of the COB serves in office for six 
years while the eight other members hold office for four 
years. Re-election is excluded for the president; the 
other members may be re-elected for a second term. All 
mandates to hold office may be interrupted upon reaching 
the retirement age.
The reform in 1989 has notably increased the number 
of members from five to nine and modified the composition 
and modality of appointment of members. The composition 
of the COB has become more stable by increasing the term 
of office of the president from four to six years.
The president is appointed by decree of the Council 
of ministers. Of the eight other members six are directly 
designated by the bodies to which they belong; the 
remaining two members are co-opted by the six other 
members "on the basis of their competence and experience 
in the sphere of savings business," (in our 
translation)?? Gavalda is of the opinion that for the 
appointment of the two of the COB members with reference 
to their competence and experience, their selection by 
the other members is a "master key" formula which does no
 : :   _
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harm to anybody but it confers a discretionary power on 
the other members, as a solution which is not ideal but
better than appointment by the ministry of finance.?”
With respect to the president the principles of
incompatibility provided for public office apply, but 
nothing similar is provided for the position of the C O B ’s 
other members.
The exercise of direct sanctioning powers lies
within the collegiate competence of the COB, but indirect 
sanctioning power lies within the ambit of autonomous
authority of the president. Gavalda underlines?? that
while the President has at his disposal the exercise of
powers delegated to him, the collegiate body has as a 
whole stronger powers. As to C O B ’s autonomy, it is in the 
first place derived from a security of office of COB’s 
members and C G B ’s financial independence.
Before 1989 some members of the COB were selected 
from the sector of the stock exchange and financial 
affairs. Currently not more than half of the eight
members of the COB may belong to the world of the stock 
exchange and finances. Members of the COB include a
strong participation from the sphere of administration; a 
councillor of state and a councillor of the Court of
Auditors participate in it, making the administrative arm 
of government strongly represented. At the level of
professional representation, a member comes from the
Conseil des Bourses de Valeur (CSV) (Council of the Stock 
Exchange) and another from the Futures market (marche a 
terme). There is also a representative of the Bank of
France. No provisions have been made for the
representation of investors.”” Tunc”’ observes that among 
CO B ’s eight members half of them are from the judicial 
establishment or are representatives of the Bank of
France, as a guarantee for the protection of general 
interests, and the other half of the members come from
 ! : : : :_______________________
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the sphere of the stock exchange and financial affairs, 
as representatives of another type of experience and 
awareness. Only one woman has been included on the board 
of the COB,”? but she has not been re-elected.
It should be noted that the reforming law of 1989 
has weakened the link between the COB and the executive 
arm of the government, as while the CO B ’s president is 
directly appointed by the Council of Ministers, six of 
the members are elected directly by professional bodies, 
which was not the case prior to the reform. The
composition of the COB after the 1989 reform is 
considered”” to be a guarantee for its independence and 
professional qualities. However, the question remains 
whether a member of the COB could be relieved of his
function. Leading authors”* are of the opinion that the 
mandate of a member is irrevocable. In reality until now 
no member has been removed from office. Other authors”” 
think that on the contrary the members of the COB can be 
removed from office ad nuturn. Within the COB it is 
maintained that the President cannot be relieved of his 
functions,”*
Financial autonomy
The financial autonomy of the COB is the best 
evidence in support of its independence from the
executive arm of the state, a fact which did not exist
prior to 1985 when the COB did not enjoy any financial 
autonomy.”? Successively C O B ’s right to cash fees related 
to activities subject to its control has been recognised, 
linking COB’s finances to the development of the 
markets,”® In 1992, the operational budget of the COB 
increased to FF 123,61m,”? and to 131,8m. in 1993*® while 
income decreased to 7m. Currently the COB is subject to a 
control a posteriori of the (state) Court of Auditors.
On December 31, 1986, the COB had 105 agents*’
'WT'
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rising to 232 at the end of December 1992*? and 
decreasing to 226 at the end of December 1993.*” In 
comparative terms, in 1992 the SEC had 2,835 persons as 
members of its staff, with a budget totalling to 
approximately US $276m. or approximately L180m.**
4. Functions and Powers of the COB
What follows below, again in summary, is intended to 
outline the profile of the COB as an agency in charge of 
regulating and controlling the financial markets and,
ancillary thereto, to protect the interests of investors 
in their contracts with the market operators and
particularly with the intermediaries.
The practice of the COB involves (i) regulatory 
powers with a thereto related regulatory procedure; (ii) 
sanctioning powers involving injunctions and the
imposition of pecuniary penalties; and (iii) new powers 
relating to penal actions,
a .) The COB in practice
Initially the functions of the COB were limited to 
controlling information offered by market operators and 
consumed by the public on societies appealing for 
investment and offering stocks and shares, as well as in 
monitoring the proper functioning of the stock 
exchange,*” Therewith two fundamental spheres of 
functions were indicated :
—  control, a priori as well as a posteriori, of 
information publicised by companies appealing to the 
investing public ; and
~ general monitoring and supervision of the stock 
market.
The first extension in the powers of the COB was 
effected by the Decree No. 68-50 of January 3, 1968. It
abolished the Committee on the stock markets and 
transferred its competences to the COB.** The latter was 
also entrusted with the competence of supervising the
_____________________   ' I
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admission of ail listed stocks or the withdrawal of 
stocks from the market.
The first amendment of the Ordinance of 1967 was 
through Law No. 70-1283 of December 31, 1970. Its Art. 34
extended the supervisory powers of the COB to cover all 
companies capable of issuing shares and stocks. Arts. 5 
and 10 of the Ordinance were amended and Art. 12- 1 was
added.*? Thereafter with the Law No. 83-1 of January 3, 
1983, for the purpose of promoting investment and
protecting investors, the supervisory powers of the COB 
were enlarged to cover (in our translation) "investment 
in diverse assets". As to the attribution, to the COB, of 
penal powers, Art, 35 of the Law of 1983 (which
corresponded to Art. 10-1 of the 1967 Ordinance) was in 
turn amended by a law in 1992. After the passage of this 
1 a w , the powers which the COB could exercise were
regrouped then into four categories ;
1.) Regulatory powers
They were bound to the stock market and involved the 
capacity to approve the articles of association of a firm 
with exchange agents as partners. In this respect no 
sanctions were included for application,
2.) Powers "auxiliary" to judicial authority
Art. 4 of the Ordinance provided that the COB is 
empowered to receive from any interested party
complaints, petitions which by their nature fell within
the ambit of C O B ’s competences, and to deal duly with 
them. Art. 5', para. 3 of the Ordinance of 1967,
sanctioned by Art. 10 last para,, enshrined the power of
COB to mandate a witness to appear. This was and remains 
all the more remarkable in the light of the fact that in 
France solely judicial authorities dispose of such a 
competence and not even parliamentary enquiry commission 
can constrain a witness to appear,*®
3. ) Action of persuasion by the COB '
_________________________________________
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This still constitutes one of the most original 
traits of the COB. In the case of resistance, by Art, 3 
of the Ordinance of 1967 the COB Is empowered to bring to 
the public’s attention observations which the COB has
formulated (in the interest of the market and of
investors). Disciplinary action and penal measures were 
in this context still considered by the law of 1983 to be 
extreme remedies.
4.) Actions by the COB and appeals related thereto
Since the COB is a public agency not subject to any 
hierarchical authority and not endowed with legal
personality, its decisions cannot be the object ' of
administrative appeals, but they are open to judicial
review by administrative tribunals and the Conseil d ’Etat 
as the highest administrative judicial authority. Art, 
12-1*? already provided that the relevant judicial 
authority could be requested at any stage of judicial 
proceedings to deal with an act or opinion of the COB,
The Law No. 85-695 of July 11, 1985 defined and enlarged
the functions of the COB,”® A further important 
development for the COB took place when Law No, 83-1321 
of December 14', 1985 (compare Art, 4-1 of the Ordinance
of 1967), attributed amplified regulatory powers with 
respect to f inanoial markets governed by its authority; 
with respect to information supplied to investors; and 
with respect to "professional practice" related to public 
appeals for Investment and to portfolio management. The 
Law No. 88-70 of 22 January, 1988. by the range of its 
provisions, produced a "peaceful revolution" in four 
a r e a s :
1.) Exchange agents were replaced by stock exchange 
companies for the purpose of making the profession 
accessible to new intermediaries, particularly non-French 
intermediaries' ;
2.) The antiquated national firm of exchange agents was
____________ ____
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substituted by two organisations : the Council of the
stock exchange and the firm of French stock markets ;
3.) The competences of the COB were extended to cover 
future contracts with powers to enforce them ;
4.) The financial markets were so to speak "moralised" 
with the introduction of deontological norms and with the 
reinforcement of the "suppressive" system by
reformulating the nature and contents of infractions in
the sphere of the stock exchange.
Hence, the law of 1988 amplified the control powers 
of the COB beyond the stock market into all financial 
markets, including futures and commodities. Moreover,
consequent to the reform of 1988, the COB ceded its 
traditional power to prepare the admission of stocks to 
official listing or to ordain their withdrawal to the 
Council of stock markets; this competence of the Council 
may not be exercised in case of opposition by the COB. In 
substance, it can be said, the 1 aw of 1988 has renovated 
the institutional as well as moral architecture of
financial markets.
The moral impact of the reform of 1988 is less
visible in the words of the legislative text, but it is
no less important ; the affected professions were given a
set of deont□1o g ica1 standards. This should be underlined 
as to its importance, because a rigorous deontological 
system was installed, adapted to the new requirements of 
the reformed market.
On March 8, 1989, after less than a year subsequent
to the reform of 1988, under the impact of the Pechiney 
scandal,” ’ the National Assembly had to deal with the 
draft text of the Law No, 544. It was rapidly adopted 
without any opposition on 27 July, 1989 and became
binding law on August 2, 1989 (Journal Officiel, August
4, 1989, p. 9622). This new legislative text modified the
composition and the powers of the COB to such an extent
T-^vT:/TJ:T:?T'
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that experts have been speaking of a "new COB",”?
The two driving motives underlying the new law of 
reform of 1989 concern the reliability and transparency 
of the financial markets. Both aspects are Intimately 
interconnected because transparency can have but 
necessary repercussions on security on the markets. The 
1989 reform left the attributions of the COB 
substantially untouched as to information and control 
over information. It heightened notably its powers of 
vigilance as to the proper functioning of the financial 
markets by attributing to the COB a sanctioning power and 
by increasing its investigatory competences.
The attribution to the COB of direct and autonomous 
powers to issue injunctions and impose sanctions is one 
of the most significant aspects of the last reforms 
affecting the reorganisation and the strengthening of the 
powers of professional and disciplinary groups affecting 
the activities of intermediaries. Presently the functions 
of the COB are enshrined in Art. 1 of the Ordinance No. 
67-633 of September, 1967. as amended by the law of 
January 22, 1988, The given formulation in the
legislative text points to a triple function of vigilance 
or surveillance affecting ;
-- the protection of savings ;
-- information supplied to investors ;
-- the proper functioning of the financial markets. 
Bonavera points out”” that two major lines of"action 
can be distinguished for the purpose of protecting 
investors: on the one hand in connection with vigilance
to be applied to information supplied to investors; and 
on the other in connection with vigilance affecting the 
proper functioning of the financial markets, Indeed, it 
is these two directions that the activities of the COB 
are deployed.
Control by which the COB is exercised with respect
____________________________
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to information which listed companies have to supply to 
the public or to their respective shareholders. The 
regularity and contents of the published information are 
verified. In case of need, the publication of rectifying 
information by companies may be prescribed, to remedy 
inexactitudes or omissions in the published documents* 
The COB may in this respect taring to the public attention 
its own observations and ulterior points of 
information.”* In particularly serious cases, the COB may 
request the suspension of quotation of a listed stock,”” 
It should be added that the control by COB extends also 
to non compulsory information, to individual points of 
practice and conduct which may be denounced for 
endangering the security of investors’ interests. In this 
respect, particular mention deserve the following
stock exchange delictual acts: abuse of privileged
information or of illicit communication of a privileged 
information; delict of manipulation of quotations and the 
diffusion of false or erroneous information ;
-- acts incompatible with the rules of the COB ;
Infractions ; Ca) violating provisions of company 
law, for example, publication of false balance sheets; 
abuse of company assets; incorrect appeal to the 
investing public; Cb) violating standards governing the 
management of individual or .collective investment 
portfoli o .
5,) Power to issue Regulations and the Rescript
Procedure
The law of 1985 (with the introduction of Art, 4-1) 
has given to the COB real and proper regulatory powers 
which extend to almost all the financial sector.”* 
Therewith the COB is empowered to issue regulatory rules 
concerning the functioning of the markets subject to its 
control as well as concerning standards of professional 
practice, addressed to those who make offers to the
i-: ' '
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investing public. This category of persons, does not
include those who participate, as part of their
professional work, in the placement of investment offers 
or assure the individual or collective management of
portfolios (Art. ■ 4. 1, first para. Ordinance of 1967).
Additionally, subject to approval by the Stock Market
Council (Conseil des Bourses), the COB is authorised to 
adopt decisions on all questions of a general character 
touching the proper functioning of the stock market. The 
issued regulations are subject to approval by the
Ministry of Economy and Finance and are published in the 
Official Journal. If regulations in question concern a 
specific market, then their approval by the supervisory 
authority of that market is necessary. The regulations 
may be challenged by application to administrative
judicial authority. Their legality m a y b e  scrutinised by 
the highest administrative judicial authority, the
ConseII d ’Etat.
The COB can penalise conduct breaching its
regulations. In extension of its regulatory powers, It 
has set up a particular procedure which completes and
gives concrete expression to its powers: the rescript
procedure. Regulation 90.07 of July 5, 1990, provides
that the COB may be consulted with respect to the
interpretation of its regulations, by all who planning a 
transaction, wish to know in anticipation whether the
intended transaction is in conformity with CO B ’s rules.
For this purpose the COB has at its disposal the rescript
procedure.
This procedure, introduced by the already mentioned 
COB Regulation 90.07, confirmed on July 5, 1990 (See J.O.
of July 20, 1990), is inspired from Roman law. Rescripts
were then so to speak responses of the Roman emperor
which he put down as footnotes to the requests of all
those who referred to him a controversial case and wished
__________________________________
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of civil l a w . 5 7 The ratio of the French rescript is the 
same as that of Roman rescription, promoting legal 
certainty. In a way a rescript may also be compared with 
"rulings" in English and American legal tradition. They 
have been extensively used by the SEC in the USA, It 
should be however added that the scope of the French 
rescript is much a m p l e r , because C O B ’s interpretations 
of its regulations bind the COB and it later cannot 
penalise a transaction with sanctions or refer it to 
judicial authority. Thus, a COB rescript has preventive 
effects. It should be noted that COB’s rescript procedure 
is applicable to C O B ’s regulatory rules only: the COB
cannot indulge in the appreciation of the merits of 
statutory rules or standards adopted by other bodies, for 
example, by a disciplinary authority. Practice also shows 
that a request for a rescript may be submitted only by 
those who are a part of a proposed transaction; third
parties are excluded (Art. 3 of the 90-07 Regulation).
Specific standards guarantee confidentiality (Art. 4 of 
the 90-07 Regulation).
The COB has a maximum time limit of 30 days to 
respond to a rescript application, provided the
application is clear and complete as to.its contents,
otherwise the time limit may be suspended and the COB may
request clarification. If the COB finds itself not to be 
in a position to assess the real scope of the proposed 
transaction, or if it considers that the request for the 
rescript has not been submitted in good faith, it may 
decline to issue the rescript.
The new procedure differs profoundly from that of 
earlier informal consultations, already through the fact 
that the COB has to proceed formally in the case of a 
rescript, deal with it as a collegiate body in response 
to a (formal) request. If the proposed operation is
 : :_______________________________________________________________________
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transacted in conformity with COB’s standards and if the 
applicantCs) act in agreement with the rescript, the COB 
has no powers to prohibit the completion of the 
transaction or to forward a report to judicial 
authorities or to the relevant disciplinary body (Art. 
8). Thus, the rescript binds the COB too while binding 
the applicant on the other side. Art. 9 of the 90-07 
Regulation established that the rescript together with 
the formal request for it, is to be integrally published 
in the monthly Bulletin of the COB, as a sort of "binding 
practice" by the COB, so that inevitably future analogous 
cases can be treated equivalently without resort to a 
further specific rescript.
The Rescript procedure, by virtue of the ample 
drafting of CO B ’s regulations and of professional 
standards, involves a delicate point for the 
intermediaries as specific forms of coordination between 
the various sanctioning procedures do not exist. At a 
formal l e v e l , t h e  various stock market authorities are 
invested with various competences and the legislative 
reforms have not reliably provided for certain 
coordination at an institutional level. Conflicts may be 
the result between the roles of the various competent 
quarters,
The legislative reforms of 1988 and 1989 defined as 
mutually independent the disciplinary procedure related 
to the COB, on the one hand, and a corresponding 
procedure allocated to the disciplinary bodies dealing 
with the intermediaries, without dealing with matters of 
procedure related to penal rules. Therewith the rescript 
procedure raises delicate points to the extent that it 
binds only the COB without having any binding effects 
for the judicial authorities or disciplinary bodies, it 
may hence be asked as to what would happen if a given 
transaction is bindingly assessed by the COB in
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a c c o r d a n c e  with its own standards taut found to be
incompatible with professional, and even worse, with 
penal standards.
The initiation of an independent panel or
disciplinary procedure concerning persons in possession 
of a favourable rescript remains, in principle, always as 
something possible, even if the COB would seek to make 
use in such a situation of all its proper "morally 
persuasive" efforts and, above all, its links of
cooperation with judicial authorities and professional 
bodies. With respect to the latter the COB may request a 
second decision affecting disciplinary matters. In
substance, however, it would be improbable to initiate an 
independent penal procedure in the absence of any signal 
from the COB to the judicial authorities.&o Consequently, 
the coordination of the various existing procedures 
constitutes one of the most evident problems of the new 
system.
If the rescript procedure shows that a growing need 
for adequate direct relations exists between the 
regulatory bodies and the market operators, it can also 
be an important opportunity for the COB to clarify the 
extent of its own regulations, but it at the same time 
involves a renunciation on the part of the control bodies 
to elaborate precise rules. The adoption of a regulatory 
system using generally drafted standards may serve the 
purpose of flexibility, but it at the same time obliges 
the same authority to indulge in a process of continuous 
interpretation for orientating from case to case the 
conduct of the market operators- Nonetheless, the new
procedure definitely amounts to a novel and important 
development for giving concrete expression to the stock 
market reform in France, consolidating at the same time 
the role of the COB as one quite different from a less 
articulated "administrative mission" to which escperts
_______ _________
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used to refer in the not distant past.*^
The specific characteristic of the rescript consists 
in its ambivalence; it is at one and the same time an 
individual decision which binds the COB with reference to 
its sanctioning powers, and an act with general effect 
with which the COB interprets its own regulatory 
standards. The reconciliation of these two aspects Is a 
very delicate matter. The prudence manifested by the COB 
in drafting regulation No. 90.07 and its first and still 
unique rescript does not attenuate the point of legal 
certainty. This reflects up to now why there has been an 
absence of enthusiasm In support of the innovation.
6.) Sanctioning powers
i. Direct and indirect powers ; 
ii. Power to issue Injunctions, 
i. Direct and indirect powers
The sanctioning powers of the COB, enshrined in the 
Law of 1989, are limited to the control of the proper 
functioning of the markets, of information supplied to 
investors and of the protection of savings. The exercise 
of such powers presupposes always a breach of a 
regulation of the COB. They may be exercised directly or 
indirectly, necessitating the adoption of provisions on 
the part of the judicial authorities. Hence, the COB may 
opt for one of the two possibilities. On the basis of the 
principle that special rules derogate from general ones, 
with reference to Arts. 9-1 and 12-2&% it may be deduced 
that Art. 9-1 enables the COB to act under "direct" 
sanctioning powers and anything v/hich is not covered by 
the contents of this Article authorises the COB to apply 
to the judicial authorities to ascertain whether a 
certain professional conduct violates legislative or 
regulatory standards in such a way as to be detrimental 
to the rights of investors.
The COB may (a) issue Injunctions; (b) apply
__
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administrative sanctions; (c) submit reports to the
judicial authorities; and (d ) request addressed to
disciplinary bodies.
( a ) I n.iunct ions
The COB can order discontinuance of violations of
its rules when these may interfere with the functioning
of the market, or provide to those concerned unjustified 
advantages not available in a normally functioning
market, or interfere with the principle of equal access
to information and with the treatment of investors and of 
their interests; or may help obtain benefits accruing to 
issuers or to investors with intermediaries involved in 
conduct contrary to professional standards. If the 
injunct!on does not generate results, a sanct ioning 
procedure may be initiated,
Cb) Administrative sanctions
The COB may apply administrative sanctions to
infractions against its regulations, involving pecuniary 
sums not exceeding FF 10m, and if pecuniary benefits have 
been secured, up to ten times the amount of the benefit. 
The administrative measure is in proportion to the 
seriousness of the committed act and is related to the 
benefits and profits derived from it. The procedure 
provides for objections to CO B ’s measures and an appeal 
from a decision of the COB may be lodged with the Appeal 
Court in Paris. The Appeal Court in Paris has confirmed 
the regularity of the sanctioning administrative 
procedure established by Decret No. 90-263 of March 23, 
1990.63
(c ) Reques t addressed to a judicial authority
The President of the COB may turn to the President 
of the Grande I stanza Tribunal in Paris for stopping or 
eliminating law or regulatory violations when it could be 
a danger for the rights of investors.
The Tribunal can order cautelative measures or apply
it: -y.-'
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a pecuniary sanction.
The COB may turn to the Parquet in cases of penal 
infractions.
(d ) Request addressed to a disciplinary body 
The COB may turn to the Conseil des Bourses des 
Valeurs (Stock Exchange Council) or to the Conseil du 
Marché a Terme (Futures Market Council) when it becomes 
aware of irregularities committed by a professional 
member of the stock market or of the futures market; or 
the COB may address itself to the Disciplinary Council of 
OPCVM to report on infractions affecting statutory or
regulatory standards applicable to the OPCVM; or the COB 
may communicate to the disciplinary chamber of the stock 
market operators breaches of duty by "auditing
commissioners" ("commissaires aux comptes").
The sanctioning powers may be applied in two stages: 
an order to discontinue the conduct incompatible with 
the regulations; the imposition of pecuniary
sanctions.
As the law does not subordinate the imposition of 
pecuniary penalties to non-compliance with an order to 
discontinue the incompatible act, it may be c o n c l u d e d ^ ^  
that both aspects of available powers are mutually
independent. The imposition of pecuniary penalties
depends on a valuational discretion on the part of the
COB, Ascertaining the amount is dependent on the
seriousness of the committed offence and on profits 
derived from it (Art. 9-2 of the 1967 Ordinance).
Consequently, the sanctioning powers are flexible and
lend themselves to rapid application, 
i i ) Power to issue injunctions
The power to issue injunctions is in substance the
ability to impose the adoption of a defined conduct. It 
is one of the typical manifestations of the powers of 
judicial authority. Such powers have been more and more
_______
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frequently bestowed by French law to administrative
bodies like the Conseil Superior de l’Audiovisuel,
Conseil de la concurrence, the Commission bancaire.
The exercise of a power of injunction by such
administrative bodies as the one just mentioned above
raises a delicate balance of qualitative delimitation or 
distinction between administrative powers, on the one 
hand, and judicial authority on the other. Should
administrative powers be allocated to the sphere of
"administrative policing"? In the light of such a
qualification "power to issue injunctions" could be
recognised as being part of the administrative
competences, as a power attributed solely indirectly, 
also as a competence subject to ultimate judicial review 
for approval of the injunction.
COB has been granted, since the Law No. 85-1321 of 
December 14, 1985 (Art. 31) "indirect" powers to issue
injunctions, appeal from which for judicial review is
possible when "conduct contrary to statutory or
regulatory standards" is involved, with detrimental
effects for the rights of investors. The same 1 a w , when 
amending Art, 37 of the Law No, 83-1 of January, 1983, 
had provided for a specific power for the COB to 
prescribe injunctions affecting offers to the investing 
public. In the meaning of Art. 20 of the Law of January 
3, 1972, the COB is also competent to verify conformity
with rules and may demand the communication of documents. 
Lastly, the COB is empowered, in accordance with Art. 3
of the Ordi nance of 1967, to scrutinise info rmation 
supplied by listed companies to shareholders or 
published. The company in question may be required to 
publish correct information or eliminate inexactitudes or 
omissions. The earlier Art. 4-2 of;the Ordinance of 1967 
had conceded to the COB indirect sanctioning powers of a 
quite vast magnitude enabling it to intervene immediately
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in strictly limited cases. It should b e  o b s e r v e d ^ ^  that 
the "indirect" sanctioning powers of the COB, 
necessitating recourse to judicial authorities, have been 
invoked by the COB with much discretion.
The sphere of "direct" sanctioning powers is quite 
vast. The "direct" sanctioning powers have been 
considered a substitution of a traditionally judicial 
function by that of an administrative a u t h o r i t y , * 6  Uouid 
not this involve the possibility of an abuse of powersT^? 
Maybe preference should by given to "indirect"
sanctioning powers (enshrined in the old Art. 4-2 of the
Ordinance of 1967, now Art. 12), which, although wider in 
scope, prescribe intervention by judicial authority. With 
the possibility of such risks in mind, it is important 
to reflect on the contents of the Art. 9-1 of the
Ordinance of September 28, 1967,
The attribution to the COB, by virtue of the Law of
August 2, 1989, of an autonomous
issue injunctions, beside the
"indirect" power, is part of an
sanct ionary system of the COB and is one of the central
elements of that system. Annunziata,*® however, is of the
opinion that it is difficult to distinguish clearly
between acts which may be subject to injunctions under
"direct" powers and acts which may be suitable for
injunctions based on "indirect" powers. For the exercise
of "direct" powers, the conduct in question has to be
contrary to regulatory standards set up by the COB and/have an effect of "fausser le fonctionnement du marche; 
procurer aux interesses un avantage injustifié q u ’ils 
n ’auraient pas obtenu dans le cadre normal du marché; 
porter atteinte à l’égalité d ’information et de
traitement des investisseurs, des agissements
d ’intermédiaires contraires à leurs obligations
professione11 es" (Art. 9-1 of the Ordinance of 1967,
"direct" competence to 
formally non-variable 
articulated autonomous
_____________________________________________ :___________________________— J____ A. _______ -
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attached to the Law of 1989); whereas recourse to a 
judicial injunction presupposes simply the existence of 
"une pratique contraire aux dispositions legislatives ou 
réglementaires /.../ de nature a porter atteinte aux 
droits des épargnants," As violation of a rule set up by 
the COB may also affect detrimentally the interests of 
investors, it could be a question of applying both 
powers, "direct" as well as "indirect", of issuing 
injunctions. As a further factor of complication, the 
imposition of an injunction under "direct" powers is a 
matter for collegiate decision within the COB, while the 
exercise of "indirect" powers of injunction is included 
within the autonomous attributions of the COB President, 
with a different procedure provided for each category. In 
conclusion, in 1993 the COB initiated 10 procedures for 
sanctions and adopted 10 corresponding decisions in the 
course of five investigations affecting the following
companies: Métrologie SA, Schneider, Ciments Français, 
Saint-Laurent and S u e z , * 7  The Paris Appeal Court 
partially modified the level of two administrative 
sanctions and confirmed five.^^
7, Pecuniary Sanctions
Injunctions may be accompanied with fines in 
accordance with Art, 9-2 of the Ordinance of September 
28, 1987 in the text modified by the law n. 89-631 of
August 3 1989 as the logical complement of Art. 9-1.
Differently from Art. 9-1, Art 9-2 expressly provides for 
an adversarial procedure and an explanation or ratio 
decidendi for the adopted decisions. The protection of 
persons affected by them is necessary because of the 
gravity of the fines which COB can impose on the basis of 
the new rules. Principles of (civil or continental
European) public 1 aw would be the source of such defence
rights even if the Ordinance of 1967 had not supplied any 
precision on this point. In spite of guaranteed defence
'-■ti
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rights the legal provisions related to them have been in 
the parliamentary stage criticised by many members of the 
National Assembly and particularly by the Senate. The 
endowment of the COB with powers to impose pecuniary 
fines has been a most controversial point in 
parliamentary debates accompanying the adoption of the 
Law of August 2, 1989. The powers in question constitute
a most relevant innovation mutating definitively the 
legal nature of the COB, The COB is given direct and 
articulated sanctionary powers in the interest of 
safeguarding the integrity of the market, in addition to 
the already existing regulatory powers. The COB can thus, 
as cl "magistrature d ’influence" or a "judicial authority 
of influence", act with binding powers in relation to the 
operators of the market. In this respect, as already 
mentioned, the COB is in the French legal system neither 
the first nor the unique administrative authority of 
control and vigilance entrusted with sanctioning powers. 
The Conseil de la concurrence and the Conseil supérieur 
de l’audiovisuel , are other examples of comparable
authority, but the COB necessitates a qualification; its 
sanctioning powers are added on top of its regulatory
authority, which is not the case with respect to the
mentioned two other bodies. Sanctioning authority 
invested in the Conseil de la concurrence and then in the 
Conseil de l’audiovisuel already constitutes a derogation 
from the principle of separation of powers, a derogation 
which necessitated an explicit intervention in the case 
of the Conseil de l’audiovisuel by the Constitutional 
court; in the case of the COB there is an additional 
aspect : the COB has sanctioning powers affecting conduct
in breach of rules which, itself has set up after
confirmation by the Minister of the Economy and Finance 
(Art. 4-1, para. 3„ of the Ordinance). The two other 
mentioned administrative bodies are allocated regulatory
T-T V, :: ■
powers which are strictly delimited and provisional in 
nature. A further important point related to the status 
of the COB is that the administrative sanctions it can 
impose may be part of penal sanctions or of disciplinary 
sanctions adopted by the professional control authorities 
responsible for the proper functioning of the relevant 
market, the Conseil des bourses des valeurs, the Conseil/ Sdu marche a terme and the Conseil de discipline des
organismes de placement collectif en valeurs mobilières. 
Hence it may be rightly asked whether the accumulation of 
sanctions by different authorities is a concrete threat 
and where its legitimate limits would be.
Looking more closely to the textual contents of Art. 
9-2 of the Ordinance, we find that above all the 
legislator has endeavored to 1 ay the foundations for 
COB’s sanctioning powers on top of what is laid down for 
competence to issue injunctions. As to the relationship 
between powers to impose injunctions, on the one hand, 
and powers to impose pecuniary fines on the other, it is 
in the light of the legislative text not clear whether 
fines are dependent first on the imposition of 
injunctions. The subordination of imposed pecuniary fines 
as dependent on earlier issued injunctions may involve a 
factor of potential inefficiency in influencing the 
market positively. The evolution of the financial
markets, high speed communication technology, the various 
types of effected transactions etc are all factors which 
may render recourse to injunctions useless. It may hence
be concluded that in the interest of the markets, and
participants in it, the COB may be free to act first as
an agent of mediation before resorting to sanctioning 
measures,
Obviously any decisions on sanctioning measures 
shall have to be supported by the principle of
proportionality (Art, 9-2, para. 2 of the Ordinance), of
_______________
83
defence (para. 3) and of the ratio decidendi (para. 5).
Referring again to the point of allocating
sanctioning powers to administrative bodies, it can be
said that such an allocation has been supported by the
Conseil constitutionnel. In a decision relating to the
Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel, the Conseil
constitutionnel (decision n. 89-280 of July 28, 1989, JO
August 1st) has decided that "le principe de la
separation des pouvoirs, non plus q u ’aucun principe ou
regie de valeur constitutions!le ne fait obstacle a ce
q u ’une authorite administrative, agissant dans !@ cadre
de prérogatives de puissance publique, puisse exercer un
pouvoir de sanction dès lors, d ’une part, que la sanction X /susceptible d ’etre infligée est exclusive de toute 
privation de liberté et, d ’autre part, que l’exercice du 
pouvoir de sanction est assorti par la loi de mesures 
destinées a sauvegarder les droits et libertés
cons t i tut i onneilment garantis." As long as
constitutionally guaranteed rights and principles of
justice are not violated, administrative bodies may, in 
the interest of their administrative functions and within 
defined limits, exercise judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. In this respect, the Law of August 2, 1989, i s
quite a recent manifestation of this trend which two 
authors,?! some 30 years ago have defined as a "retreat 
of judicial authority ceding ground in the interest of 
administrative tasks" ("recul du pouvoir judiciare au 
profit de commissions administratives"). They have 
qualified this development as a source of concern and 
anxiety for all who prefer to invest their trust in the 
first place in judicial rather than administrative 
authority for the protection of freedoms, adding that 
only an equilibrium between the control bodies of markets 
and their "moral authority" may secure the best 
protection of the interests of the p a r t i c i p a n t s . T o d a y
   _ _ .    _..
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the powers given to the COB are anchored in the Law of 
August 2, 1989.7 3
8. New Powers in the Sphere of Penal Measures 
The Law of August 2, 1989, provides also new
provisions for strengthening the powers at the disposal 
of the COB for repressing stock market delicts, A new 
procedure has been established for the inspection 
activities of the COB as foreseen under Art. 5-ter of the 
Ordinance, 1967 and at the same time new precautionary 
measures have been adopted for guaranteeing a level of 
high efficacy in the activities of the COB, apart from 
judicial competences (art. 8-1 of the Ordinance of 1967), 
For the prevention of penal infractions inspections 
may be made and items of evidence or proof may be 
collected "at any place", hence also in private homes, in 
accordance with the procedures of Art. 5-ter of the 
Ordinance of 1967. This includes conditions, criteria and 
principles found in other areas of application such as 
that of fiscal and competition matters. The inspection 
functions of the COB, in application of Art. 5-ter of the 
Ordinance of 1967, are subjected to the control of the 
judicial authorities and more precisely to the control of 
the President of the territorially competence Tribunal de 
Grande Instance (Department High Court). He may ordain in 
response to a request an inquiry by the President of the 
COB. As already mentioned, here we are dealing with, in 
distinction to the contents of Art. 5B of the Ordinance, 
with powers lying completely and exclusively within the 
competence of the President of the COB.
The new regime allows the COB not to limit itself to 
purely administrative enquiries for referring them to the 
judicial authority as to penally relevant facts, but may 
actively collaborate with the authorities
______________________________________
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o f  criminal justice for the purpose of repressing stock 
market delicts. Reference to such delicts seems to 
exclude, with due regard to the contents of Art. 5-ter, 
Arts. 10-1 and 10-3 of the Ordinance of September 26 
1967, any inspection activities within the framework of a 
procedure involving international cooperation in the 
meaning of Art. 5-tais of the Ordinance, if an 
investigation request by a foreign authority refers to 
penal acts committed abroad and penally non-re levant 
within France. As to preventative measures. Art, 0-1 
inserted by virtue of the Law of August 2, 1989, into the
text of the Ordinance instituting the COB, has given to 
the COB the possibility to adopt particular preventative 
measures and to request the judicial authorities to adopt 
special preventative measures, more precisely, to
sequestrate defined assets, to prohibit the exercise of 
professional activities and to impose the obligation of 
providing a given pecuniary sum as deposit. Even if the 
letter of the legal text does not refer to it, the 
preferred interpretation?^ i s to the effect that the 
applied measures, for the purpose of making the
sanctioning system of the COB more incisive, are to be 
limited to infractions of penal relevance, thus
excluding any application in with acts falling within the
ambit of administrative matters. From the text of the law 
it can be deduced that an application to judicial 
authorities for the adoption of measures should be based 
on a collegiate decision within the COB.
When dealing with a case of sequestration of 
interdiction of professional act ivities, the judicial 
authority decides upon request by the COB in the form of 
an ordinance upon application ("ordonnance sur requête") 
as defined in the code of civil procedure (Art, 493) as a 
temporary decision taken without hearing all the parties 
concerned.
  !   : : : : :
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As to the measure of temporary exclusion of a person 
from the exercise of professional activities, applicable 
without access to complaint by the person affected, it is 
a measure for preventing the misappropriation of funds 
and particularly for controlling the extremely rapid 
development of certain financial activities and for 
excluding access thereto of any person to whom 
irregularities are imputed.
As to the imposition of effecting a deposit as 
"consignation", the President of the Tribunal da Grand 
Instance, always acting upon request by the COB, may
decide as an interim decision that a deposit shall be 
made. The decision is provisional and may be altered by 
the judge maintaining it or augmenting the deposited sum 
in application of Art, 138 of the code of penal 
procedure. Any non-compliance with the obligation to 
provide a deposit or with the obligation of temporary 
withdrawal from professional activities is subject to 
penal measures (Art. 10, para 2, Ordinance of 1967). On 
October 15, 1993, invoking for the first time powers
under Art. 8-1 of the Ordinance of 1967, the COB 
requested the Imposition of a temporary interdict on 
Société Luc Terme banning the latter firm from 
professional activities. The interdict was issued by the 
President on the same day of the application. On October 
29, 1993, the Tribunal de Crete!1 has confirmed the
decision of the President,?5
9. Judicial protection against acts of the COB
Such protection has been introduced by the Law of 
August 2, 1989, and is reminiscent of experience linked
with the Conseil de la Concurrence.
Acts of the COB, which prior to the Law of August 2, 
1989, could have been challenged generically before an 
administrative tribunal, can now be challenged before 
ordinary courts and only residually before administrative
V
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judicial authorities. Acts related to collective
investment in moveable assets or to portfolio management 
can be challenged, as provided, before administrative
courts. For all acts of the COB the competence of
control is allocated to the judicial authority (Art. 12
of the Ordinance), which in a later decision (Art. 6,
Decree No. 20-263 of March 23, 1990) has been vested in
the Cour d ’Appel de Paris,. The decision has been 
necessitated for securing speedy decision making in
situations involving controversy, where power exercised 
by the COB may affect the rights of individuals.
While "the good administration of justice" ("une
bonne administration de la justice") has been a guiding 
principle for unifying access to a single court, its
implementation has not been total in the sense that a 
residual intervention by administrative judicial 
authorities is possible. The appeal against .the
sanctionary decisions of the COB to the Cour d ’appel de 
Paris is considered ambiguous and hybrid.?*
10. Changes in penal sanctions applicable to stock
market delicts
After the reform of provisions affecting the delict 
of "insider dealing" ("délit d ’initié") by the Law No. 
88-70 of January 22, 1988, and in the course of a
rigorous process for reinforcing the preventive or 
repressive system applicable to infractions committed in 
the financial markets, the Law of August 2, 1989
introduced the concept of "délit de communication
d ’information privilégiées" ("delict of communicating
privileged information"), in the UK and American stock 
market systems known as "tipping".
In the meaning of Art. 8 of the Law communicating to 
third persons, reserved information acquired in the
exercise of profess!ona1 activities and concerning the 
prospects or situation of an issuer, or concerning the
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future trend of the value of assets or of futures
contract, is a criminal act. The rule states that such an 
act should have been committed outside the "normal 
framework" ("cadre normal") of professional work and
professional functions. Communicated information should 
have the same characteristics as that related to insider 
dealing. As a clear definition and clear proof of the act 
as having been committed outside the "normal framework" 
of professional activities would be difficult, the law 
has dealt with moderation when providing penal 
consequences for it; imprisonment from six to twelve
months and fines ranging from FF 10,000 to 100,000 "or 
only one of two punishments".
Insider dealing is more harshly treated in Art, 7 of 
the Law of August 2, 1989. Fines up to FF 10m and up to
ten times the amount of illicit profits are foreseen. The 
fines may not be inferior to the level of profits. "False 
information" and the "manipulation of quotations" are 
equally subject to heavy fines (Art 10-1, last para, and 
Art, 10-3 of the Ordinance), Similarly, serious
consequences may be attached to the "del it d ’entrave"
when hindering investigators authorised by the COB from 
proceeding with their work (Art. 6).
11. Critical remarks
The wide-ranging process of reform of French stock 
and financial markets has led to a complex restructuring 
of the powers and competences of the control agencies. 
Specialisation and the reinforcement of mechanisms of 
control have been vital points of consideration, be they 
in their relation to those who appeal to the public for
investment or, and not least for the theme of the present
thesis, financial intermediaries.
In particular the COB has been endowed with direct 
and autonomous powers to issue injunctions, apply 
sanctions, as one of the most significant facets of the
______________ _____
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reforms focusing solely on the reorganisation and 
strengthening of the professional and disciplinary bodies 
affecting the intermediaries. In the wake of the reforms 
of 1988, with noteworthy increases in its powers the COB 
can conduct inspections, effect clarifications, and these 
competences have been reinforced with the institution of 
a new offence of "entrave" (hindrance) applicable to 
enquiries and investigations relating to investigatory 
work undertaken by its agents.
Looking at the situation from the angle of law, the 
powers of investigation had already made it into a first 
class investigative judicial authority. With direct 
sanctioning powers it has become an authority comparable 
with that of a lower ordinary court; it can apply 
sanctions on those who act contrary to rules it has 
established- While the sanctions of the COB are qualified 
they are based on its powers to issue regulations. These 
powers also included judicial functions. It should be 
remembered that judicial tradition in France (since the 
Ordinance of 1967 and the inception of the Code of penal 
procedure) basically rests on the principle of separation 
of the functions of prosecution, investigation and 
judgement. The decree N.90-263 of March 23, 1990
implicitly admits that the COB may initiate proceedings, 
may investigate and reach a decision at the end,?? In 
this respect the COB is u n ique in that there is no 
distinct division for initiating proceedings, no 
distinct division to act as an investigating judge. The 
same COB, after having issued a notice, examines 
observations submitted to it and may decide to suspend or 
continue with the proceedings. After a decision to 
continue, the COB can appoint a rapporteur who may later 
be entrusted with further tasks. Lastly, the COB can hear 
the defendant’ and his lawyer, who may submit their 
observations orally. Then, the COB is considered a
_____ __________ _____ _
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"Mag istrature 
économique",?
d ’influence", a "Jurisdiction
a "su i generis institution, a very 
peculiar A A 1, an archetype of the repressive
administrative order"?? It seems that a new "Ordre public 
bouvier" has been established in France.®*
It is worthwhile to note®’ that the SEC in the USA, 
with noteworthy sanctioning powers, may intervene in 
proceedings only in a capacity as an appeal judge. A 
judicial decision at the first level comes from an 
"administrative law judge" who, while formally being part 
of the staff of the SEC, enjoys a wide margin of 
autonomy. (See Appendix "A" at the end of the present 
thesis) The thereto relevant procedure implies the 
existence of a dual is tic approach to the acts of the 
(financial market) services and those of the SEC. Such a 
dualism cannot be detected in the structure of the COB, 
which acts as a single body dealing with three distinct 
functions. This situation has raised questions relating 
to problematic violations of the principle of presumption 
of innocence and respect for the adversarial system.
A further serious problem is generated by the fact 
that the COB is not under any obligation to issue first 
an injunction before proceeding with sanctioning 
measures. This touches the principle of independence or 
separation between the procedure applicable to
injunctions on the one hand, and that applicable to 
sanctioning measures on the other. The COB has decided 
that sanctions may be adopted without the necessity to 
resort first to a preliminary injunction.®? As to 
administrative procedures, it is certain that some of the 
general principles linked to the notion of penal law 
apply equally to the sphere of administrative sanctions ; 
no retroactive effects of laws, legality of the 
punishment, its’ proportionality and respect for the right 
to defence. Some experts favour the view that all rules
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of penal law should apply equally to the imposition of
administrative sanctions. The Conseil constitutionnel®^
has established that solely the general principles of law
do apply to the exclusion of the rules enshrined in the 
penal procedure codes. Consequently, non-app1icab 1e are 
the rule non bis in idem and the pure procedural rules of 
the code of penal procedure.®'*
A further problem is related to persons who may be 
addressed by sanctions issued by the COB. Contrary to a
restrictive interpretation of Art. 4-1 of the Ordinance
of 1967, limiting the applicable ambit to legal persons, 
the COB has maintained®® that with reference to Arts. 9-1 
and 9-2 of the same 1967 Ordi nance, sanctioning powers
may apply to all persons, be they physical or legal,
including the management personnel of the latter. On the 
basis of such an extensive interpretation, the COB has 
issued Regulation No. 92-03, (confirmed by the Ministry 
of economy and finance on June 10, 1992,) modifying
Regulations Nos, 90-02, 90-04, 90-06, and 90-08 and
permitting to initiate proceedings also with respect to
compa.ny directors.®* Then, the COB can sanction 
cumulatively legal persons and their management 
per sonne 1 .® ?
The series of the above pointed out problems may be
expanded by a further one which concerns decisions
adopted by the COB in the course of proceedings. When 
proceeding against the companies Concept and CCMC and 
their directors, the COB had decided to discontinue the 
proceedings against one of them and continue with respect 
to the others. The Paris Court of appeal ruled that in 
the application of Art. 3 of the Decree of 1990, the COB 
was capable, in the light of submitted observations, to 
interrupt the proceedings in question.®®
It has been observed with some concern®? that it may
no longer be noted how the COB has been accumulating
__ .
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competences to elaborate, sanction and control the 
interpretation and application of its own Regulations 
with noteworthy flexibility and means at Its disposal. 
May be all these competences were not intended to be 
claimed by the COB, but by now it can be said as in the 
case of a prince : habet omnia iuria in corpora suo.
Furthermore, the Law of 1989, having vested the COB 
with certain competences to legislate in the form of 
regulation, has also touched fundamental principles 
underlying the system of democracy in France. For 
example. Arts, 9-1 and 9-2 of the Ordinance of 1967,
introduced on the basis of Art. 5 of the Law of August 2, 
1989, seem to attach two conditions to the sanctioning 
powers of the COB: Cl) sanctions may be applied to
conduct violating a COB regulation, (2) sanctions may be 
applied to conduct which interfere with or disturb the 
proper functioning of the stock markets.?* In reality the 
sanctioning powers of the COB are subject to a single 
condition ; the existence of a COB regulation confirmed 
by the Ministry of the economy and finance (Art. 4-1(3), 
Ordinance of 1967). The problem consists in the fact that 
the regulations of the COB bear more the characteristic 
traits of "code de bonne conduite" ("code of good 
conduct") than those of a penal code. It cannot be
claimed that Art. 9-1 of the Ordinance of September 28, 
1967, defines the incriminating aspects of conduct which 
may be caught by COB sanctions. Art. 9-1 establishes 
simply a broad framework within which incriminating 
conduct may be defined. For Gavalda the Law of 1989 is 
exposed to critique because it involves the risk of 
violating the fundamental principle of the legality of 
imposed punishment. The "flou" (blurred contours) of a 
penal legislation is not admissible, because it 
inevitably leads to standards of arbitrariness. It is 
indispensable to respect the rule "nulla poena sine
-rS
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lege",?! Gavalda admits, however, that it would be unjust 
and futile to start a campaign against the reform of the 
COB effected by the Law of August 2, 1989. There would be
no point in indulging in sterile discussions. It is
important to realise that the credibility of French
financial markets implies and demands an alignment with
the other financial markets in the EC. Nonetheless, many
quarters underline a certain anxiety with which the
variety, impor tance and excessive powers vested in the 
COB are assessed.
The COB has become the inspector of inspectors,??
with quasi-legislative regulatory powers. Its executive 
powers are vast to the extent it controls the
"commissaires aux comptes" (auditing commissioners); it 
may invite them to submit clarifications, may initiate an 
inquiry, may impose injunctions, and may proceed with the 
collaboration of judicial authorities to undertake
searches and sequestrations. Like a judge, it may
prescribe significant pecuniary fines. One may
consequently ask whether this accumulation of powers does 
not breach constitutionally guaranteed principles.
In defence of the C O B ?  ^ i t has been said that the 
given concentration of powers should neither surprise nor 
preoccupy. In the USA it has been since 1867 understood
that the problems related to railways may not be resolved 
within a framework within which the state powers are 
rigidly separated. It has therefore been necessary to set 
up an independent Commission endowed with parts of the 
three powers in question: the Interstate Commerce
Commission, as the first of the major commissions 
entrusted with regulatory powers. In other spheres many 
more commissions with similar regulatory functions have 
been created. Such a commission was entrusted in 1984 
with the control of publicly offered shares, o f 
operations on the stock market and to some extent
■94
companies. In 1967 the COB was given insufficient powers, 
while in the USA and the UK the SEC and the SIB
respectively enjoy powers which in certain respects are
superior to those of the COB. One becomes aware of how
necessary it is to strengthen the powers of regulatory 
and control bodies dealing with stock and financial 
market operations when considering the gravity of
scandals experienced in all of the big industrialised 
countries. On this point various opinions have been 
expressed in the USA in the course of the last 20 years. 
For some it has been necessary to strengthen the control 
of stock and financial market operations for safeguarding 
greater market transparency, equality and security. For 
others, insider dealings are part of the normal practices 
and as such are inevitable. All in all, however, the 
regulation of stock and financial markets has reached a 
level which cannot be easily accepted. The number and 
magnitude of financial market scandals document the
inefficiency of regulation and control. The desire of 
financial companies to deserve and maintain a good 
reputation should have constituted an effective factor 
of regulation. It seems that the BCCI and Maxwell cases
dramatically favour a certain opinion. The BCCI case
demonstrates that in the present state of regulation it
has been possible, for years, to syphon dozens of 
thousands of millions of US dollars at the expense of 
investors but to the benefit of terrorists, using arms 
and drug dealers by assisting them in their activities 
and transactions,
it has also been noted?'* that the rampant "neo- 
dirigisme" of AAls (autorités administratives
indépendantes), in the light of reassuring foreign models 
like that of the SEC in the USA, is of no use for 
enhancing the international credibility of the French 
system. One may detect some americophi1ia suggesting the
 :    _
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creation of strange innovations, taut the foreign model is 
misunderstood and badly imitated. Legal culture and 
tradition are more subtle things than many legal experts 
may realise. It has been verified with great frequency, 
when a competence is vested in a given AAI, other 
comparable bodies, when the opportunity for reform 
arises, grata the occasion to have comparable powers 
vested in them. This escalation in powers may become 
worrying.
The current confusion between allocated powers in 
France, documented by a flowering series of Councils, 
Commissions and various lAAs would not be the right model 
to recommend for resolving also the relevant problems 
related to the regulation and control of the financial 
markets.?® Security and predictability as categorical
imperatives of democratic legal systems, seem to have 
been forgotten in the process of proliferating lAAs. The 
generalised multiplication of lAAs, to the detriment of 
judicial power as the natural authority, is the 
consequence of a worrying phenomenon deserving further 
research and knowledge in order to confront it. Gavalda 
stresses that?* in a democracy the roles of the police 
and that of the judge should be mutually separate. To a 
similar conclusion comes Ducouloux Favard?? when stating 
that it is amazing to see how a legislative act does not 
per S0 constitute a guarantee against the arbitrary but 
leaves it to the executive power the function of 
regulating itself. In the related literature, authors are 
becoming more and more aware of the perils and dangers 
generated by the existence of lAAs like the COB, as 
entities partly escaping parliamentary control.?® In 1975 
Pr. Guyon had foreseen with worry that "informal and 
occult administrative activities could lead to an 
arbitrary system because the defence rights and the 
adversarial principle could not be observed",?? It is
M L
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legitimate to ask whether the penal judge can feel bound
by the opinion expressed by the COB because he is obliged
(art. 12-1 of the Ordinance of September 28, 1967) to
request the opinion of the COB in case of "delicts
b o u v i e r s " . '00 ln 1989 Favard'®' emphasised that a real
curiosity is the fact how in the grandiose and
spectacular bicentennial celebrations of the French
revolution (1789), a legislative text has ignored the
principle of separation of powers; a singular and
unlikely expression of homage to Montesquieu.
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C h a p t e r  6
The National Commission for Companies and the Stock Market 
(La Commissions Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa)
- CONSÜB “
1 , Law and Practice
The CONSOB was established by Law No, 216 of June 7, 
1974, in implementation of the Decree Law (Decreto Legge) 
of April 8, 1974, No. 95 (O.J. no 149 of June 0, 1974), 
Its creation took place in a socio-economic context 
conditioned by three main structural causes;
i) an alarming spending deficit,^
ii) a peculiar relationship between small and medium 
sized enterprises on the one hand, and big enterprises on 
the other,^ and
iii) the absolutely prominent role played by banks in the 
sphere of savings and investments.^ The comparative level 
of private savings in Italy was higher than anywhere else 
in the w o r l d , t a u t  while this implied a great potential 
for access to savings and capital for investment, access 
to them for investment was not adequate. In order to 
finance public spending deficits, private savings were 
channelled towards the purchase of public bonds (titoli 
pubblici) with the banking system playing a fundamental 
intermediary function. In this way private savings were 
invested in schemes of low risk but high liquidity.^ Such 
developments could but reduce the stock market to a 
residual and marginal function with low liquidity outside 
the market for taon.ds and the strong presence of public 
capital. Inflation accentuated the gap between the 
propensity of private persons to save, on the one hand, 
and the capital and investment needs of undertakings on 
the other. The latter were becoming more and more 
dependent on i) banks for long term credits as risk
___________
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capital for investment, and ii) a marked public 
discretion influencing the availability of commercial and 
industrial credits. Such a system, conditioning the 
various functions of banks, of the capital markets, and 
of the state too, was inducing the emergence of complex 
situations financially dirigistic and not only economic 
in nature. The atrophy of the financial markets was 
generated not only by uncontrolled or uncontrollable 
developments but also by deliberate, not always coherent 
policy choices and impulses which in due time 
cumulatively resulted in a system which may be properly 
called protectionistic. In such a socio-economic 
framework the CONSOB was established.
The integration of the CONSOB into the then 
existing situation can be better understood not only with 
reference to the legal framework of its competences, but 
also with reference to practice. There is an interaction 
between the legal status and the actual practice of the 
CONSOB, the CONSOB acts as a (secondary) legislative body 
as well as an executive institution. In the 1960s the 
intention was to create a public (governmental) body as 
a watchdog entrusted with monitoring the activities of 
companies. It would have been a body subordinated to the 
Banca d ’Italia. "The initial intention was only to 
placate the unquenchable habit of tax evasion of the 
Italian taxpayer to promote his/her peace of mind,
trust and will to invest for revitalising the stock 
markets,
The Law No. 216 of June 7, 1974 instituting the
CONSOB was "promptly" enacted with "great delay" after a 
long and laborious period of gestation which can be 
traced back to the 1950s, It was influenced by political 
concessions between liberalistic visions and a dirigistic 
approach to economic affairs. It may be noteworthy that 
in 1972 the "Sindona affair" had exploded, resulting in a
,
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profound crisis of trust in the financial markets. After 
years of very elaborate discussions and considerations in 
the 1960s and into the 1970s, the quasi-improvised Decree 
Law No, 95 of April 8, 1974 was approved, giving birth to
the CONSOB, Even more noteworthy is the decision to 
proceed legislatively by adopting a Decree Law, under
Art. 77 of the Italian Constitution, for application 
solely in cases of "necessity and urgency" ("nécessita e 
urgenza"). Thereafter the Law No. 216 of June 7, 1974,
was enacted, profoundly modifying the contents of the 
Decree Law No, 95.? The Law No. 216/74 has been 
criticised for its ambiguity.® Jaeger has pointed out 
that Law No, 216/74 did not at the time evoke the 
impression of being a milestone in Italian economic law; 
it was a milestone but by the government with analogous 
governmental (public) bodies operating in other legal 
systems tried to reveal an endeavour to show that the 
CONSOB differs from the original and fundamental model of 
the SEC in the USA.^
The Law No. 216/74 has proved, however, to be "an 
authentic revolution" ("una autentica rivoIuzione"); *° 
it has shifted the accent as to information supplied by 
companies from "legal information" to "information 
necessary and adequate in relation to circumstances", and 
from "shareholders" to "the public in general". Moreover, 
it requires from the instituted body, in fulfilment of 
its publicised market supervision, to assess from case to 
case the necessity and adequacy as well as the purpose of 
an investment appeal, thus transferring the purpose of
tutelage or protection from shareholders to the saving
and investing public. Thus, the Law No. 216/74 has
modified the valency of information required from 
companies, such information, which, initially private, 
has become public in nature by virtue of the intervention 
of the Commission (CONSOB)^' addresses itself, beyond
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shareholders, to the saving public and to the financial 
market.
In spite of the creation of the CONSOB, the Italian 
stock markets languished, with the index reaching on 
December 22, 1977, a historical low of 54.90.1% The
"first" CONSOB, under the presidency of the democratic
party Gastone Miconi, did not intervene, and its role did 
not become noticeable prior to the "second" CONSOB under 
the presidency of Guido Rossi. The Law No. 49 of
February 23, 1977, had amplified the functions of the
CONSOB. The regulation of the so to speak second market, 
also referred to as the "restricted market", had
attributed to CONSOB powers to discipline the market with 
a proper regulation affecting the organisation of the 
market, the way it should function and its supervision. 
The merit of the new Law was the introduction, in the 
Italian financial markets, of the tutelage or protection 
of the saving p u b l i c . I n  1970 the markets seemed to 
wake up and government quarters seemed to develop an 
interest in the problems of the stock markets. However, 
not long thereafter, the case of Roberto Calvi and of the 
Banco Ambrosiano surfaced, with the death of Calvi under 
the Black friars bridge in London in 1982.1'* This was, 
within ten years, the second major affair after that of 
Sindona in 1972.
Ten years after the mysterious death of Calvi the 
condemnation, on April 16, 1992, of 31 persons dealt a
further very heavy blow to the international image and 
prestige and credibility of Italian entrepreneurship.*^ 
It was related to the financial operations (and losses) 
of the Istituto per le Opere di Religions (I OR) with 
close links to the Vatican.
The first years of the 1960s proved to be a very 
difficult financial time in Italy, Losses by the 
Europrogramme of Bagnasco, to mention but one person,
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suffered a serious crisis involving the savings of some 
70,000 investors.*? However, the 1980s marked at the same 
time the period in which the stock markets experienced an 
upward turn.’® A further Law, of March 23, 1983, No.
77,*’ beyond enlarging the competences of the CONSOB
introduced detailed rules applicable to appeals for
investment, in addition to instituting and regulating a 
new and important financial instrument in the form of
common investment funds. The technical terms (with
definitions) of "valore mobiliare" (stocks) and of
"so 1 1ecitazione a 1 pubblico" (offer to the public) were 
established. The functions of CONSOB as to promotion and 
control of information was extended to all aspects of the 
stock market by virtue of Art. 18 of the Law No. 216/74. 
In the scope of functions and operations of the CONSOB
the best promotion of the whole market became a matter of 
central concern: the limits of the Law No. 216/74, which
identified the market substantively with reference to
only one of its segments, namely, the stock markets, was
overcome. Thus, in substance, the existence of a
financial market larger than the stock market was
established "by applying the term ’control’ in an ampler 
and more comprehensive context" for the purpose of
unifying and harmonising more transparently all aspects 
dealing with appeals to the investing public.^® The
importance of this legislative innovation and extension
is given by the fact that loopholes in the past powers of 
the CONSOB were eliminated and the principle of 
disclosure was raised to a level of general and dominant 
principle in the system of rules. Therewith, a genuine 
system of investor protection was introduced into the 
Italian legal system,?* As a real minireform of the
CONSOB, the Law of 1933 constituted an exceptional legal 
forward jump 'of both cultural and practical nature: 
concern for shareholders was replaced by that of
________________________
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investors, from a level of contractual relationship to 
one of pre-contractuaI relationship,?? As a positive 
result, interest in common funds of investment increased 
noticeably on the stock markets at the end of 1984. 
Thousands of small investors, as if feverishly possessed 
by an urge to make profits, discovered the existence of 
the stock market.
In 1985 a further so to speak minireform of the 
CONSOB was instituted by the Law of June 4, 1985, No. 281
(Italian Official Gazette, June 4, 1985), when the
existing rules were truly and properly integrated. Its 
general text translated into law the valid aspects of
observations and proposals made by the VI Permanent
Commission for Finance and Treasury of the Chamber of
Deputies. It contains provisions on the legal status of
the CONSOB; rules for identifying the partners of a
listed public company (societa con azioni) and of credit 
institutions; rules for the implementation of EC 
Directives 79/279, 80/390 and 82/121 relating to stock
markets and to provisions for the protection of 
investors.?3 The approach underlying the law is Unitarian 
in the sense that it emphasises the discretionary powers 
of the CONSOB for the purpose of promoting an 
increasingly greater disclosure of data concerning 
participants in the market.
Art. 20 empowers the CONSOB to scrutinise the
request for admission to official listing and to check 
whether the listing would not be contrary to public 
interest. The discretion of CONSOB to authorise admission 
to official listing in the light of the overriding 
interests of investors is confirmed by Art. 20 para 2.?’* 
in accordance with the provisions laid down in the EC 
Directive n, 279 of 1979,
The whole administrative procedure for admission for 
listing is based on the system of the information
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prospectus, its contents and modalities of publication 
are determined by CONSOB in general terms with due regard 
to the interests and protection of investors. Rules 
governing the form and contents of the prospectus are
guided by the principle of information, and as such they 
correspond to a systematic approach to the legal 
regulation of capital markets, with an expanding trend to 
reinforce the mechanisms of pressure and control on 
operators active in the market and on their activities, 
for covering, if possible, new areas for the ultimate
purpose of insuring the best possible protection of both 
investors and the market.
The Law 281/85 gives to the CONSOB also the
sanet ioning powers provided under Art. 2377 of the Codice 
civile (civil code).?^ The law also improves the 
administrative structure of companies, by introducing
standards for identifying the partners of a listed
company, for indicating the real assets and relationships 
between listed companies, on the one hand, and
participating companies on the other, by overcoming
formal barriers of evidence as to shares or quotas in
company ownership. Furthermore, under Art. 20, par. 3,
publication is prescribed for a prospectus containing 
information and notices relating to a company or
corporate entity the stocks of which are admitted for 
listing on the stock market in accordance with 
requirements prescribed by the CONSOB. Art. 13 refers
also to the requirement of a semi-annual report.
The fundamental legislation in its substance marked 
by an intensification of links, strengthening ties
between standards governing the control bodies, on the
one hand, and standards governing the stock markets on 
the other, and since the inception of Law 281/1985,
activity on the financial markets has been improving. On
May 20, 1986, the stock market index reached a highest
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level with 900,20 points, but downward trends on the 
world stock markets in October 1967 affected also the 
situation in Italy, and in September 1992 instability on 
international money markets led to a devaluation of the 
Italian Lire by seven per cent. Subsequently a period of 
recession affected also the situation in Italy. As a
result, the stock market in Milan dropped to half the 
level of its historic high referred to above,?*
A 1 1 in a 1 1 the latest reform of the CONSOB has, as a 
merit, transformed the CONSOB from a mere organ of 
control for companies and for the stock market to a body 
of governance for the stock market in its global meaning. 
Furthermore, new legislative texts regulating the
activities of stock market intermediaries and standards 
for the organisation of the stock markets (No. 1 of 
January 2, 1991, G.U! No. 3, January 4, 1991; "insider
dealing" (No. 157, May 17, 1991, GU, No. 116, May 20
1991); and standards applicable to public offers for 
shares, subscription acquisition or exchange of shares 
(No. 149, February 12, 1992, G.U. No, 43, February 12,
1992), This development justifies the conclusion that 
within the framework of an organic structure, the
regulation and to a certain extent, the fundamental
restructurisation of the activities of the stock markets 
in Italy have been promoted.
114
2. Legal Personality
Applying the French legislative approach, the Law
216/74 made originally no reference to the legal nature 
of CONSOB. This has led to the claim, on one side, that 
the CONSOB possessed herewith implicit legal personality, 
while on the other side it has been alleged that the 
legislator did not intend to endow the CONSOB with legal 
personality. Probably in order to put an end to a sterile 
debate, Art. 1 of the Law 281 of June 4 1985 explicitly 
attributed legal personality to the CONSOB. While this 
has generated further discussions on the topic, attention 
should be given to the question of the real autonomy of 
the CONSOB.
The recognition of the legal personality of CONSOB 
confirms the CONSOB as a subject endowed with autonomous 
powers, in the first place for the purpose of 
establishing for itself its own internal order. In this 
respect it is comparable with the French COB as a model 
created by positive law, as an independent administrative 
authority separate from the general executive and 
administrative arm of the state authority. This 
underlines the autonomy of the CONSOB, be it at an 
institutional or political level, within the general 
framework of the legal order as a whole.??
Such an independence or autonomy is not a novelty in
the Italian legal tradition, that is, historically, in 
relations between the administrative and political 
spheres of the state. Admittedly, however, with due 
regard to the principle of legality, the subjection of
state administration to the rule of law in the form of
legislative texts has served the purpose of defending the 
administration from political influence and endowing it 
with a non-political quality.?® In due time the concepts 
of impartiality and objectivity have undergone a profound 
transformation parallel to the increasing
___________________ L:____ :_________:_________ ____ ___
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responsibilities assumed by the state in administration 
for the sake of safeguarding interests of general nature 
and for complying with the imperatives of independence. 
Independence is not tantamount to guarantees applicable 
to the functions of a civil servant, but extends also to 
the entire operative sphere of administration. Beyond 
doubt it may be submitted that by an explicit recognition 
of the legal personality of the CONSOB, the Italian legal 
system has acted differently than the French system. In 
France, preference has been given not to have a defined 
express recognition of legal personality for the COB, 
because French law looks at substance, not at the formal 
aspect of legal personality. In this way, French law has 
the same approach as the law in the UK,
However, the question of legal personality should 
not be confounded with the question of the autonomy and 
independence of the CONSOB. Legal personality is by 
itself not sufficient to insure the autonomy and 
independence and, inversely, autonomy and independence 
may not presuppose necessarily the existence of legal 
personality. Autonomy is a substantive fact which may 
not by itself accompany the formal .recognition or award 
of legal personality. The recognition of legal 
personality could constitute a mode for avoiding 
confrontation with the substantive problem of CONSOB’s 
autonomy. Possibly, with this very point in mind, the 
French legislator has avoided clarifying the question of 
the legal personality of the COB, In Italy, the necessity 
was felt to have an institution endowed with a large 
scope of autonomous action, independence accompanied with 
the highest standards of professional quality: a type of 
"economic judicial authority". { "mag i s t r a t ura economica") 
enjoying credibility and prestige.
Such a situation cannot be created, however, with 
the proclamation of a decree, nor can it be achieved in a
  _
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single day. It can be but the result of a process In 
which the quality of the government, the quality of
initiatives deployed by commissioners as members of the 
CONSOB, their professional qualifications, the impact of 
their collaborators, and the existence of an economic and 
professional environment all contribute to help the 
actions of CONSOB assume concrete form.
CONSOB is endowed with legal personality as a
subject of public law, with full autonomy within the
scope determined by law. Thus, no longer is any decree by 
the Ministry of the Treasury necessary for implementing a 
decision by the CONSOB, and in any case in which the 
participation by the Ministry is provided for, such 
participation concerns the question of the legitimacy of 
the act by CONSOB and not its substantive merits. A major 
guarantee is anchored in the particular requirement that 
a majority of four fifths shall prevail for decisions. 
The relationship between the CONSOB and Ministry of the 
Treasury is regulated comprehensively, and there is
provision for dissolution of the CONSOB in case of 
functional paralysis or continued inactivity.
2 a
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3, Organisation of CONSOB
The CONSOB, as a collective body governed by public 
law, consists of five members who hold office for five 
years and may be re-elected once.?’ They are nominated by 
decree of the President of the Republic upon proposal by 
the President of the Council (Presidents del Consiglio) 
after consultations with the Council of Ministers 
(cabinet). The nominations are subject to scrutiny by a 
competent parliamentary commission, as provided for by 
the Law of January 24, 1978, No'. 14.
Underlying the collegiate nature of CONSOB has been 
the realisation that the plurality and complexity of 
functions entrusted to CONSOB could be best coped with by 
a collegiate body.^o CONSOB's collegiate nature has been 
confirmed by the Law of June 4, 1985, No. 281. It lays
down the procedural dimensions of CONSOB's functions as 
that of a collegiate body, thus delimiting the functions 
of CONSOB's President. A qualified forum is prescribed 
for some of the decisions of major importance (Art. 25, 
para 1 and 2 of the CONSOB regulation).
For decisions of highest importance, a majority of 
four votes is required. For the adoption of internal 
organisational and accountancy rules, in addition to the 
four votes within the CONSOB, the control of legitimacy 
by the President of the Council of Ministers is required, 
whereafter he approves them for implementation by issuing 
a relevant decree (Art. 25, para. 9 of the CONSOB
regulation).
It goes without saying that for the nomination of
CONSOB members, persons considered for office must
evidence high standards of proven competence, experience, 
unchallengeable morality and impartiality.^* Some 
standards of incompatibility with office in CONSOB have 
been established. Art. 1, par. 5 of the Law 216/74 has 
laid down that members of CONSOB may not indulge in any
 : ;
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activity outside their functions within CONSOB; as
consultants, administrators, partners in companies with 
limited liability or in commercial undertakings; as
auditors; be in any way dependent on commercial 
enterprises or of public or private undertakings, nor act 
as public officials of any kind. A curiosity is that no 
similar catalogue of incompatibility is foreseen for the 
office of the CONSOB President.^?
Minervini^s points out that the activities of the 
CONSOB are not subjected to any control by the executive 
arm of the state, thus making the CONSOB a sort of 
"economic judicial authority governed solely by the law", 
with evident reference to Art. 101 of the Italian 
Constitution.34 However, some functional link exists 
between CONSOB and the executive part of the state 
authority. This link is peculiar in that a flow of
information from CONSOB to the Ministry of the Treasury
has to be maintained, not only for keeping the Ministry 
informed about the situation on the market, but also for 
enabling the Ministry to assess continually the 
intentions and activities of the CONSOB. In this respect, 
Minervini points out that the executive arm of the state 
authority has recovered its possibility to influence the 
decisions of CONSOB, while by virtue of the law CONSOB is 
a completely autonomous authority.^®
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4. Functions and powers of the CONSOB; regulatory 
powers as a quasi-legislative function
The functions of CONSOB concern fundamentally :
1) Matters related to the stock and financial
markets ;
2) Matters related to companies and information
related to companies.
In comments related to the intended conversion of 
the Decree-Law of April 8, 1974, No. 95 into more
elaborate legislation, the government expressed the view
that CONSOB should restore the trust of investors in the 
stock market and should propose solutions to some of the 
felt needs of the stock market, so that the flow of 
investment could be reactivated in productive sectors. 
With the creation of CONSOB concrete expression should be 
given to the tenets of good information, adequate levels 
of savings, contractual freedom, equality, with due
regard to justiciability applicable to powers related to
information, contractual activities etc., under exclusion 
of any "contamination" of political nature.’*
The essential functions of CONSOB are referred to 
summarily in Art. 3, para, c of the Law 216/14: 
"ascertain the exactitude and completeness of information 
and notices communicated to the public". The same Art, 3 
under para, g refers to the "control of the operations of 
the individual stock markets and checking the pegularity 
and the modes of transactions involved in the 
intermediation and negotiation of stocks listed on the 
stock market."
in substance, the duty of CONSOB is to exercise, 
with reliable standards of objectivity and ability to 
act, public control promoting market transparency both on 
the stock markets as well as in the conduct of companies, 
so that investors can be adequately protected and the 
good standard can prevail in private contractual
A'-/' _ _ __
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transact i ons.’?
CONSOB, beyond a duty to regulate adequate standards 
of information and transparency serving the interests of 
investors, has also a responsibility to see that new 
(atypical) forms of investment incompatible with
prevailing and desirable forms do not find access to the 
market.’®
In the fulfilment of its functions and
responsibilities, CONSOB acts directly or through other 
intermediary organs subject to its supervision such as 
auditing firms.
The powers of CONSOB are also of relevance
externa Ily.
In conclusion, if prior to the mini-reform of 1985 
the CONSOB could have been defined as an organ of
governmental authority attached to the Ministry of the 
Treasury without a necessary relationship of dependence 
from the Ministry, currently the major competences
awarded to the CONSOB, in terms of autonomy by virtue of 
enacted legislation, apart from the attribution of a 
legal personality, makes CONSOB into a so to speak 
auxiliary organ of the state.
 :  ^
121
5. Financial administration, personnel and seat of 
CONSOB
In agreement with the autonomous status it enjoys, 
CONSOB financially too enjoys autonomy. The expenses 
(which the law euphemistically defines as "indemnities" 
are determined and approved by decree of the President of 
the Council, upon proposal from the Minister of the 
Treasury (Art. 1, para 4, Law 216/74), In 1991, 
expenditure totalled Ital.Lire 42,000m; 72.9 per cent
were expenses for personnel, 19.9 per cent for 
administration, and 7.22 per cent for the acquisition of 
property.
In 1992 expenditure amounted to Ital.L. 73,960m, 
with 73.1 per cent of it being spent for personnel, 5.2 
per cent for the acquisition of p r o p e r t y . * ?  p y  the end of 
December 1993, the number of CONSOB staff was 318.
The choice of Rome as CONSOB seat instead of Milan 
as the traditionally most important Stock Exchange in 
Italy, has been a bureaucratic d e c i s i o n , A  second seat 
in Milan has been established by the Law No. 176 of April 
1981, under the Presidency of Guido Rossi. Finally, Milan 
was defined as the principal seat of the Stock Exchange 
Council by Law No. 1 of January 2, 1991 (art. 24).
Secondary seats may be established at the site of each 
stock market.
1
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6. The exercise of the functions of the
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financ i a 1
intermediaries and the organisation of the stock 
markets (Law No. 1 of January 2, 1991)
1. Regulation of Activities of Intermediaries on 
the Stock Market and the Societa di 
Intermediazione Mobiliare (S.I.N.)
Law No. 1 of January 2, 1991 (JO n.3 of January 4,
1991) governing the regulation of the activities of
intermediaries on the stock market and concerning also 
various standards affecting the organisation of the stock 
markets came into force after a long and stormy 
parliamentary stage.
It is a legislative instrument with an ample scope 
and innovative dimensions affecting the set of rules 
regulating the financial markets. The notion itself of 
" inter mediazione rnobiliare" (intermediation on the 
financial market) was extensively modified and now 
embraces in substance the entire range of activities 
related to stocks. The term "valori mobiliari" has in
turn been defined in such a way as to include 
omn i conipr ehens i ve 1 y all contractual aspects.
Title 1 of the Law concerns the regulation of the
activities of intermediation related to stocks; Title II 
concerns provisions affecting the organisation of stock 
markets.
The essential elements of reforms introduced by the 
Law are, in essence ;
a) Allocation of the activities of exchange agents 
to and substitution thereof by a corporate structure: the 
SIM (Societa di intermediazione Mob i 1iare)
b) Multifunctionality of the intermediary;
c) Monitoring or control of those acting as
intermed iar i es ;
d) Obligation to treat negotiations with a 
concentrated approach;
______________ ___________________
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0 ) Introduction and establishment of a national 
compensation fund;
f) Establishment of the Consiglio di Borsa.
a) Replacement of stock exchange agents by a SIM as 
a corporate entity and allocation of the activities of 
agents to SIM.
The purpose of Law No. 1/91 has been to reorganise 
the services of the stock market intermediaries by
replacing the preexisting framework wherein all or
almost all activities were treated liberally or were
regulated with reference to a specific group such as the
exchange agents and to the place where the activities 
were exercised. The then existing fragmentary and
dispersed organisational approach was characterised by 
the existence of a number of agents with sufficiently
ample and diversified functions and services which were 
offered, and the same remark applied to their 
organisational nature.
Until January 1991, the Agents di Cambio (exchange 
agent) was exclusively competent to be in charge of 
negotiations in the stock market, with access to the 
grida and matters of quotation were part of their 
reserved domain. Banks were able to offer a wide variety
of services but were governed by precise limitations
related to their particular statutes, while 
commissioners acted multifunctionally including acting on 
their own behalf.*2
Art. 1 of the Law No. 1/1991 not only abolished the 
functions of the Agente di Cambio, but also excluded 
physical persons from the sphere of activities as 
intermediaries in the stock market. Such activities of 
intermediation were transferred and reserved to legal
persons organised as stock companies (societa per azioni 
CS.p.A.) or possibly as societa in accomandita per azioni 
(S.A.p.A.) (in which part of the partners would be
 : : '
-.   ■ ■ ' :«7g7
124
exposed to unlimited liability).
The law opted for the single notion or category of a 
multifunctional intermediary, authorised to participate
in all transactions of the stock market, transactions 
which earlier were affected by a myriad of agents, 
corporate entities and credit institutes, societa 
fiduciare (trusts), commissionary stock market firms, 
stock market agents, insurance companies, financial firms 
of various forms.
However, not only SIMs may act as intermediaries on
the stock market, credit companies and institutes too may
operate as intermediaries, in agreement with the second 
EEC Directive related to the coordination of banking 
activities (89/646/EEC) In the meaning of Decree-Law Mo, 
481 of December 14 1992 (O.J, No. 296, December 17,
1992), which has implemented the above mentioned EC 
Directive, credit establishment in the EC (since November 
1st 1993) may establish branch offices in Italy or may
transact in Italy directly within the whole range of
mutually recognised activities, that is, without prior
authorisation (Art. 13, par. 3, and Art. 14, par. 1 and
3). This rule applies to credit undertakings to all 
financial institutions which have their seat in an EC 
member state and are controlled by one or more credit 
undertakings with a seat in the same member state (Art. 
15, par. 2, Decree-Law 481/92).
What has been said above with reference to banking
institutions within the EC concerns licensed entities. 
Not licensed intermediaries within the EG shall not 
benefit under Community law for activities in Italy, 
unless they form a SIM under Italian 1 aw with a
registered seat within the territory of Italy (Art, 3, 
par. 2, a) of the Law of 1/91), or may avail themselves 
of an already existing SIM acting as an 
agent/representative for them, as provided for in Art. 5
____________________________________________
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of t he Regulation CRe go 1 amento) of the Bank of Italy of 
July 2 1991, which empowers a SIM to act as a
representative of non-Italian intermediaries. This 
limitation affecting non-Italian entities has been 
rightly considered to be contrary to the principle of
freedom of establishment within the EC and with Arts. 52, 
53, 59 and 60 of the EC Treaty. This limitation has been
definitively condemned by the ISO.**
Art, 16 of the Law indicates clearly that functions 
as an intermediary exercised by a bank shall be governed 
by the same rules as those relating to a SIM. Thus a 
unified approach applies to the transactions of an 
intermediary, be it by a firm of the stock market or by a 
bank, and investors too are governed by the same system 
of reguI at ion.
Besides the SIM as new intermediaries credit firms 
and institutes shall continue to operate if authorised 
accordingly by the Bank of Italy. They shall be, however, 
responsible to distinguish between activities as 
intermediary, on the one hand, and their other activities 
in the areas of accountancy or internal organisation,
A SIM itself shall not be allowed to operate unless 
authorised or approved by CONSOB, which shall put the 
name of the given SIM in the relevant registry of firms 
acting as intermediaries, indicating in addition the
activities for which the intermediary has already been
given authorisation.
As already mentioned, a SIM must be constituted as a 
stock company or commandita per azioni, and the corporate 
identification text of the SIM has to include the terms 
"societa di intermediazione mobiIiare" (licenced as 
intermediary on the stock market), its registered seat 
must be situated in Italy, and the corporate capital 
(capitale sociale) has to be paid at a level not lower 
than thrice the capital prescribed for the formation of
■ /  y 'K -T
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stock companies., that is, a minimum capital of 
Ital.L.600m, or to a higher amount determined by the 
Banca d ’ Italia in agreement with the CONSOB. It goes 
without saying that normative standards govern the 
question of qualification competences of persons 
expected to act as members of a SIM, The law has been 
preoccupied with the guaranty for investors based on high 
professional qualifications and the integrity of persons 
responsible to manage the financial assets of other 
persons. Thus, the protective net for safeguarding the 
assets of investors is reinforced not only by the 
institutional structures of intermediaries, but also 
qualities attached to natural persons active in the 
administrative organs involving persons who monitor or 
control t her:.
The authorisation of a SIM may be withdrawn by the 
Ministry of the Treasury upon proposal by the Bank of 
Italy or CONSOB (Art. 16, last par. )
On December 31 1992, there were 285 authorised SIMs
with, geographically the largest concentration in 
Northern Italy. As to natural or legal persons 
constituting these SIMs, there were 121 natural persons, 
55 credit institutes, 52 financial groups, 27 stock 
market agencies, nine insurance companies and 21 non- 
Italian banks,44 On December 31, 1993, the SIMs decreased
to 267 of which 121 were control led by natural persons, 
55 by Italian credit institutions and 27 by foreign 
credit institutions.'^* The SIM's process of concentration 
is destined to undergo an acceleration in the coming 
years (see II Sole 24 ORE of October 16, 1994, p. 20)
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a , Multifunctionality of the intermediary 
A multifunctional approach to the tasks of an 
intermediary corresponds to an internal trend, and it is 
not that new for developments in Italy. A great number of 
complementary functions were fulfilled by a person: the
execution of orders, the administration of stocks, tasks 
related to planned stock offers etc. Licensed bodies too 
acted as brokers as well as dealers.
The notion of multifunctionality is also related to 
the second EC Directive relating to the harmonisation of 
banking institutions' activities, and to the Decree-Law 
No. 481/92 implementing the Directive, wherewith banking 
institutions would be enabled to deploy, in addition to 
banking activities, also activities as stock market 
intermediaries. For guaranteeing a maximum of neutrality 
or objectivity by the intermediary negotiator, it is 
prescribed exhaustively for banks that the principle of 
functional specialisation, making it clear that the 
function of a negotiator is to be treated as a function
incompatible with the strict meaning of banking
activities. Therewith applying the principle of a rigid 
separation of services offered as an intermediary from
other services offered as a banker, a functional 
specialisation is intended and prescribed, and all in all 
progress is made toward the promotion of a proper sector 
of services by intermediaries in the developing stock
markets of Italy.
"A--
1 2 0
b ) Supervision and control of the intermediaries 
Prior to the Law No. 1/91, stock market 
intermediaries were not governed by a strictu sensu 
system of monitoring and vigilance.'**
Now the philosophy underlying the system of 
vigilance applicable to the SIMs is that of a real and 
proper administrative control affecting the activities of 
the physical and/or legal persons concerned, as a sort of 
dirigistic and functional responsibility of those to whom 
it addresses itself.^?
The system of supervision and control is initiated 
already at the level of authorisation or licensing. 
Beyond it, the allocation of control competences is based 
on Art, 9 of the Law No. 1/1991, which refers to CONSOB 
as a body of vigilance of great importance for 
monitoring the quantity and quality of information 
supplied to investors, the standards of regularity 
applied to negotiations affecting stocks; the Bank of 
Italy is mentioned by the Law with reference to the 
stability of monitoring. In this respect there is an 
element of so to speak institutionalised delegation by 
CONSOB to the Bank of Italy relating to the supervision 
of banking institutions, and vice versa there is in turn 
a delegation of control from the Bank to CONSOB relating 
to the activities of SIM's and trusts (societa 
fiduciarie). Thus there is a segmental sharing of the 
same market between the CONSOB and the Bank of Italy. 
CONSOB concentrates on the prerequisite qualities of 
transparency and the Bank of Italy pays particular 
attention to aspects affecting market stability. This may 
be referred to also as a functional division of 
vigilance, and the result of a difficult compromise with 
unpredictable consequences.'*®
What has been said above may generate a doubt: Does
the system of outlined vigilance applied to
______
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intermediaries have bureaucratic or dirigistic dimensions 
while protecting the interests of investors? Could it 
possibly inhibit the freedom and economic or financial 
initiative of firms acting as intermediaries? The optimal 
efficiency of the stock markets may possibly require also 
a coordinated system ' of auto- or se If-regulation 
operative within the category of the participants in the 
market.*^
The Law no 1/1991 (in arts 4-5-14 and 25) introduced 
some penal dispositions concerning the financial markets. 
Until 1974, only the unauthorised exercise of the 
Exchange Agent profession was punished by Art 53 of the 
Law no 272 of March 20, 1913. The principal penal
dispositions of the Law no 1/1991 are the following:
- Art. 14 punished with arrest (6 months to four years) 
the unauthorised exercise of intermediary activity;
- Art. 14 par 4 obliges the SIMs to communicate to the 
Bank of Italy any changes in the control and in the 
composition of the corporate bodies. The sanctions 
consist in arrest up to three months or a fine from 
Italian lire 2 millions to 40 millions. It is worth 
noting tha.t the powers of Independent Administrative 
Agencies do not include a guarantee for the due process. 
The procedures of such Agencies do not have the high 
standards of professionality and independence associated 
with judicial powers. This could lead to distortions. We 
should not forget that administrative sanctions have been 
particularly used by authoritarian regimes.
S' - ■
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c ) Duty to concentrate Transactions
Art. 11, par. 1 of the Law No. 1/1991 introduces a 
principle not always heeded by market participants : that 
of the obligatory concentration of transactions in 
markets regulated and where different shares are traded. 
It is a principle intending to yield in due time 
benefits, be they in the form of developing markets or in 
the form of promoting, through concentration at a single 
place, better levels in quotations and therewith better 
benefits to the investors.
The purpose of the rule is to "guarantee a parity" 
in the way the clients are treated.^* CONSOB has pointed 
to the need of the said principles in 1987, making its 
absence responsible for part of the deficient functioning 
of the markets. It has been observed that any transaction 
effected outside the market of reference involved lesser 
protection affecting investors, be it because the 
transact ion 1 ay outside the proper market mechan ism, or 
because therewith the quality of prices or quotations 
were not what the proper market may have generated. 
However, transactions outside the proper market site may 
take place if "the client ordains or authorises 
accordingly, in writing and if therewith a better 
quotation or deal for the client may be expected". (Art 
11 par. 2). A second derogation from the principle is 
provided under Art. 11, par. 9 of the Law and 'by virtue 
of the CONSOB Regulation No. 5552 of November 14 1991. 
Agreements in derogation of the contents of Art. 11 are 
to be treated as void.
In 1992, that is, in the first year of application 
of the principle of concentration, it was still difficult 
to assess what the beneficiary impact of the principle 
had been on the market and on the interests of 
investors.52
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d ) Establishment of a National Fund of Guaranty or 
Compensât 1 on
The fund, created by Art. 15 par. 1 of the Law of
No. 1/1991, has been regulated by the Finance Ministry 
(Decree of September 30, 1991). On March 25, 1990, as
proposed by the CONSOB, the fund was integrated with the 
Bank of Italy. In 1993 there were 4 collapses 1 exchange 
agent and 3 SIMs. In the Annual Report it recounted that 
the fund is not adequate to the l o s s e s . 3 Participation 
thereto Is compulsory, but contributions may not be 
higher than two per cent of income derived from 
activities as an intermediary, with due regard to the
structure of various risks affecting the active side of 
the intermediary's balance (Art. 15, par. 3, Law No. 
1/1991). 18 SIMs were involved in failures affecting 13
thousand clients. These clients may possibly recover a 
small part of their invested assets. Only a negligible
part of the recovery payments wilI come from the National
Fund of guaranty because its total capital assets 
amounted only to Italian lire 10 billions, (See 11 SOLE 
24 ORE of October 16, 1994, p. 20)
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i i) Organisation of the Stock Markets
Title I I of the Law no 1/1991 has transformed the 
entire structure of the stock markets (subdivided into 10 
exchanges) by integrating them into a single national 
market related or connected to each other by means of
information and telematic systems. CONSOB is in additi.on
empowered to establish markets, also of local importance 
for trading in non-quoted shares (O T C ). A further 
innovation of relevance to trans-frontier trading within 
the EC and possibly beyond, is that of "recognition" and 
agreements of cooperation between the CONSOB, on the one 
hand, and corresponding institutions or bodies of control 
of financial markets abroad, wherewith market
intermediaries will be in a position to have access to 
markets outside Italy, thus extending the geographical 
scope of their transactions beyond the frontiers of 
Italy.
In 1992 the Mercato Italiano del Future (MIF) sui 
Buoni del Tesoro Poliennali (BTP), the Italian Futures 
Market for long term treasury bonds, started its 
act ivities.*^^
A Council of the Stock Market (Consilio di Borsa) 
was created by Art. 24 of Law 1/91. It consists of 14
members. One of them is appointed by CONSOB, one by the
Bank of Italy (Banca d ’ Italia), a third Is nominated by 
the cameral consortium responsible for the coordination 
of stock markets; seven members represent the SIMs, while 
two act as representatives of corporate bodies and credit 
institutes authorised to act as f inancial/stock market 
intermediaries; a further two members represent companies 
and enterprises' issuing shares traded on the stock and 
restricted markets. Members designated by CONSOB and the 
Bank of Italy are not eligible for the posts of Council 
President and Vice-President. The Council of the Stock 
Market is appointed for a period of three years by a
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decree of the Ministry of the Treasury. Beside its
principal seat in Milan, it has secondary seats at the
site of each stock market.
The Consiglio di Borsa can exercise the totality of 
powers and attributions already allocated to the chambers 
of commerce, to the commissions per il listino and to 
deputations of the stock market. (Art. 24 of the Law No.
1/91). The Consiglio di Borsa may delegate to the
chambers of commerce the exercise of competences. (Art. 
24, par. 1). The innovative institution of the Consiglio 
dl Borsa is based on the principle of concentration not 
so much physical as informational functions of the stock 
market; it is based on comparable positive experiences 
gained in foreign stock markets,
Minervini““ makes the interesting observation .that 
undeniably, the legislator, with respect to the
organisation of the markets, has used fantasy, and an 
awareness of the sense of responsibility to be exercised 
by a controlling authority, by providing a real and
proper delegation to the Consiglio di Borsa, as evidence 
of trust on the part of the legislative power in the
executive arm of government.
_____________      . .
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1. The Italian state spending deficit has reached Italian 
lire 2,000,000 billions in 1994. (See La Repubblica of
January 20, 1995, p. 44,)
2. The Italian economic structure is dominantly based on
small and medium sized enterprises. This structure rests 
on Roman and Renaissance traditions.
3. The Bank of Italy govenor, in the annual meeting of
May 31, 1994 has defined "essential'" the role of banks
for the development of financial markets in Italy, (see 
Riv. Soc. no. 3 (1994), p. 613.
4. According to OECD, the Italian family savings first in 
the world until 1992, have decreased in 1993 to a third 
place after Belgium and Portugal. (See IL SOLE ORE of 
July 13, 1934).
5. A- Marzano, la Pinanziarizzazione della Economica 
Italian^a, in Studi in memoria di F, Piga, (1992), vol. 
2, p. 1521.
6. G. Cottino, La Commissione per le Societa e la Borse.;
luci ed ombre della mini-riforma, in G iursprudenza 
Commerciale (1974), p. 439.
7, For example, the power given by Art 2 to the CONSOB to 
"determine", "order" and "statute" has been changed in 
"can determine" 
discretionary powers.
"can orde/'and can statute", giving more
8. G. Rossi, 11 Mercato Finanziario dopo la legge 216, in 
Riv, Soc., vol. 29, p. 2.
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9' P* G . Jaeger, la legge No. 281 e i nuovl poteri della 
CONSOB, in Guirlsprudenza Commerciale (1985), p. 946.
10. G. Rossi, op. cit. (note 8 above), p. 1.
11. CONSOB Report 1983, p. 33.
12. La Repubblica of January 10, 1992, p, 1.
13. Art. 18 of the 1 aw 216/1974 laid down the first rules 
on information as a matter of transparency relating to 
the activities of operators and the market,
14. La Repubblica of January 10, 1992, p. 1.
15. Sindona had indulged in extensive fraud. He died in 
1986 in a maximum security prison. See La Repubblica of 
April 20, 1992.
16. There were many penal proceedings and sentences. See 
La Repubblica of July 30, 1994,
17. La Repubblica of January 10, 1992, p. 1.
18. Fiat is growing and Carlo De Benedetti has already 
started building his empire.
19. J.Ü. n. 85 of March 28, 1983.
20. N. Marzona, op. cit., (Chap, 4 note 17), p. 16,
21. G. Rossi, op. cit., (note 8 above), p. 11.
22. G. Minervini, la CONSOB (1989), p. 27.
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23. A. Jannuzzi, la Consob (1990) pag. 27.
24. Art. 20 comma 2 "L’ammissione di un titolo alia 
quotazione di borsa puo' essere subordinato dalla 
Commissione, ne 1 solo intéressé degli investitori, a 
condizioni particolari, che devono essere comunlcate a 1 
richiedente."
25. ex Art. 2377 the CONSOB has the power to challenge 
decisions of listed companies.
26. CONSOB Report 1992, p. 59,
27. N. Marzona, op, cit., (Chap 4, note 17), p. 261,
28. Ibidem, p. 264.
29. art. 1, para, 3 and 5 of law n. 216/74.
30. N . Marzona, op. cit., (Chap. 4, note 17), p. 230.
31. art, 1, para 3, of 1 aw n . 216/74.
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33. G, Minervini, op. cit. (note 22 above), p. 40.
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Q h a p__,t.
The United Kingdom ; The SIB
1, Development of the British System
The landscape and regulation of British financial 
markets has undergone significant changes in the 1980s, A 
main instrument for the changes has been the Financial 
Services Act 1Ô3S. In the history of financial regulation 
X n the United Kingdom it has been the most complete 
normative instrument since the Joint Stock Companies Act 
of Gladstone in 1844.* The reform has aimed inter alia 
rightly at the consolidation of the position of London as 
a leading financial centre at an international 
competitive level, by establishing clear rules of conduct 
addressed in general to all British and non-British 
operators. The new rules have been introduced to remedy 
manifest gaps found in the traditional approach of self­
regulation in a modern and increasingly complex market 
system.
The economic results of the introduced reforms we r e 
soon manifestly clear and positive : London succeeded to
confirm its position as the capital of financial 
capitals. Already in 1987, members of the international 
stock exchange in London were, in the wake of reforms, in 
a position to claim to have a truly cosmopolitan market 
function starting in March 1987 at a time when foreigners 
were authorised to be in charge of firms participating in 
transactions on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) market. 
Of the then 338 members of the' LSE 71 were owned by non- 
British firms, those from the USA being with 32 the most 
numerous among them; followed by those owned by the 
French (8), the Canadians and the Danes, Only four firms 
were from Japan.%
Looking at it from a socio-legal angle the PSA 1986
_______
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represents an uneasy compromise between the views of 
those, who would like to retain se If-regulation and the 
views of those who do not believe that self-regulation 
alone couiii provide adequate protection for investors. 
The new system governing the regulation of financial 
services in the UK is thus a combination of the two
principles of central or government supervised
regulation, on the one hand., and se If-regulation on the 
other. Having stated this, it is difficult, however, to 
establish clearly as to which of the two principles is 
the more dominant, just as it is still difficult today, 
to make the two principles in question "co-exist" in the 
new system.
When confronted with the alternative of a choice 
between the two principles of centralised or self­
regulated systems in terms of pure models, there has
been, when preparing the review of the traditional
regulatory system, an attempt to avoid a complete break 
with the past (of se If-régulât ion), thus preferring to 
tread the difficult path of both continuity and
innovation. The search for a just balance between "self-
regulation" and "statutory" regulation has tried to do 
justice to the attempt to retrieve the tradition of self­
regulation with reform(s) at the level of statutory 
regulation. Reforming without denying the positive
lessons of the past has been a guiding tenet, just as
regard for tradition and for cultural and doctrinal roots 
has been in consideration in the mutations in question in 
the 19 30s.
Nevertheless, the introduction of the new system has 
raised and continues to raise doubts, questions, pre­
occupations and to meet resistance. After a long a.nd
uninterrupted tradition of "self-regulation" that has 
characterised the history of British stock markets since 
their origins, the idea of control and supervision by
 :________
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central (state) authorities has generated understandable 
reactions. For professionals active in the stock markets, 
the thought of continuing along the path of tradition of 
"se If-regulation" seemed particularly attractive and 
tempting, while at the same time, in new dimensions of 
globality and competitiveness, a new approach to 
regulatory dimensions commended itself as no less 
necessary and urgent.
The FSA 1986 has been amply criticised. In 
Parliamentary debate Sir Gordon Borrie has underlined the 
"impenetrability" of the rules set up by the SIB, and 
Robin Cook has attacked the length, the language and 
complexity of the texts of the rules,= Also in the report 
by the Director General of Fair Trading to the Secretary 
of State on the rules adopted by the SIB, worry is 
detectable as to the scope and complexity of the rules, 
apart from the already above mentioned points of 
impenetrability of the language used and of the enormous 
quantity of cross-references in the texts. While it was 
partially accepted that such a situation was partially 
inevitable, it has been asserted that the meaning of what 
was supposed to be said would probably be difficult to 
understand by those called upon to apply such rules as 
well as by those for whom the rules would have meaningful 
significance.4 |t has in general been claimed that the 
scale and complexity of the rules in question has to be 
qualified as "disproportionate" to the activities which 
the rules are intended to regulate.^
The hybrid solution, which provides that the 
principle of' self-regulation should operate witfiin a 
framework resting on statutorily adopted standards, could 
be capable to impede the effective functioning of a self- 
regulatory system when the latter has to be characterised 
principally by qualities of flexibility and speed of 
adaptation as well as respect for the spirit and the
: •• - ________________________ ______
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wording of what is to be applied.* The impression is that 
the resulting hybrid approach which has been adopted is 
producing not a few problems of its own. The relationship 
between the role of the SIB and the role of SROs is one 
of the difficulties in question, in addition to the fact 
that determining the content of the Core Conduct of 
Business Rules dramatises the situation.' Charles 
Goodhart® has critically pointed out that less costly 
methods could and should have been taken into 
consideration for protecting investors, just as less 
severe penalties should have been considered for those 
violating rules, in addition to greater transparency for 
public information. David Lomax, economist with the 
National Westminster Bank, has observed that the cost of 
the new regime of control is much higher than that of any 
losses suffered by investors in the wake of scandals of 
recent years.’ A 1 1 that has been said above seems to 
validate the theory that "The need to revitalise and 
restructure the economic and financial institutions of 
the City /of London/ was dictated more by political and
economic considerations than an admitted deficiency in
regulation and supervision,"*®
Models scrutinised for the purpose of reforming the 
financial mai'kets have been substantially of two types :
1) A system concentrating on regulatory
responsibility in a single statutory regulator;
2) A two-tiered structure.
The first, as a model is a product of the legal
tradition of civil law, and has been correspondingly
adopted in France and Italy. The second approach, related 
to the common law tradition, has been applied in the USA. 
Although "the City has always harboured an almost
paranoid fear that it would have a governmental body
similar to the United States' SEC imposed upon it", * * 
has opted for the second system, as a choice
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substantially motivated by a necessity "to avoid a 
bureaucratic juggernaut of a regulator and to ensure 
common sense and flexibility".*^ It should also be noted 
that preference for a two-tiered system is due, if not in 
the first place, to the possibility this system offers 
for retaining alive the secular or pragmatic tradition of 
self-regulation. Thus continuity and tradition seem to 
have inspired the nature of the Big Bang. The term Big 
Bang may be used in two meanings ;
—  As the series of changes introduced on October 
27, 1986 Ï
-- As the entire process of deregulation extending 
over the course of several years.
In the second meaning, the Big Bang is in reality a 
process with profound and varied roots.
In March 1877, the report of the Royal Commission to 
look into the administration and operation of the Stock 
Exchange "recognised a great public advantage in the fact 
that those who bought and sold for the public in a market 
of such enormous magnitude ... should be bound in their 
dealings by rules for the enforcement of fair dealing and 
the repression of fraud, capable of affording relief and 
exercising restraint far more prompt and often more 
satisfactorily than any within reach of the Court of 
law". The commissioner recommended that inquiries into 
fraud and suspicious dealings should be undertaken 
promptly by "some public functionary and enforced by 
1 aw"* =*
In 1938 the Prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act was 
passed. The Act prohibited dealing in securities except 
by persons who obtained a licence from the DTI. A member 
of a recognised stock exchange or recognised association 
of dealers in securities was not required to obtain a 
1icence.
Section 14 of the Act imposed a general prohibition
______________I_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ ;
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on the distribution of investment circulars inviting 
investment. * * The Licenced Dealers (Conduct of Business) 
Rules 1933 (31 1983 N.585) introduced a number of new
and radical concepts, like the Chinese Walls, an 
obligation of "know your client". The scope of cold 
callings was restricted and dealers were held to 
generally accepted standards as to what constitutes "good 
market practice". The rules lacked any real sanction 
other than an unlikely disciplinary jurisdiction vested 
unenthusiastically in the DTI.*** Its provisions are 
considered "complicated and in places obscure".**
In 1964, the incoming Labour Government had created 
a new Department of Economic Affairs (DEA). A host of 
regulatory agencies were set up to work along side it. 
Regulatory agencies also survived the next change in 
governmental philosophy.*'
The sixties, and to a lesser extent the seventies, 
were decades of economic growth. In 1973, the oil crisis 
created a new demand for international finance. 
Intermediating these needs and recycling "petrodollars" 
confirmed the international role of the City.*"
In 1976 the Labour Government issued the Restrictive 
Trades Practices (Services) Order extending the scope of 
the restrictive practices legislation to the service 
sector.*’
In 1979 the Office of Fair Trading, the government 
agency charged with enforcing the Restrictive Practices 
Act 1976 decided that certain Stock Exchange rules did 
not conform to the law on restrictive trade practices and 
a court case was begun against the Exchange. The suit 
charged that the Exchange’s fixed commission rates and 
membership restrictions were illegal under the
Restrictive Practices Act.
In 1979, there was a change of government. The Stock 
Exchange was disappointed when t ii e Conservative
 : : :____________________________________
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Government refused to interfere despite urging from the
Bank of England. Mrs Thatcher has never been a supporter 
of the "club mentality" which characterised the City.*'®
In 1979 11) e Thatcher administration’s repeal of
currency restrictions made it possible for British 
investors to purchase foreign securities. The removal of 
exchange controls made easier for foreign investment
packages to move in and for British investors to move
their money out and invest abroad.
The late 1970s saw considerable growth in activity 
on the New York Stock Exchange following the abolition of 
minimum commission charges in 1975. Foreign securities 
firms, many of them American, found that since they were 
not bound by the London Securities Exchange’s fixed 
commission rate schedule they could compete successfully 
with London Stock Exchange members in trading equities of 
large capitalisation British companies. The erosion of 
business be came so severe by the early 1985 that the
exchange was obliged to appeal to the Dank of England and
the Board of Trade for protection from "off Exchange"
dealers,22
In 1980, the Wilson Committee (C1980) Cmnd 7987) had
reviewed the functioning of financial institutions in its
Report, while recognising the need to improve certain 
aspects of the system, "on the whole it thought that it 
worked tolerably well and was probably better tha.n any 
other system that could reasonably be devised".*'**
Professor Gower' observed^** that the Wilson Report
seemed to imply that in respect also of the balance 
between Governmental-regulation and se If-régulât ion the 
present balance is about right. He found it impossible to 
accept also because it seems to assume that, one of the 
two related distinctions, that between statutory and non- 
statutory regulation is more important than that between 
Governmental-regulation and self-regulation. He would
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have thought that the former is of less importance than
the latter.
"The approach in the UK has traditionally been by- 
devising methods of regulation which operate along less 
formalised lines than in most major countries, with less 
emphasis on statutes and more on non-statutory forms of 
regulation, especially s e 1 f - re gu 1 a t i on . However, the 
Wilson Report recognised that (Cmnd 7937, para 1073) 
’’there is little doubt that the overall tendency has been 
towards more, and more stringent, statutory controls” and 
”we do not regard it as acceptable that the regulation of 
financial institutions, particularly those as important 
as the Stock Exchange and Lloyd’s should be left entirely 
to the Institutions themselves” (Cmnd 7937, para 1108).
In July 1981, Professor Gower was commissioned to
study new systems for investor protection and to 
undertake a review with the following terms of reference;
“ to consider the statutory protection now required 
by private and business investors;
- to consider the need for statutory control of
dealers in securities, investment consultants and 
investment managers;
" to advise on the need for new legislation.
He was also asked to take account in the review of any 
relevant developments in the European Community,^*
On January Z0, 1902 was published as a discussion
document by Professor Gower the ’’Review of Investor
Protection” , called the ’’green paper” . He underlined that 
the perceived defects of the then existing system were 
complication, uncertainty, irrationality, failure to 
treat like alike, inflexibility, excessive control in
some areas and too little (or none) in others, the
creation of an elite and a fringe, lack of enforcement,
delays, over-concentration on honesty rather than 
competence, undue diversity of regulations and
"v,.
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regulators, and failure overall to achieve a proper 
balance between Governmental regulation and self-
re gu 1 at ion.
Most of the defects were unlikely to be cured 
without a redistribution of responsibilities between 
Governmental and self-regulation and between statutory 
and non-statutory regulation.
Professor Gower^® "off-shore tax havens and 
financial centres have sprung up in archipelagos such as 
the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, the Cayman 
Islands, the Bahamas, Vanuatu and many more. This has 
enormously increased the difficulty of providing British 
investors with effective protection". "It was high time 
that ail clearing banks looked very carefully at all 
their subsidiaries in the Channel Islands and the Isle of 
Man to ensure that there was no longer any scope for 
those companies being used as a cloak for fraud.
By 1982, growing commercial pressure for change was 
being exerted on the Stock Exchange. Member firms were 
increasingly frustrated by the restraints imposed by 
fixed commission rates and the single-capacity system on 
their ability to diversify and to compete with foreign 
f i rms,  ^®
In January 1984 Gower published, as a Command Paper 
(Cmnd 9125), the "Review of Investor Protection" Part 1.
He recommended that
- A new Act to replace the Prevention of Fraud 
(Investments) Act 1958 should be called the Investor 
Protection Act.s*
- The Investor Protection Act should afford the same 
protection to both private and professional investors.
- The criteria®^ for the recognition of self- 
regulatory agencies should be set out in the Investor 
Protection Act and should be satisfied that:
a) There is a need for the recognition of another self-
________________________________________________________ _ _
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regulation agency in the field concerned.
b) The agency’s rules and practices relating to the 
admission, suspension, expulsion and discipline of its 
members are fair and reasonable.
c) Its rules and practices relating to admission to 
membership are such as to ensure that those who will
thereby be permitted to undertake investment business are 
fit and proper persons by virtue of their character,
training and experience, and financial resources.
d) It has rules relating to the conduct of business by 
its members which afford investors adequate protection 
and which, to the extent that the Department (or
Commission) has promulgated Rules relating to the
conduct of that business by those registered directly
with it, will afford at least equal protection.
e) It has procedures and resources enabling it 
effectively to monitor and enforce observance of its
rules.
f) Its constitution secures adequate independence of its 
governing body from the sectional interests of its
members and effective procedures for investigating
complaints against itself or its members,
g) Its rules do not impose restrictions on competition 
greater than are necessary for the adequate protection of 
investors and the orderly conduct of the relevant
business or market.
Recognition should be withdrawn if the Department Cor 
Commission) ceased to be satisfied that these criteria 
were met.
In 1985 Gower published, as a Command Paper the 
"Review of Investor Protection" - Part II; He considered 
that the title "the Financial Services Act" was "not 
appropriate" since the Act would not replace the
legislation on banking and deposit taking, a major 
financial service, and concluded^'’ that the City
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revolution has made it essential to introduce a
regulatory system which will ensure that the City remains
what the White paper describes as a "clean place to do 
business" and which inspires deserved confidence in those 
who use its services.
In 1984 the Restrictive Practices Act 1976 had been 
amended to exempt the Stock Exchange from its provisions. 
The RTF case against the Stock Exchange was dropped after 
agreement between the Secretary of State for Trade and 
the Chairman of the Stock exchange on the reform 
concerning the Stock Exchange’s practices (September 
1983).
The London Stock Exchange for its part, agreed to 
change its rules voluntarily opening its membership and
abolishing fixed commissions in equities and gilts by the
end of 1986.  ^®
The changes were considered necessary if the Stock 
Exchange was to remain competitive. In the 1980s, with 
increasing international competition in financial 
services and developments in information technology, a 
rapid growth had taken place also in the international 
markets for securities. Much of this activity had taken
place in London, particularly as a consequence of the
freedom that followed upon the abolition of Britain’s 
foreign exchange controls in 1979.
It soon became apparent that the abolition of fixed
commissions would have a profound impact on the London 
stock Exchange and its members. The three main changes in 
the Stock Exchange rule-book (first published in 1812) 
were:
i) the abolition of minimum commissions. All 
Commissions became negotiable between brokers and their
clients and thus enabled the London Market to remain
competitive with markets abroad that already had changed
to a system of negotiated commissions.
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2) Allowing outside firms to take over member firms. 
This had been possible In the past up to maximum level of 
29,0%, but in the future there would be no lirnit.^* It 
changed the membership structure of the London Stock 
Exchange, giving access to the Exchange to major British 
and foreign investment banks and commercial banks; it 
brought about fundamental changes in the Exchange’s 
systems for trading securities, which were designed to 
create a more efficient and fairer market for investors;
3) the abolition of the single capacity system - 
The single-capacity system had been in force at least 
since 1847, when the Exchange’s rulebook banned 
partnerships between brokers and dealers as being "highly 
inexpedient and i m p r o p e r " . T h e  single capacity dealing 
system is based on a separation of brokers and dealers, 
every stock exchange member or member firm could be 
either a jobber or a broker, taut not both.
In 1967 to restrain the number and ill practice of 
Brokers and Stock-jobbers, on admission the stockbroker 
was bound to swear that he would execute his duties 
v^ithout fraud and collusion, "to the best of my skill and 
knowledge"^®
Financial surveillance of firms was tightened up in 
1974 and each was obliged to maintain a minimum solvency 
ratio, to submit a monthly profit and loss statement and 
a quarterly balance sheet.
A jobber (or dealer) traded only for his or her own 
account and did not deal directly with members of the 
public. A broker traded only for the account of his or 
her customers and dealt only with jobbers. Exchange rules 
required a broker to bring every order to a jobber on the 
floor of the exchange, even if the broker had matched 
orders for both sides of a transaction. The broker was 
expected to shop around among competing jobbers for the 
best price, but was not permitted to execute transactions
--- ____
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in his own office, either as agent or principal.
This prohibition was made explicit in 1909 when a 
revised rule provided that, with the exception of 
arbitrage outside the United Kingdom, "all members must 
declare whether they were brokers or jobbers, and might 
only change with the consent of the Committee; that 
brokers might not make prices and might not deal with 
non-members unless by doing so they could get better 
terms for their principal; and that jobbers might not 
deal with n o n - m e m b e r s . ®
The single-capacity remained in effect until October 
1980. In dual capacity trading, in line with the US
system, one type of dealer can operate in both role of 
broker and jobber. In order to allow member firms to 
organise themselves for dual capacity trading from 27 
October 1966, the Stock Exchange introduced its new 
membership rules on March 1st, 1966. These permitted 
outsiders to own up to 100 per cent of member firms 
(removing the earlier ceiling of 29.9 per cent) and 
allowed "limited liability" corporate membership for the 
first time.4 I
In fact until then the liability of members of the 
stock exchange was unlimited. Initially considered to be 
a weapon against fraudulent conduct, this rule in due 
time became one of the greatest obstacles to the 
enlargement of the numbers of stock exchange firms. In 
1969 this rule was slightly modified and externals 
(individuals, ban!<s, financial institutions etc.) were 
allowed to hold up to a maximum of ten per cent of the 
capital. In 1982 this limit had been raised to 29.9 per 
cent, ^
Between 1960 and 1984 the number of registered
brokers and jobbers f e l 1 from 305 to 100 and from 201 to
17 respectively.*® The loss of competitive standards in
the market, caused by the drastic reduction of the stock
________
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exchange members has been generally considered to be one 
of the main reasons motivating developments in 1986.**
The Big Bang has been compared with changes on Wa 1 1 
Street in May 1975 when fixed commission fees on all 
stock transactions valued between 100 and 300,000 dollars 
were abolished. Commission charges were drastically 
reduced from May 1975 to December 1970, ranging from 
deductions of approximately 50 per cent on large stocks 
traded by "institutional" investors to 10 per cent for 
small investors.*® "Big Bang has been e, unique, 
fascinating and influential experiment in the technology, 
operation, economics and regulation of a modern
securities ma i‘ k e t , " * *
The term Big Bang has been generally considered to 
be synonymous with revolution ; "City revolution" or the 
"Margaret Thatcher October revolution", "Something 
revolutionary in the City" stood in The Daily Telegraph 
of August 12, 1985. The Financial Times of October 28,
1986 was ironic, describing the Big Bang day: "A solid
downpour of English rain set the scene for what was to be
a trying day , / Big Bang breakfasts advertised by
enterprising restaurateurs.", France had sought to
challenge the advent of the Big Bang by launching on
February 20, 1906, the Marche a terme international de
France (MAT IF), the French futures market, and was both 
diffident as well as preoccupied. Le Figaro (Paris) of 
July 1st, 1907, advocated a reform of the Paris stock
exchange for "containing" the expansion of the City of
London into Europe: it urged patriotically that it was
"time to react". Les Echos (Paris) of February 16, 1987,
carried a headline that "London’s advantage was a threat 
to Paris” , It reported that a study of the COB indicated 
how the reduction of stock market transaction costs in 
London in the wake of the Big Bang had generated 
noteworthy advantages for London to the disadvantage of
___ ____
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Paris. It concluded that "the international SEAQ. 
constitutes a real threat for the French financial 
markets", French stock exchange agents, seeing their 
monopoly threatened, claimed that "the transposition of 
the British system into France would be inauspicious for 
inves tor s . ^
The Italian press oscillated between the desire to 
deepen the understanding of the events and the temptation 
to stupefy the readers. The Italian daily La Repubblica 
of 24 October 1986, commented that the Big Bang would 
enable the banks "to launch new issues to increase their 
capital of big companies by offering shares and bonds 
directly to expand their own investment funds, to offer 
to their clients the purchase or sale of shares, bonds or 
other stocks at possibly better conditions."
"An explosive mixture capable to cancel centuries of 
history and tradition", titled II Sole 24 Ore of October 
26, 1986.
___________________________________________
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2. The Structure of the Two-Tier System
The Financial Services Act 1986 provided a two- 
tiered system, thus adopting the system prevailing in the 
USA. It can be described as one with a vertical 
structure, at the vertice of which the principle of 
statutory regulation is housed, with supervisory 
functions exercised by the state and assumed to serve at 
the same time as the basis of the whole system.
The supervisory functions of the state or central 
authority are exercised through the Secretary of State 
for Industry and Comme r-ce (Treasury). Between the level 
of the Secretary of State and the lower echelons of the 
system the SIB is inserted as a new institutional body. 
It is called upon for the important function to 
guarantee that at the lower levels referred to in the 
Financial Act, expected standards are maintained and even 
possibly improved by Self-Regulatory Organisations (SROs) 
within an ambit supported by the principle of self- 
regulation.
The SIB may be referred to as a senior regulator, 
responsible on the first tier for validating or 
recognising the second-tier bodies (SROs, RIEs, RcHs), 
who in turn take care of the so to speak frontline 
regulation of authorised firms and of markets. At,a 
higher level the Secretary of State exercises powers by 
virtue of Section 114 of the 1986 Act, by delegating 
regulatory authority to the SIB. The SIB in turn 
exercises supervisory powers over the various SROs, and 
these in turn supervise individuals and firms providing 
services to customers. To coordinate a dimension of self- 
regula.tion with measures concerning the protection of 
investors, each SRÜ generates its own, very detailed set 
of rules complying with the core rules laid down by the 
SIB. This framework is Intended to promote investor 
protection through the existence and authority of (1) a
----
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senior regulator dedicated to the public interest and to 
setting fundamental standards; (ii) frontline regulators 
in charge of practising and delivering "adequate"
investor protection. To coordinate the needs of operating 
within a statutory framework while doing justice to the 
needs of day-to-day activities, powers initially vested 
in the Government are delegated to the senior regulator. 
This enables the regulatory system to be anchored in
public policy objectives, but, as separate from
government, to respond to day-to-day needs with minimum 
of or at least limited bureaucracy. In practical terms, 
in the interest of the investor, the system is destined 
to control and see that those offering investment
services are qualified and capable in accordance with 
determined standards including qualities of integrity, 
honesty, competence and financial knowledge.
______________________
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i ) The Upper-Tier: Rules, Functions and Competences
relat ing to the 5IB 
The primary task of the SIB has been the promotion 
of a new regulatory system capable to respond to two 
fundamental tasks in terms of 1) the protection of
investors and 2) the maintenance of an adequate level of 
efficiency on the financial markets. Created in the 
spring of 1985, it has proved worthy of recognition by
the UK Parliament as a "designated Agency". By December 
1985 it had published its first set of rules on 
investment, and on November 7, 1986 Parliament passed the
Financial Services Act 1986 defining the scope of 
competences of the SIB. "This new normative system is 
destined to equip the SIB with a formidable arsenal of 
sanctions ranging from admonitions, be they private or
public, to civil actions for the restitution of funds 
owned by clients, to suspension and withdrawal of 
authorisation. T h e r e is provision also for the
application of direct mechanisms for the protection of 
investors, such as compensation, arbitration and systems 
of protection of the rights of citizens,"'*®
Continuing the affirmation of its responsibilities, 
the SIB published in February 1987 its second set of 
regulatory rules under the title of "Approaches of the 
BIB to its regulatory Responsibilities," On May IB, 1967, 
the UK Parliament approved the Financial Act 1986 
(Delegation Order 1987), recognising the SIB as a 
"designated Agency", to which some powers were delegated 
as provided for in the Financial services Act 1986.**’
SlB’s statutory tasks, (all with relevance to the 
interests of investors,) include:
initial and continuing recognition of SROs, RIEs, 
RPBs and R C H s ; creation of a rulebook (both for firms 
directly regulated by SIB, and for providing the 
benchmark of equivalence necessary to judge the rulebook
_____
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of SROs)Î
—  exercise of enforcement powers, e.g., in relation to 
unauthorised investment business, supplementing of SRo 
powers and restitution;
-- collective investment scheme authorisation,
recognition and regulation;
-- maintenance of a central register of authorised 
firms;
““ direct regulation of firms who choose to be regulated 
by SIB rather than by an SRO or RPB.
In addition the SIB is empowered to refer a 
relevant matter to judicial authority.
Among SIBs powers of supervision the most important
are ;
a) A binding request addressed to a SRO to modify a 
rule or rules considered to be inadequate in comparison 
to SIB standards;
b ) To award recognition to SROs (self-regulatory 
organisations), to investment exchanges and to recognised 
professional bodies (RPBs);
c) To extend authorisation directly to a natural 
person or legal person.®®
Section 3 of the Financial Services Act 1986 (FSA) 
provides that no one may be active in investment business 
in the UK without previous authorisation provided for 
under Chapter 3 of the FSA, unless express exemption is
provided for, such as for the Bank of England, Recognised
Investment Exchanges (RIEs), clearing houses, Lloyds etc.
Part I, Chapter I of the FSA 1986 includes a
normative definition for "investment" as well as for 
"investment business". "Investments" are further defined 
in detail in Schedule 1, Part 1 of the FSA, while
activities constituting "investment business” , hence with 
necessary authorisation, are described in detail in the 
same schedule 1, Part II of the FSA, Part III of Schedule
-1
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1 contains a list of activities excluded from the 
definition of "investment activities".
Under the FSA authorisation for "investment 
business" may be obtainable :
1) For members of an SRO recognised by SIB;®‘
2) For members of a recognised professional body 
(RPB) who are expressly authorised by the RPB to exercise 
an "investment business".
3) For those authorised to exercise "Investment 
business" in the sphere of insurance in the meaning of 
the Insurance Companies Act 1982;®®
4) For those registered as a "friendly society" in 
accordance with the Friendly Societies Act 1974;®*
5) For operators of some "Collective investment 
schemes" recognised by SIB;®®
6) For those "directly" authorised by SIB;®*
7) For those authorised in another member state of 
the European Community.®?
Each SRO is empowered to control its members and to 
apply, if needed, disciplinary measures against them. 
This same rule applies in the relationship between SIB, 
on the one hand, and those "directly" authorised by SIB 
on the other. The latter may be physical or legal persons 
(companies as well as associations), who must obviously 
supply evidence as to being fit and proper persons. SIB 
is responsible for verifying with great care the contents 
of information supplied by applicants. Whenever 
necessary, powers to suspend or withdraw an authorisation 
may be exercised under the Financial Services Act 1986, 
FIMBRA and
. p
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LAUTRO will be officially derecognised on 1 October 
1995.®^
It is possible to be a member of more than one SROs 
or have at the same time an authorisation directly from 
SIB for exercising some functions. For such situations, 
SIB has introduced the notion and solution of a "lead 
regulator" who then accordingly bears responsibility as 
well as control functions as a "single authority". Such a 
"lead regulator" shall be the SRO related to the most 
important part(s) of an authorised person’s activities. 
The "lead regulator" may also be the SIB if SIB has 
issued an authorisation "directly" for the given major or 
most important of exercised activities, A situation of 
multiple authorisation presupposes and even more 
importantly requires close contact and collaboration 
between the various SROs concerned or between the 
relevant SROs, on the one hand, and the SIB on the other. 
In any case the SIB is always to be kept informed about 
agreements reached between various SROs as to the 
designated authority called upon to exercise supervision 
and control as a "lead regulator".
.
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i i) Composition. Legal Nature and Financial Aspects 
of SIB
The FSA 1986 makes no concrete reference to the 
legal nature of SIB. Although it is a private company
limited by guarantee, formed on May 30 1985 between a
broker (Sir Kennetfi Berrill) and a banker (Martin
Wakefield Jacomb),®? it exercises public functions and 
statutory powers in the interest of the stability and 
reliability of the financial markets, and not least, in 
the interest of investors. While being in form a private, 
practitioner-oriented body, it exercises in substance 
public functions by statute, as the prolonged arm of 
public authority, and as such it is subject to statutory 
and public law constraints just as if it were a public 
body incorporated by statute.*® Such delegation of 
governmental pov/ers to a private body as a
"constitutional anomaly" presents constitutional legal 
problems, and it involves challenges to the legal logic
at the level of continental European or civil 1 aw 
trad i t i o n .*'
Already at the level of Parliamentary debates,*? it 
was evident that the SIB was conceived as being a 
"creation" of the Parliament and not of the City, create 
for the purpose of guaranteeing the protection of 
investors. At the beginning of its conception and 
thereafter the SIB has tended to seek an adherence to 
professional standards applied in the City of London, 
thius generating at the level of definitions a difficulty 
as to what the legal status or nature of not only the SIB 
but also of the other "recognised regulatory bodies". The 
situation may be considered even as more com]31 ex in the 
ligfit of the fact ttiat the creation of the SIB was 
envisaged for assuming a peripheral role within the 
system of regulation applicable to the "corporate 
issuer" under the jurisdiction of the FSA 1986, the main
I'
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function to be assigned to the SIB being that of 
controlling the financial intermediaries.
The SIB is not an entity based on the notion of
self-regulation, in spite of the fact that many of its
members come as professionals from various areas of
experience on the market,*® The SIB is a creature the 
legal nature of which is unusual. It is destined to
exercise regulatory powers, including the competence to
submit to judicial control questions relating to 
investment and the protection of investors’ interests, 
and to see applied, whenever justified, the penal
provisions included in the FSA 1966, Yet, the SIB is not 
a, governmental department, but a specific body with the 
formal nature of private company.** It has regulatory 
competences anchored in the FSA 1986 and delegated to the 
SIB, As a further definition the SIB may be qualified as 
"the new watchdog of the City of London"*® or the 
"umbrella supervisory body for Britain’s securities 
markets".* * The SIB has self-defined itself "a new 
watchdog with teeth". The SIB constitutes, in substance, 
the principal executive instrument of the FSA 1986, and
therewith an instrument of intervention of the state in 
the economic sphere.
In the SlB’s Board there are currently 13 members, a 
size which has been qualified as excessive by Gower.*? 
More relevant to the topic of .the present thesis are the 
qualifications of the members of the SIB Council, They 
include professional experience in the area of investment 
and independence. The members include :
a) Persons with experience in investment business of a 
nature relevant to the functions or proposed functions of 
the agency; and
b) Other persons, including regular users on their own 
account or on behalf of others of services provided by 
persons carrying on investment business,*®
1
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Thus, this arrangement tends to secure the 
representation of users of investment services or/and of 
the public in general, providing therewith for an 
equilibrium between the interests of the category of 
service providers, on the one hand, and of the category 
of recipients of services on the other, as expressly 
required by the FSA 1986: "the composition of that body 
must be such as to secure proper balance between the 
interests of persons carrying on investment business and 
the interests of the public.*?
in comparative terms, members of the Board do not 
hold office for a given period of time, as is the 
sanctioned case for the COB in France and CONSOB in 
Italy; but at the highest level, the appointed chairman 
and other members of the governing body of the SIB are 
"liable to removal from office by the Secretary of State 
(Chancellor of the Exchequer) and the Governor of the 
Bank of England acting jointly."?® Therewith a threat of 
dismissal exists, considered to be an effective sanction 
that the Government may apply to ensure that the private 
body does not neglect public interests and does what 
these interests demand.?* Moreover, since January 26, 
1987, members of the SIB Council have to comply with some 
rules relating to a duty to communicate investments in 
"secur i t i es".? ^
As a measure of periodic control, the Board makes an 
annual report pursuant to Section 117 of the FSA 1986, 
covering functions transferred to it under the SFA 1986 
and Companies Act 1989. Of course, highest standards of 
integrity at a practical level apply to officials of the 
SIB; no acceptance of favours or of gifts without prior 
authorisation by the head of the executive office; 
optimal discretion when responding to hospitality, so 
that in any case no bad interpretation may result. The 
SIB and its officials enjoy immunity for acts and
# 1
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omissions, in good faith, in the exercise of their 
functions. The same immunity applies with respect of the 
SROs.?® Stating the same rule differently, the SIB, its 
members, officers and employees are immune from damages 
claims except where the alleged act or omission is shown 
to have been committed in bad faith.?*
An advantage for the public finances, resulting from
the private nature of the SIB, is that the SIB is 
financed by the financial markets, without any public 
contributions; but while not being a governmental body, 
the SIB Council is responsible for its activities to the ‘7
Secretary of State (now Treasury). The Secretary in turn 
is responsible for the SIB in relation to Parliament.?®
Thus, the element of self-regulation deploys itself also 
in the form of self-financing,?* with resources supplied 
by those who are subject to SIB’s regulatory authority; 
all those recognised and/or authorised by SIB 
periodically pay fees. It deserves underlining?? that
because the SIB is financed by payment of fees by SROs,
other recognised bodies and authorised persons under
Sections 112-113 of the FSA 1986, it is able to maintain 
"a flexibility which, it is argued, would not be
available to a body dependent on government funding", as 
is the case with COB in France and CONSOB in Italy. While 
financing the SIB is not a matter of public finances, it 
does not escape discussions and polemics.
G o w e r , ? G in keeping with the spirit of self- 
regulation and self-financing as part of the tradition in 
the UK, maintained that the cost of regulation "will 
inevitably be borne by investors, for whom the protection 
is intended, and that it is right that it should", adding 
however, that "it is in the national interest that a
country should have an effective system of investor 
protection and accordingly the taxpayer should bear part 
of the cost /... / The cost of day-to-day regulation
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should be borne initially by those regulated, who would 
pass it on to their clients, but that of the body charged 
with decisions on policy and overall surveillance should 
be borne by the taxpayer."??
A general and common criticism, difficult to assess 
objectively at the level of non-financia 1 discussions as 
is the case in the present thesis, has been that "the 
present regulatory structure generates unnecessary cost: 
it is too complex; there is duplication, but 
inefficiency also arises because of under laps: the
regulators, in monitoring, create needless requirements 
/... / all leading to a bottom line conclusion of
excessive cost,' which the investor has to pay for".®® 
This is a matter to be adjudicated best by experts and 
consultants of financial and administrative management. 
The net costs of SIB had gone up from E11.4rn on March 
31st 1989 to £14.216m on March 31st 1993 and to £17.733 
on March 31sb 1994.®* Personnel or employment costs, 
representing less than 50 per cent of total budgetary 
costs, had increased from £4.618m on March 31st 1989 to 
£7.048m by March 31st 1993, and £7,717m by March 31st 
199 4,°? The employees of the SIB had increased relatively 
lightly from 164 to 183 between 1989 and 1994.°® In March
1993 the City Research Project, in a study by Julian
Franks and Steven Schaefer from the London Business
School, dealt with the costs and effectiveness of the UK 
regulatory system to estimate the cost of regulation for 
individual sectors, both in absolute and relative terms 
in order to compare with the cost of regulation in the 
USA and France,®* The general conclusion was an obvious 
one. In the words of La.rge, "we must insure not only that 
the costs of regulatory bodies are well controlled but, 
above all, that they give value for money in investor 
protection terms" /... / "strong cost control discipline
should be built into the regulatory system".®®
IJ
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ill) Self Regulation at the Lower Tier 
Se 1f-Regulatory Organisations
The relationship between the role of the SIB and the 
role of the SROs is a very delicate one. Each SRO has its 
own, V e r d e t a i l e d  set of rules which must comply with 
the rules laid down by the SIB, In a hierarchical or
vertical relationship, the SIB exercises supervisory 
powers over the SROs, and the SROs in turn supervise
individuals and firms which provide the services to 
customers or investors.
With particular reference to regulation at the lower 
tier, the primary function of the SIB may be defined as 
that of supervising the activities of all recognised 
bodies, that is, the SROs, RPBs, RIEs and the Recognised 
Clearing House (RCH). The SIB has asserted its ongoing
supervisory function also in respect of the one RCH, the 
London Clearing House, in order to satisfy itself that
the Clearing House has satisfactory procedures and
adequate financial resources to fulfil its obligations.®*
In terms of a regulatory hierarchy relating to the 
investment markets in the UK, operative since April 29, 
1988 ("A Day"), the following organisations, all based on
self-regulation, exist;
a) SROs “ Self-Regulation Organisations ;
b) RIEs - Recognised Investment Exchanges a.nd 
RCHs - Recognised Clearing Houses ;
c) RPBs - Recognised Professional Bodies.
Here mention should be made of a body that has been 
and constitutes also currently the oldest cornerstone in 
the history of se If-regulation in the UK : The Stock
Exchange, rightly referred to as the "senior self- 
regulatory body". The Stock Exchange has united in itself 
the two functions which in the new system are exercised 
by two different or separate organisations, namely, the 
SROs and RIEs, With the introduction of the new system,
I
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the Stock Exchange has been constrained to structure 
itself in the form of two different bodies for the sake 
or necessity of obtaining recognition by the SIB.
The first body of the Stock Exchange, generated at 
the end of 1986 through the fusion or merger of the Stock 
Exchange and the International Regulatory Organisation 
CISRO), is destined to operate as a SRO and has been 
given the name The Security Association (TSA);
The second body of the Stock Exchange is The 
international Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and 
the Republic of Ireland, and is structured to function as 
a RIE.
The Stock Exchange continues to function as the 
unique body responsible for the admission of securities 
to listing as well as for the establishment of rules and 
standards regulating such admissions.
The Council of the Stock Exchange has been 
confirmed by the FSA 1986°? as the "competent authority" 
already designated as such in The Stock Exchange 
(Listing) Regulations 1984 as a RIE. The task of The 
Stock Exchange is to organise efficient and properly 
regulated markets. Possibly psychologically and
historically understandable. The Stock Exchange has been 
the strongest opponent to the creation of the new system 
and, in particular, the creation of the SIB.
With the protection of investors in mind, as the 
topic of the present thesis, the following observations 
may be made on SROs, RIEs, and RPBs,
a ) SROs ; Recognised Self-Regulating Organisations 
A SRO is a body qualified to authorise its members 
to carry on an investment business; it is competent to 
set up its own rules of professional conduct and to 
monitor the implementation of the rules. With respect to
187
investor protection, e. SRO Is essentially a body 
responsible for the regulation of the relationship or of 
relations between its members active in the field of 
investment business, on the one hand, and their clients 
on the other.
A SRO operates exclusively on the principle of self- 
regulation, that is, once recognition as a SRO is 
extended to it by the SIB. The recognition of a SRO 
effects, for members of the SRO, the authorisation to 
carry on the type of investment business to which the 
authorisation as a SRO by the SIB is related. As an 
important point in terms of self-regulation, a SRO is 
responsible for the selection, admission to membership, 
evaluation of professional qualifications of its members. 
Parallel thereto it should be added that the authority of 
a SRO over its members is derived from a contractual 
relationship to them. Membership of a SRO is voluntary, 
and does not involve any delegation of competences from 
the SIB to thb recognised SRO.
To qualify for recognition by the SIB, an aspiring 
SRO must do its homework by equipping itself with an 
adequate set or body of rules related to the exercise of 
an investment business in a given sector and must provide 
evidence as to being in possession of certain requisites 
specified in the FSA 1986.
If a SRO is not able to satisfy all the conditions 
and requirements stipulated by the FSA 1986, the SIB 
shall decline to extend recognition to it.
The SROs' framework was divided, in terms of types 
of investment business being carried out in the UK, 
partly on functional grounds and partly by reference to 
the product or service provided. The structure originally 
involved five SROs and nine RPBs, as well as numerous 
recognised and designated investment exchanges,°g
b . Recognised Investment Exchange (RIE)
   .
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An investment exchange regulates the markets and the 
conduct of those who offer securities. It may need 
recognition by the SIB. Unlike the situation between SROs 
and their respective members, member ship in a RIE does 
not automatically include an authorisation for the given 
persons. This constitutes a m a jor difference between the 
RIEs and the SROs. All members of an SRO are as such 
automatically authorised to exercise investment business 
once the SRO itself is granted an authorisation by the 
SIB. Recognition by the SIB of an RIE applies to the RIE 
itself but does not exonerate its members from 
author isation. RIE members may obtain recognition if the 
RIE fulfils fundamental requirements, among which are :
a.) sufficient financial resources ;
b.) adequate standards regulating conduct ;
c . ) adequate liquidity ;
d.) systems for documenting financial transactions ;
e.) possibilities of effective control and effective 
application of the same,
c ,) Recognised Professional Bodies
The FSA 1986 includes also provisions for persons 
certified by RPBs, who are engaged in investment business 
but not as the main part of their business activities.®?
The FSA 1966 also empowers professional bodies 
recognised by the SIB to authorise firms under the 
control of their members to carry on investment business.
As the FSA does not specify the limit of investment 
business required to be "wholly or mainly" an investment 
business, the limit is agreed with the SIB at the time of 
recognition. The FSA 1986 provides?® that a professional 
body may request recognition for carrying on investment 
business. If a professional body does not acquire 
recognition, individual members may become members of an 
SRO or may apply for authorisation directly from the SIB,
The requirements for recognition of an RPB are
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similar to those required for the recognition of SROs. 
Additionally, Schedule 3 of the FSA 1986 lays down strict 
requirements to ensure that the control of RPB firms
remains in the hands of RPB members, whose main business 
is the practice of the particular profession regulated by 
the RPBs concerned.
Unlike firms which obtain their authorisation to 
carry on investment business by becoming members of an 
SRO, RPB firms (the partners and controllers of which 
will already be members of the RPB) require specific 
certification for investment business activity. The FSA 
1986 requires therefore the RPB to have adequate 
arrangements for monitoring a firm’s continued compliance 
with the certification conditions, and enforcing the
withdrawal or suspension of certificates and other 
disciplinary procedures where firms fail to fulfil the
relevant conditions.
The constitution of a governing body of an RPB does 
not require the balance of membership required by 
Schedule 2 of the FSA 1986 for SROs.
There were in 1993 nine RPBs.?*
The FSA 1986 gives the SIB discretion whether or not 
to recognise a body as a self-regulating organisation. 
Once the SIB has recognised an SRO it has no power to 
modify, other than by agreement, the SR O ’s activities. 
Thus, the powers of the SIB to withdraw recognition from 
an SRO completely are very circumscribed. By contrast, in 
the case of RPBs, the SIB has no power to refuse 
recognition to a professional body which it considers 
meets the necessary criteria, nor to specify, otherwise 
than by agreement, what, its threshold for investment 
business shall be. The absence of those various powers 
limits the ability of the SIB to effect or prevent 
changes in regulatory coverage in the interest of
  ' _
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the system as a whole
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C h a p t e r  8
Investor Protection
1 * EC Legislation. Investor Protection and new financial 
intermediaries in (2.) France. (3.) Italy and (4.) the
United Kingdom
1. EC Le g i sI a 1 1 on
The cardinal principles adopted by EC legislation 
for creating a single European market for banking and 
financial services aim at providing for investors 
safeguards substantially equivalent in the member states. 
For this purpose they apply (i) minimal essential 
harmonisation, Cii) mutual recognition and (ill) home 
member state control. More specifically, minimal 
essential harmonisation is conceived as constituting the 
presupposed basis for mutual recognition and home state 
control .
i ) From Disclosure to Investor Protection ; the 
Prospectus
i
The function of EC legislation in the sphere of 
financial markets has been twofold :
-- to regulate the activities and interpenetration of 
securities markets for the purpose of creating a "common 
(capital) market"; and
to provide an adequate control relating to the 
operations of the markets by establishing for that 
purpose a Community model for the protection of 
investors.
The strategy for a Community wide investor 
protection started emerging in the 1970s with respect to 
the prospectus addressed to potential investors. As such 
it was the first instrument or document of interest for 
EC legislation. Therewith the extent of attention of EC
5
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I aw was enlarged beyond the field of disclosure to that 
of investor protection.
The philosophy of disclosure underlying the basis of 
approach to information contained in a prospectus relates 
coherently to a line of historic evolution going back to 
a French law in 1867. In it, beside the freedom of 
activities granted to stock companies (sociétés 
anonymes), were instituted obligations governing 
publicity and information on companies as a counterweight 
to corporate freedoms granted by law. Therewith the 
possibility to solicit for investment by the public 
involved a duty to inform the potential investor(s) on 
the identity and quality of an applicant company, on the 
details and risks involved in a proposed investment, on 
specific and atypical risks related to it. Solely the 
availability of relevant information would enable the 
investor(s) to assess adequately any risks and adopt a 
decision based on proper information.^
In the USA, more than 70 years ago, the philosophy 
of disclosure was generated by the necessity to induce 
small and average investors, traumatised then by the Big 
Crash of October 1929, to regain confidence and 
participate in a model of economic development not based 
on banks as intermediaries but on channelling savings for 
investment directly toward the interested companies. The 
control system, resting on a duality of inherent risks 
and freedom to take them in an environment of adequate 
transparency free of any manipulation affecting relevant 
information, tended to motivate small and average 
investors to participate directly in the market without 
the fear of getting exposed to unclear transactions 
involving excessive risks.%
The Directive 80/390 EEC of March 17, 1980 CDJ L
100/1 April 17, 1980) coordinating the requirements for
the drawing-up, scrutiny and distribution of the listing
_______________ :_____________________________________________________ I............. .............................
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particulars to bo published for the admission of
securities to official stock exchange listing, adopted 
the provisions of Directive 79/279 EEC of March 5, 1979
COJ. L 86/21 of March 16, 1979 coordinating the
conditions for the admission of securities to official 
Stock Exchange listing) and subordinated admission for 
official listing to the publication of a special 
informâtive prospectus. Conditions governing its
contents, mode of publication and exception clauses
constituted therewith the first step at Community level 
for the harmonisation of rules prevailing individually in 
the member states. However, already the proposed
Directive of October 5, 1972 COJ C 131 61, of December 13
1972, adopted as Directive 80/390/EEC of March 17, 1990)
contained the gist of fundamental elements underlying the 
emerging EC legislation. The scope of the proposed 
Directive intended to render "sufficiently equivalent 
guarantees offered by each member state as to adequate 
and objective information made available to third parties 
as actual and potential shareholders" (preamble par, 4), 
for protecting investments and for regulating the 
functioning of stock markets.
The proposal was born out of the preoccupation that 
in their relations with the investing public "issuers 
furnished absolutely unequal information both in 
qualitative as well as quantitative terms, resulting in 
unequal standards of protection for investors." It was 
noted that inf orm a t i on which issuers had to provide for 
official listing of shares at the stock markets in London 
and New York was clearly subject to more rigorous 
requirements; additionally, experience gained at these 
stock markets confirmed that a duty to provide ample 
information did not involve any negative consequences.
___ ____
181
(The introduction to the Comments accompanying the 
proposed Directive). The proposed directive underlined 
the necessity that the provisions in question should 
apply not only to the required information supplied in 
the form of a prospectus, but also to the control of the 
same information.
Art. 1 of the draft Directive introduced the
obligation to issue a prospectus and its control by the 
designated (national) authority. Art. 2 determined its 
contents. "The prospectus shall contain all the
information which, in accordance with the characteristics 
of the issuer(s) and the stocks in question, are
necessary for enabling the investors and their financial 
advisors to form an opinion on the assets, financial 
situation, performance and prospects of the issuer(s) as 
well as on rights related to the stocks proposed for 
official listing."
Art 13, governing the control of prospectuses, 
provides for the authorisation by the competent authority 
only "if it considers that the prospectus fulfils all 
the conditions of the Directive and there is no good 
reason to believe that the prospectus is free of any 
indications or omissions which may mislead the public." 
As to the control of prospectuses, in the report 
accompanying the proposed Directive it was considered to 
be necessary that they contain analogous information 
verified with equal efficacy.
In the Directive 80/390 EEC, the purpose of 
"protecting the interests of actual or potential 
investors is expressly laid down in the preamble. It has 
in addition been recognised that "guarantees presuppose 
the existence of adequate and as much as possible 
objective information concerning particularly the 
financial situation of the issuer(s), the nature of the 
stocks intended for official listing."
_____________
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When confirming the scope of "rendering sufficiently 
equivalent the 'requested' guarantees in each of the
member states as to adequate and objective information on 
actual or potential bearers of shares, the term "offers" 
of the draft proposal has been modified into "requests".
The contents of the prospectus, which substantially 
follow the proposals of the Directive, are governed by a 
rule of general character: "The prospectus shall contain
all the information which, in accordance with the
particular character istics of the issuer and of the
stocks the admission of which Is requested for official 
listing, are necessary for the purpose of assisting
investors and their advisors to assess thoroughly the
assets and f1nancia 1 si tuation, the perf ormance and
prospects of the issuers, not excluding rights connected
with the stocks in question." (Art. 4)
The Directive, as the draft underlying it, has left 
to the member states (Arts. 6 and 18, paras, 1 and 3) the 
designation of the author ity, which within the framework 
of the respective national legal systems, should be 
entrusted with the control of adequacy of the
prospectuses as to prescribed standards regarding their 
contents. Publication of the prospectuses has been made
dependent on such an adequacy (Art. 18 para. 2). As to 
the modality of control affecting a prospectus, in
simple confirmation of the principle already laid down in 
the draft text that "the competent authorities shall
approve the publication of the prospectus only if they
are satisfied that it fulfils all the conditions of the 
Directive" Art. 18, para. 3), the phrase "and if they 
have no reason to believe that it is devoid of
indications or omissions which may mislead the public" 
has been deleted (Art. 13 para. 3 draft Directive), In 
addition, while in the draft text it was underlined that 
"for absolving its responsibility the designated
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authority shall be endowed with all the necessary control 
competences and powers" (Art. 13, para. 4), the text of 
the Directive was drafted in terms of "the member states 
shall see to it that the competent authorities are 
endowed with the powers necessary for the fulfilment of 
their functions" (Art, 18, para. 3), and it is clarified 
that" the present Directive shall not in any way modify 
the responsibility of the competent authorities governed 
exclusively by the disciplinary standards of national law 
(Art. 18, para. 4).
As to the modality of publication of a prospectus,
Art. 20 enables opting for its publication "in one or
more national or large distribution news papers", or for 
its reproduction as a separate publication made freely 
available for the public at the seat of a stock market 
where the official listing is requested, or at the seat 
of the issuer or of bodies in charge of providing
financial services at the expense of the issuer.
If it appears to be necessary to publish the
prospectus prior to the beginning of trading, a 
"reasonable space of time" is to be considered (Art, 21, 
para, 1). As to any "new significant fact which may 
influence the quotation of the stock(s), having emerged 
between the editing of the prospectus and the beginning
of trading, it is obligatory to prepare a new supplement 
to the prospectus, subject to the same control as the 
latter and to publication in the same way as laid down fay 
the control authority (Art. 23).
Directive 87/345/EEC of June 22, 1987 (0J L185/81 of
Jul 4, 1987), amending Directive 80/390/EEC has
introduced the principal of mutual recognition of 
prospectuses: "Once approved in accordance with Art. 24, 
the prospectus shall be approved, with due regard to any 
required translation, in the other member states where
admission for official listing is not subject to ulterior
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approval by the competent authority or to the condition 
of including additional information in the prospectus." 
(Art. 24 bis).
The replacement of harmonisation by mutual 
recognition and by the delegation of standard setting to 
technical bodies introduces a principle of competition 
between rules and between regulators in a way that may 
stimulate flexibility and policy innovation.
The Directive 89/298/EEC of April 17, 1969 (ÜJ L
124/8, May 5, 1989) coordinating the requirements for the
drawing up, scrutiny, and distribution of the prospectus 
to be published when transferable securities are offered 
to the public, has laid down the rule that member states 
shall coordinate their standards regarding the above 
mentioned matters, the contents and the mode of 
publication of the prospectus when transferable 
securities are offered to the public. As to investor 
protection, it is expressly mentioned in the preamble of 
the Directive: "Whereas investment in transferable
securities, like any other form of investment, involves 
risks; whereas the protection of investors /emphasis 
added/ requires that they be put in a position to make a 
correct assessment of such risks so as to be able to take 
investment decisions in full knowledge of the facts;
"Whereas the provision of full, appropriate 
information concerning transferable securities and the 
issuers of such securities promotes the protection of 
i nvestors /emphasis added/;
"Whereas, moreover, such information is an effective 
means of increasing confidence in transferable securities 
and thus contributes to the proper functioning and 
development of transferable securities markets;
"Whereas a genuine Community information policy 
relating to the transferable securities should therefore 
be introduced; whereas, by virtue of the safeguards that
■All:
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it offers investors and its impact on the proper 
functioning of transferable securities markets, such an 
information policy is capable of promoting the 
interpenetration of national transferable securities 
markets and thus encourages the creation of a genuine 
European capital market.
For guaranteeing the effective implementation of 
investors' protection, member states shall ensure that 
any offer of transferable securities to the public within 
their respective territories is subject to the 
publication of a prospectus by the person making the 
offer (Art 4.)
Concerning mutual recognition, Art. 21 stresses that 
"the prospectus must /... / b e  recognised as complying or 
be deemed to comply with the laws of the other member 
states in which the same transferable securities are 
offered to the public simultaneously or within a short 
interval of one another, without being subject to any 
form of approval there." By virtue of this principle 
approval of a prospectus by the competent authority of a 
member state in which the offering person has his 
registered seat (or possibly in another member state 
selected by the offering person, if the member state of 
his registered seat is not interested in the offer or in 
the request for possible listing) has to be recognised as 
valid also by the respective authority of another member 
state interested in the offer. In substance the Directive 
89/298/EEC has ruled that the public offer prospectus 
published in the issuer’s home member state should be 
accepted for public offers in all member states.
The principle of mutua1 recognition of a prospectus 
has been in addition used to widen its scope of 
application with respect to prospects of public offers 
prepared and approved in conformity with the standards of 
third states in accordance with agreements which the EC
' : ' '   .
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may be capable to conclude with them, with due regard to 
the requirement that the standards of such third states 
may guarantee the protection of investors in a manner 
equivalent to that prevailing under the EC Directives 
(Art. 24).
Lastly, Directive 90/211/EEC of 23 April, 1990 (ÜJ L 
112/24 May 3, 1990), amending Directive 80/390/EEC in
respect of the mutual recognition of public offer 
prospectuses as stock-exchange listing particulars, 
allows issuers to use the public offer prospectus as a 
stock exchange listing prospectus as well with the result 
that a single prospectus can enable an issuer not only to 
raise capital on a Community wide scale, but also to 
apply for listing for its securities on all EC stock 
exchanges.3 Hence, a prospectus constitutes a primary and 
fundamental instrument for the protection of investors 
within the EC legal order. It should be on the one hand 
pointed out that no Directive has thus far provided for 
provisions governing the function of part of a prospectus 
in ascertaining liability. Under "lia.bility" in 
conjunction with a prospectus may be subsumed all those 
facts and circumstances dealing as an object with an 
obligation to guarantee the reliability or veracity of 
all the information material used in written form for 
offering to the public transferable securities.
The historical background of the link of the notion 
of liability with a prospectus has its beginnings towards 
the middle of the 19th century, as a reaction to the 
fraudulent way in which stock companies were formed.< In 
the Companies Act 1867 the introduction of liability for 
the veracity of certain obligations to supply information 
by founders of companies remained, however, totally 
linked to the idea of a control on the formation of 
limited companies. Not before the end of the 19th century 
was a link or connection established between the
______________________
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obligation to issue a prospectus, on the one hand, and 
liability on the other. The primary scope of liability 
related to a prospectus consisted in the protection of 
individual investors opting for the acquisition of shares 
on the basis of inexact and erroneous contents of a 
prospectus (individual protection). Only successively
were liability for a prospectus and the (individual) 
protection of investors transformed into means for the 
creation of financial markets and guaranteeing their
efficient functioning (funotiona1 and institutional
protection). In the United Kingdom, the "Bubble Act" of 
1720 prohibited the constitution of private associations 
devoid of legal personality, with members exonerated from 
collective liability and able to transfer association 
shares. Instead, in the states of continental Europe the 
advantage or privilege of limited liability was 
subordinated to a so to speak concession. The control of 
the state over the formation of commercial companies 
endowed with a concession made liability for the contents 
of a prospectus superfluous.
After the abrogation of the Bubble Act in 1825, the 
Gladstone Committee decided to opt for the regulatory 
effect of publicity (as having a decisive influence) ; 
"publicity is all that is necessary. Show up the roguery 
and it is h a r m l e s s . T h e  Companies Act of 1844 
prescribed to register prospectuses made available for 
the public, whereas the Companies Act of 1867 demands the 
inclusion of determined details in the contents of a 
prospectus. In 1889 the Lord's Chamber decided in Derry 
V. Peek. that a liability from prospectus could exist 
only in the case of deceit, and in 1890 the Directors 
Liability Act invoked a responsibility for negligence.& 
Finally, the Companies Act of 1900 provides details of 
what a prospectus should contain : it should not only be
free of any false claims
3 /
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but should also inform with respect to all the 
circumstances which could influence the decision to 
invest of a person of average knowledge and capacity. In 
this way the foundation for liability for a prospectus 
was laid and would become a regulatory fact for the first 
time in the USA in 1933 and 1934 for any form of 
investment offered to the public. Even prior to the 
Securities Act 1933 and Securities Exchange Act 1934, 
some states in the USA began, while their company laws 
became more and more permissive, to adopt legislative 
provision (blue sky laws) directed at the elimination of 
illicit practices applied for attracting investment 
capital.7 This approach was essentially based on the 
assessment of power which publicity could mobilise: 
"publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and 
industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfections; electric light the most efficient 
po 1 iceman.
From the angle of a systematic approach, liability 
for the prospectus is prevailingly considered to be an 
aspect of non-or extracontractua1 liability.
EC legislative efforts have endeavoured thus far 
solely to introduce in all of the member states a lowest 
common denominator as a standard for the protection of 
investors, as one of the conditions for the creation of 
an integrated European financial market in the meaning of 
EC Article 68. For the implementation of this objective, 
the EC has made exclusively use of the Directive as a 
legislative instrument for the reception of relevant 
standards into the national legal systems of the member 
states on the basis of EC Art. 54(g) and Art. 100, thus 
leaving to the member states the regulation of liability 
related to the prospectus. Therewith arises, for the 
national legal systems, the necessity to define the 
nature of guarantee with respect to the reliability of
i
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information addressed to investors, that is, with the 
help of ordinary standards and laws of domestic law in 
the absence of more specific legislative texts,’
The question of liability related to the prospectus 
may arise solely when the prospectus is either inaccurate 
or incomplete as to its contents. The basic standard 
concerns the correctness and completeness of the
contents of the prospectus (Art. 4 of Directive 
82/148/EEC), points which may arise only with respect to 
recent information.** It is therefore necessary to 
institute a system of integrated liability which assigns 
liability to different aspects of the prospectus in a 
differentiated manner, in accordance with assumed 
functions and possibilities of manifest influence in the 
various phases of sales of transferable securities to the 
public.** In the USA, as an example, so called "control 
persons” have been held to be collectively liable, while 
in Germany, liability for the prospectus has been defined 
as including all those persons who have participated in 
the decision to produce the prospectus.*= Auditing firms 
in the USA have been the object of an increasing demand 
for compensation to investors who have contested the 
correctness and reliability of accounting prospectuses. 
Court actions for liability are based on Rule iOb-5, 
adopted in 1942, prohibiting in quite a generic manner 
misleading or fraudulent conduct on securities markets, 
using any form of presentation or tricks, including false 
claims or fraudulent omissions or exclusion of relevant 
facts which may be related to the acquisition or sale of 
transferable stocks.*% Courts in the USA have applied as 
valid, when applying relevant rules, two types of 
liability; involving directly the person committing the 
violation or the person, who while not directly violating 
the rule, has lent substantial support to the person 
committing the violation. As to liability affecting
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auditors arguments of improper certifications and claims 
of failure to divulge relevant information have been 
submi tted.
In some countries like Italy and Germany, the legal 
system based on civil law tradition has proved to be 
sufficiently flexible to provide norms for regulating new 
situations. A group of individuals was considered liable 
for prospectuses in a manner similar to situations 
affected by specific rules.**
The emerging claims for liability related to the
prospectus may be raised only by investors in possession, 
or involved in a not yet concluded transaction in a 
national market, relating to a transferable security to 
which there is reference in the contested prospectus. As 
for the nexus of causality, it is maintained that it 
would be preferable to exonerate the investor from the 
burden of supplying the evidence in abstraction that the 
investment was effected on the basis of trust in and
reliance on the correctness of the contents of the
contested prospectus. The existence of proof should be 
treated as reasonably given if the investor has acqu i red 
the stocks after the publication of a prospectus vitiated 
by essentially incorrect contents.*®
All legal systems provide for compensation for
damages in case of guilt on the part of those responsible
for the prospectus, but many differences exist as to the 
seriousness of guilt and the possibility of those assumed 
or alleged to be responsible to prove their innocence,*&
Minimum "multi-purpose" Community wide standards 
have been introduced through EEC Directives in the sphere 
of securities markets. They aim at Ci) promoting the free 
movement of capital within the EU also for the purpose of 
investment in the service of stock market listed
companies, Cii) investor protection at a level of a
 -
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common legislative denominator applicable in all member 
states, Ciii) promoting competition between the national 
stock markets and making them thus more efficient and 
dynamic, and (iv) making the capital and stock markets of 
the ED also competitive at an international level in an 
age of liberalisation. Concerning investor protection, 
the situation may become more challenging and problematic 
when not only institutional investors but also and above 
ail small and average investors get interested in cross- 
border investment in various member states. Such a 
development may point toward the need to move from 
standards of protection at the level of a lowest common 
denominator to higher and more sophisticated arrangements 
on the way toward a system which may become truly 
comparable with the system in the USA at a federal level. 
Both at Community as well as member states' level 
interest in such a development exists, but progress for 
it may be gradual and effected through small steps from 
current systems marked by traditionally national horizons 
to a truly EC or EU approach. The logic and dynamics of 
progressive integration and not least the pragmatic 
necessity of competitiveness at an international level 
point in such a direction. As a further step toward a 
"more efficient EU securities market" as a reality, EC 
finance ministers have adopted a directive amending stock 
exchange listings standards. The Directive promises to 
simplify cross-border listing requirements. International 
companies seeking listings in more than one member'state 
shall be able to be listed with reference to one 
prospectus. The new cross-border requirements are 
expected to facilitate the launching of the Federation of 
European Stock Exchanges' EUROLIST project. The cross- 
border approach is an initiative aiming to provide deeper 
and more liquid markets for large, high quality, 
international EU companies by enabling them to have their
■-'iliï
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share listed simultaneously in at least six member
s t a t e s . T h i s  will also be relevant for small and
avers.ge investors’ cross-border protection (as a topic of 
research which transcends the delimited purpose of the
present thesis).
The Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 (0.) 1987, L.
169/1) following the Commission’s original White Paper on 
"Completing the Internal Market" (COM (85) 310 final, 
June 14, 1985 -), shifted the emphasis from a process of
harmonisation to a process of coordination based on the 
notion of "substantial equivalence". Therewith the EC 
moved to the gradual establishment of Community wide
common minimum standards in every member state for
providing substantially equivalent standards of
safeguards for investors. This minimalist approach has
been accompanied by the supplementary principle of
"mutual recognition". Thereunder a company satisfying
minimum standards of recognition in one member state 
shall be entitled in any other member state to engage in 
investment activities in respect of which it is licenced 
under the jurisdiction of the home member state. It may 
claim the possession of a so-called Community passport. 
The EC ■ wide authorisation known as the "single passport" 
which enables firms to provide investment services 
anywhere in the EC without separate authorisation, has 
been introduced by ISD,
The "single licence" or "home passport" concept is 
marked by three interrelated characteristics :
—  An authorisation for defined enterprises to carry 
on certain activities from their home member state as 
base, to establish a branch or to provide cross-border 
services in the "host" member state(s) with respect to 
listed activities, that is, without the need for further 
(intra-Community ) authorisation ;
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-- EC member states shall have harmonised certain 
minimum or key standards, the application of which shall 
fall within the province of the "home" member state ;
The principle of "home" member state control 
recognises the sole competence of the "home" state to 
authorise its home enterprises and to exercise
supervisory control over them, that is, wherever they 
operate. Complementerily, the "host" member state has a
merely complimentary control role to fulfill.*®
The nature of authorisation under ISD is different 
because it is potentially EC-wide rather than confined to 
the single member state. An authorisation granted in 
accordance with the ISD will no longer have a national 
scope, but will be potentially EC-wide.
The differences in scope between ISD investment 
services and member states investment services, and the 
fact that ISD authorisation is Community-wide, mean that 
after implementation there will in effect be two types .of 
authorisation,
A firm whose business is outside the scope of the 
ISD, or which is excluded from the ISD, will need, as 
presently, its home state authorisation, if it is
carrying on investment business within its country.
The ISD introduces some new criteria to the
authorisation:
- a firm must have its head office in the same member 
state as its registered office (Art. 3(2));
- The so-called "four eyes" principle : the business of
a firm must be directed by at least two persons of
sufficiently good reputation and experience;
- Special requirements in the case of individual trader 
or a one-man company -
Natural persons have, in particular, to make arrangements 
for the protection of investors in the event of cessation 
of their business following death, incapacity, or any
 : : ___
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other similar event. The requirements for natural persons 
authorised to hold client money or securities are most 
relevant. Such firms must meet three additional 
conditions - four if the firm is a sole trader - over and 
above the other relevant requirements of the ISD and 
CAD.‘’
The "home state control", as the corollary of mutual 
recognition, shall act as a basis enabling the "home 
state" to qualify as the leading regulator, while any 
other member state in which the company operates shall 
enjoy, as the "host state", a merely accessory
control/competence. Both principles of "home member state 
authorisation" and "host member state accessory 
competence" were introductori1 y included in the UCITS
Directive EEC Directive 85/611, as amended by EEC 
Directive 88/220.=°
To dispel any confusion as to what the terms "home 
member state" normatively cover, the ISD states under 
Art. 1(6), that the terms apply to
~- "where the Investment firm is a natural person", 
"the Member State in which his office is situated";
"where the investment firm is a legal person", 
the Member State in which its registered office is
situated or, if under its national law it has no 
registered office, the Member State in which its head 
office is situated;
"in the case of a market, the Member State in 
which the registered office of the body which provides 
trading facilities is situated or, if under its national 
law it has no registered office, the Member State in 
which that body's head office is situated".
Responsibilities of the "home" member state include 
also supervision of the financial soundness of an 
investment firm by the competent authorities, pursuant to 
the CAD, (see consideration 26. relating to the ISD). The
■f:
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CAD’s requirements are an essential element of the co­
ordinated requirements which make possible for ISD 
investment firms authorised In their home member state to 
carry on business in other EC states. The CAD is also a 
necessary follow up to the Solvency Ratio Directive and 
Own Funds Directive (ÜFD) which complement the Second 
Bankruptcy Directive for credit institutions.
To obtain home member state authorisation, an 
investment firm shall have to demonstrate that
-- It has a "sufficient initial capital in 
accordance with the rules laid down in the CAD";
-- "The persons who effectively direct the business 
of an investment firm are of sufficiently good repute and 
are sufficiently experienced" (Art. 3).
The competent authority shall not grant an 
authorisation without prior knowledge as to the identity 
of shareholders and persons who effectively direct the 
business of an investment firm (of. Art. 4),
To pre-empt complications generated by
considerations when dealing with intricate questions of 
priority to be given, for vital legal purposes, to the 
site of the real administration of a firm, or the site of 
its statutory (registered) seat, a firm shall maintain, 
for enabling the home member state to exercise 
effectively its supervisory functions, its central 
administration in the same member state where its 
statutory seat is indicated to be : "any investment firm
which is a legal person and which, under its national 
law, has a registered office, shall have its head office 
in the same Member State as its registered office"; " any 
other investment firm shalI have its head office in the 
Member State which issued its authorisation and in which 
it actually carries on its business" (Art. 3(2)). In this 
way an undeniable nexus is established between statutory 
seat, central administration and the member state of
— - ____
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origin granting authorisation and in which a firm 
effectively carries on its business. Because sucfi 
provisions are not instituted as applicable to credit 
and insurance firms, the EU Commission has adopted a 
proposal for a Directive which, beside extending the 
scope of application of such provisions, shall 
horizontally modify a series of Directives related to 
credit institutions, insurance and financial services 
firms. The proposed Directive tends to integrate with ISD 
provisions intended to (i) supplement conditions for 
granting an authorisation, a new requirement that a group 
heading a credit institution, insurance firm or 
investment company shall be transparent for the purpose 
of effective individual supervision; (ii) amplify the 
scope of competence or organs of authorities called upon 
by law to collect and exchange information related to 
supervisory vigilance; (iii) put auditors under an 
obligation to communicate to the competent authorities 
any irregularities discovered in the course of 
exercising, under law, auditing functions related to a 
relevant company, if such irregularities are prejudicial 
to the interests of the company’s clients, to the 
financial system or to the financial stability of the
given company As the ISD is expected to enter into
force by December 31st 1995, until then credit 
institutions and insurance firms will benefit from 
greater independence with respect to the seat of their 
central administration, that is, compared with investment 
firms a, Iready bound by relevant obligations under Art. 
3(2) of the EEC Directive 93/22.
It has been observed^: tliat in many cases the
’’passport" provisions of the investment services 
Directive may be of little practical effect. In many 
countries, and thereto EU/EC member states are not 
exceptions, investment services are conducted by banks,
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and for commercial reasons firms from member states 
establishing a presence in a member state are likely to 
set up a banking subsidiary or branch. Even when 
financial services are to be carried out by an investment 
firm and not a credit institution, there may be tax and 
commercial reasons to set up a separate subsidiary in the 
given member state rather than establish a branch. The 
subsidiary would then need local authorisation in the
same way as at present (1994). In addition, where a firm 
does provide services in another member state within the 
scope of the ISD, the notification procedures applicable 
under the Directive may be rather involved, bureaucratic; 
ultimately, there may be little difference in practice 
between obtaining the "passport" and obtaining local 
authorisation under EC Arts, 52 and 58.
iii) Home and host state supervision in the ISD;
Prudential Rules and Rules of Conduct 
The here relevant Council Directive on investment 
services in the securities field, no. 93/22/EC, proposed 
in 1989 COJ C43/7), amended on February 3, 1990 (ÜJ
L386/1), and definitively approved on May 10, 1993 (OJ
LIAI (June 11)), has had a long and rather tortuous 
distance to cover owing to diverging interests in 
individual member states and particularly owing to the
use of the terms transparency and recognised markets. 
Much of the difficulties in reaching agreement on the
Directive have revolved around the extension of its
applicability to matters relating to investment 
exchanges, referred to as regulated m a r k e t s . F o r  the. so 
called "concentration" problem a compromise was reached 
on June 29, 1992 by the ECOFIN M i n u t e s . I n v e s t o r s  shall
have the right to apply the established order outside the 
markets. The ISD allows EC states to require that certain 
transactions must be carried out on a regulated market 
(Art. 14(3)). However, the exercise of this right can
___ ___________ --- ___________
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eventually be subject to express authorisation (Art. 
14(4)).
The UK does not propose to introduce a new 
concentration requirement as part of its implementation 
of the ISD and will be watching closely to see that other 
member states do not abuse the requirement for the
purposes of market protectionism rather than investor
protection.“®
The ISD achieves, for investment firms which are not 
banks, the same freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services which banks currently (1994) have under 
the second banking co - o r,d i na t i on Directive. It
therewith sanctions the defeat of the Italian system in 
two respects ; the principle that stock transactions 
should in Italy be concentrated only within the stock 
market and that to transact a stock market
intermediation firm (SIM) with a seat in Italy is
necessary as an intermediary (Arts. 3 and 11 of the 
Italian Law of January 1991),
On January 19, 1994, the EU Commission applied,
under EC Art. 169,■ to the ECJ in Luxembourg with a
complaint concerning the Italian Law No. 1 of January 2, 
1991, on the requirement to form a stock market 
intermediation company (Societa di 1n termediazione
Mobilière) (SIM) for offering financial services in 
Italy. The Commission referred to a violation, by the 
Italian Law, of the freedom of establishment and the free 
supply of services as cornerstones of the system of the 
single and integrated EC market. Art. 3(a) of the Italian 
Law lays bindingly down that financial services shall be 
offered only by SIMs, with statutory seats in Italy. The 
EU Commission (rightly) argues this to be in open 
contradiction (if not conflict) with basic provisions of 
the EC Treaty,particularly with Art. 52 on the right of 
establishment applicable to all EU/EC nationals w i t h o u t
---   -1   . :
199
discrimination. The United Kingdom too has presented a 
formal protest to the EU Commission in Brussels on the 
Italian Law on the compulsory formation of SIMs. Art 3 of 
the Italian Law has been judged to be a protectionist 
(and discriminatory) measure. The President of the CONSOB 
in Italy, Enzo Berlanda, has reacted by declaring (in our 
translation) "we are not the only ones in this respect.
Other nine (of the 12) EU member states have the same
normative standard as a guarantee with reference to 
their nationals as investors".z? The conclusion is 
implicit that the Italian Law will have to be
consequently modified as a necessity for complying with 
EC Directive 93/22 when the latter enters into force by 
December 31st, 1996 (Art. 15(3)). It is to be noted that
this date has been implicitly conceded for enabling 
member states to adjust their national standards to the
requirements of the Directive,/'®
The ISD is intimately correlated to Council
Directive 93/6/EC (OJ L141/71) of March 15, 1993, on the
capital adequacy of investment firms and credit
institutions (CAD). In addition, EC legislation has used
the CAD (Directive 93/6/EC) for clarifying the scope of 
the ISD (Directive 93/22/EC). Concerning the protection 
of investors, EC standards tend historically as well as 
currently to reconcile and coordinate the exigencies of 
investor protection with those of the development of the 
markets and operators involved in it. This has involved 
and still involves the promotion of a difficult and
delicate balance between competing interests which may 
after all be reconciled and may meet for a better and 
more efficient economic system as a whole. Such an 
objective involves the consideration and participation of 
two points:
-- Integration between EU member states should
generate and lead to greater and better competition
4
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between firms and therewith to a better supply of 
services to Investors as eventual beneficiaries ;
-- Investors as ultimate beneficiaries should be 
c apab1e to select the firms which offer greater 
guarantees and better quality of services, thus 
unleashing in turn a gradual increase in better standards 
for protecting investors.
The above two points as keys to a better 
interpretation and understanding of the relevant issues 
may reflect the great care which EC legislation has taken 
with respect to investor protection, particularly in the 
two recent (here considered) Directives, The protection 
of investors has been placed at the same level and has 
been given the same valency as those attached to the 
stability and reliability of the financial markets ; 
authorisation by the home member state pursues the 
purpose of investor protection as well as the stability 
of the financial system (cf, preamble par. 2 of the ISD), 
In other words, the scope of investor protection has been 
recognised as merely one of the objectives : "one of the
objectives of this Directive is to protect investors" 
(ISD Directive 9 3 /22/EC, preamble par. 32), The Directive 
more explicitly identifies, as a principal objective, 
facilitation for investment firms to establish branch 
offices and to supply services freely in other member 
states (preamble par. 1).
The scope of protection of investors is defined by 
CAD (Directive 93/6/EC of June 11, 1993) coordinating
rules on matters of risk on the markets (cf. ISD, 
preamble pa r , 26). In this way both directives are
intimately correlated, to such an extent that their entry 
into force at different dates would induce a distortion 
in competition (cf. CAD, preamble, last par.). Member 
states shall see to it that the implementation of both 
Directives are effected as foreseen under Art. 31 of ISD
-------
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(Directive 93/22/EC) that is, on July 1st 1995 (see also 
Art. 12(2) of CAD, but they will not come into force 
until December 31, 1995, Once again, the approach to the
integration and coordination of the national markets is 
made clear, as follows, in terms of lowest common 
denominators : "the approach that has been adopted is to
effect only the essential harmonisation that is necessary 
and sufficient to secure the mutual recognition of 
authorisation and of prudential supervision systems" 
(Preamble par. 3 of CAD Directive 93/6/EG).
The ISD (Directive 93/22/EC) allows taking into 
account the professional nature and expertise of the 
firm’s client or customer; it is appropriate to take 
account of the different requirements for the protection 
of various categories of investors and of their levels of 
professional expertise" (preamble par. 32). "The rules 
of conduct must be applied in such a way as to take 
account of the professional nature of the person of the 
person for whom the service is provided" Art. 11(1). 
"Where an investment firm executes an order for the 
purpose of applying the rules referred to in paragraph 1, 
the professional nature of the investor shall be assessed 
with respect to the investor for whom the order 
originates" (Art. 11(3)), "taking into account investors’ 
differing needs for protection and in particular the 
ability of professional and institutional investors to 
act in their own best interest" (Art. 14(4). Moreover, 
the ISD introduces the concept of "indirect customer": 
the professional nature of the investor shall be assessed 
with respect to the investor from whom the order 
originates (whether private, professional etc) and must 
be considered in determining how conduct of business 
rules should be applied not the intermediary with whom 
the firm may be dealing directly. (Art. 11(3)),
One of the more incisively normative rules affecting
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the protection of investors could be the possibility to 
revoke the authorisation: the competent authorities can
withdraw the authorisation issued to an investment firm 
where it has seriously and systematically infringed the 
provision adopted pursuant to Articles 10 and 11 of the 
ISD (Art. 3(7,e).
It has been commented that when qualifying a 
violation as grave and systematic, it would not be
sufficient to refer to a single or some serious 
violations. It may be wondered whether this approach does 
not favour the protection of the institutional investors 
more than private or non-institutiona1 investors, because 
institutional investors, with financial strength as well 
as legal and financial expertise available at their 
disposal, may much more easily survive a few and even a 
few serious violations as blows, whereas for private
investors, particularly for small investors, even a 
single serious violation of a rule or standard of conduct 
may mean the difference between financial security in old 
age or total financia 1 ruin, as practical experience and 
cases from the last ten years from more than one EU
member state amply illustrate. Is a national compensation 
scheme with tax payers’ money a proper remedy? The SIB 
does not believe that ISD will require to limit the 
existing ground for UK authorities to withdraw an
authorisation they have granted.3°
The host member state is to be informed about the 
revocation of an authorisation and shall take adequate 
measures to impede the investment firm in question from 
undertaking further investment activities in its 
territory and for safeguarding the interests of investors 
(Art. 19(9) of ISD).
The Directive lays down other prudential 
requirements for the home state to be applied in the 
interest of investor protection. All investment firms
V " *■ '.* ------- --
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affected by the contents of the ISD and needing home 
member state authorisation have to satisfy applicable 
criteria, irrespective of the question whether or not 
they wish to take advantage of the "passport" to provide 
services in other member states. They are also caught by 
the conduct of business rules of their home member state 
in which they provide investment services. These 
requirements are also to apply to credit institutions in 
possession of the "passport" under the Second Banking C o ­
ordination Directive 89/646/EEC (OJ L386/1 (1989)). The
ISD introduces a split of supervisory responsibilities 
between prudential requirements (home state authorities) 
and conduct of business rules (host state authorities). 
The home member state shall be responsible for the 
prudential supervision of the investment firm (Art. 8(3) 
of the ISD). Each home member state is entrusted with
drawing up prudential rules for observance by investment
firms. The same rules shall a.pply also to credit 
institutions conducting investment business. The rules 
are intended to strengthen investor protection by 
obliging investment firms to adopt and apply, in 
permanence, determined norms relative in the first place
to organisational and control matters.
There are five identified home member state
prudential rules, concerning in the first place the 
structure and organisation of investment firms:
1. The firms are to have sound administrative and
accounting procedures, control and safeguard arrangements 
for electronic data processing, and adequate internal
control mechanisms, including, in particular, rules for 
individual transactions by employees;
2. They are to make adequate arrangements for
instruments belonging to investors with a view for
safeguarding the letter’s ownership rights;
3. Adequate arrangements are to be made for funds
-- ___________________ ____
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belonging to investors with a view to safeguarding the
latter’s rights and, except in the case of credit
institutions, preventing the investment firm using 
investors’ funds for its own account;
4. Arrangements are to be made for keeping records 
of transactions executed in such a manner that they shall 
be at least sufficient to enable the home member state’s 
authorities to monitor compliance with the prudential 
rules they are responsible for applying ; such records 
shall be retained for periods to be laid down by the 
competent authorities ;
5. The firms are to be structured and organised in 
such a way as to minimize the risk of prejudicing
clients’ interests by conflicts of interest between the
firm and its clients or between one of its clients and 
another. Where a branch is set up the organisational 
arrangements may not conflict with the rules of conduct 
laid down by the host member state to cover conflicts of 
interest (Art, 10 of the ISD).
The above mentioned rules, general in nature, may be
variously interpreted. As a result, their real efficacy 
in investor protection may depend on their interpretative 
elaboration by the home member state which also may lay 
down rules more stringent than those enshrined in the 
ISD, particularly with reference to matters related to 
authorisation, prudential arrangements and rules on 
statements and transparency (Cf. par. 27 of the preamble 
of the Directive).
For adopting the ISD each member state shall above 
all establish whether to coordinate or to let Investors’ 
interests prevail in the first place or let the interests 
of investment firms prevail. This involves a delicate 
question touching the long term economic and financial 
interests of individual member states. A neglect of 
investors’ interests by a member state may motivate
____________
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investors to move to the financial markets of other
member states, while a neglect of investing firms’
interests may in turn motivate the latter to abandon the 
member state in question in favour of other member states 
where lesser investor protection may prevail. Hence there 
is a need, as hitherto, for at least minimal standards of 
coordination between national financial markets on the 
road to a really integrated single EC market. An
awareness of the herewith implied problem and challenge 
is reflected by ISD when its preamble in paragraph 4
states that "the principles of mutual recognition and
home Member State supervision .require that the Member
States’ .competent authorities should not grant or
should withdraw authorisation where factors such as the 
content of programme of operations, the geographical 
distribution or the activities carried on indicate 
clearly that an investment firm has opted for the legal 
system of one Member State for the purpose of evading the 
stricter standards in force in another Member State 
wittiin the territory of which it intends to carry on or 
does carry on the greater part of its activities". 
Conduct by investment firms fleeing from the more 
demanding standards of the legal system of a member state 
may be scrutinised by the home member state where 
authorisation for the activities of the firm has been 
granted. The home member state is under an obligation to 
require that an investment firm’s head office must always 
be situated in the relevant home member state and that 
the firm also actually operates there (cf. par 4 of the 
preamble of ISD). At a higher level of judicial control 
under EC law it may be worthwhile to note that if a home 
or host member state fails to fulfil obligations 
undertaken under primary or secondary EC law, the matter 
may be submitted to a decision by the ECJ in accordance 
with the provisions of EC Arts. 169 or 170.
____________________
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With respect to a balance between the application of 
the home member state rule, on the one hand, and the host 
member state rule complimentary to it on the other, it 
has been critically remarked that if dogmatically 
applied,, the home member state principle may prove to be 
unfair and unworkable with reference to the interests of 
the investor as a consumer; it may produce political
difficulties if applied too dogmatically, as it has 
advantages for firms as they.are able to know they can 
operate and are governed by one set of dominant rules as 
a general proposition,'’* while the regulatory role of the 
host member state seems to be relatively unclear and as
such marginal, particularly with regard to sanctionary
competences. In general terms. Art. 11(1) of the ISD
provides for the host member state to specify conditions, 
including conduct of business rules applicable, 
evidently, to business which must be carried on in that 
host member state, and the rules and any other conditions 
have to be justified as being in the general good, that 
is, be non-discriminatory, not duplicate home member
state requirements and be proportionate to the risks they 
are intended to address. The exact normative and
regulatory content of these expectations may not be easy 
to define and inter-coordinate even if under Art, 11(1) 
of the Directive the host member state is guided to 
implement at least the following seven general 
principles :
1. Firms shall be expected to act honestly and
fairly in conducting their business activities in the 
best interests of clients and the integrity of the
market ;
2. Firms shall act with due skill, care and 
diligence in the best interests of their clients and the 
integrity of the market;
3. Firms shall have and use effectively the
 : - : !
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resources and procedures necessary for the proper 
performance of their respective activities;
4. Firms shall seek to get from their clients 
information regarding their situation, investment 
experience and objectives as regards the service 
requested ;
5. Firms shall make adequate disclosure of relevant 
material information in their dealings with their 
clients;
6. Firms shall avoid conflicts of interests; when 
such conflicts cannot be avoided, firms shall ensure that 
their clients are fairly treated; and
7. Firms shall comply with all regulatory activities 
applicable to the conduct of their business activities, 
so as to promote the best interests of their clients and 
the integrity of the market.
These are based on principles agreed between 
international supervisors in IOSCO, in turn based largely 
on SIB’s own Principles. The SIB’s view is, therefore, 
that, in general, the substance of the U K ’s existing 
requirements (currently involving a mix of Principles, 
Core rules and Third Tier conduct of business rules) 
already satisfy the ISD. Even once the Core rules are de­
regulated, the SRO rules based on them will provide 
similar safeg u a rds.^z
Because of the division of responsibilities between 
home a.nd host states, the authorities of each member 
state need to change the way in which their rules and 
practices apply to ISD firms so that they have sole 
responsibility for the prudential supervision of firms 
they have authorised, extending throughout the EC but 
reduced responsibility for firms operating in their 
territories but authorised in other states.
The Directive evidently sets out only the general 
principles which shall condition the conduct of business
1S
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rules. Any state may impose additional requirements as 
long as they are justifiable in the interest of the 
general good. The concrete elaboration and implementation 
of conduct of business rules is left to the host member 
state in which the investment service is being conducted 
by a "host" firm: the concrete dimensions and normative
impact of conduct of business rules may vary considerably 
from member state to member state with potential 
confusion for the firms concerned and headaches for the 
regulatory authorities and even bodies c a, lied upon to 
exercise a judicial function.'’'’ Although the ISD affirms 
in the preamble (see paragraph 41) that the stability and 
soundness of the financial system and the protection of 
investors presupposes the right and responsibility of a 
host member state both to prevent and to penalise within 
its territory any conduct by investment firms contrary to 
the conduct of business rules as well as contrary to 
other legal or regulatory provisions it has adopted in 
the interest of' the general good, and to take action in 
emergencies, the real powers of both the home as well as 
the host member state do not seem to be as yet adequately 
clarified, it is submitted that admittedly at the current 
stage of the development of the EC financial markets with 
national traditions and divisions influencing them, an 
adequate clarification of what has been implied above as 
a problem and challenge cannot be as yet achieved, nor is 
such a clarification a top urgency; but it is important 
to be aware of it while the cross-and interpenetration of 
national markets slowly evolves and emerges. Later, the 
creative challenge for lawyers may be the question 
whether to proceed, in the best general interest, with a 
more pragmatic and case by case approach more pronounced 
in the UK legal tradition, or with a more a priori 
normative approach more typical of Continental European 
civil law tradition. Probably, the best approach will be
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a mixed one. In the meantime, where an investment firm 
breaches host member state rules, the Directive offers 
both general as well as rather complex provisions on the 
extent to which the state regulators may resort to 
concrete action against the firm. Such action may involve 
first by administration and then if necessary, 
subsidiarily, judicial measures such as an injunction. At 
an administrative and regulatory level, the host member 
state authorities can require the investment firm to 
remedy the breach, but if the firm fails to do so, the 
authorities should generally refer the matter to the home 
member state authorities for action to be taken by the 
latter (see Arts. 18(4) and (5) of the ISD). As already 
stated above, these provisions are vague and may create 
uncertainty and even harmful confusion both for firms and 
affected investors; not least they involve a potential 
for disputes which may ultimately end in Luxembourg for 
judicial interpretation and settlement by the ECJ , ®
This possibility could be averted by setting up a 
control authority at EC level with supranational powers ; 
a European SEC model could establish a centrally cited 
body similar in functions to the USA SEC, and competent 
to institute Investigations and impose sanctions. Such a 
proposal conjures up, however, in the member states 
political fears and can generate correspondingly stubborn 
resistance: it explicitly indicates the necessity, if not
the inevitability, of ceding traditional state powers to 
a central supranational authority escaping their 
collective as well as individual control, with the ECJ as
an example.35
The EC Commission seems to be aware of the above 
outlined problems and challenges. For expanding the scope 
of investor protection it intends to prepare a further 
Directive requiring the member states to introduce, 
individually, an investors’ compensation scheme
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satisfying minimum standards, The scheme would cover
claims by investors in the home as well as in other EU/EC
member s ta. tes (see Art, 12(2) of the ISD).
With reference to the currently prevailing situation 
(1994), it may well be said that as every member state 
will have conduct of business rules applicable to 
investment services effected in that state by both credit 
institutions and investment firms, it is not excluded 
that there may be unnecessarily more rather than less 
regulation of investment activities.'**
As the freedom of establishment and freedom to 
provide services are directly applicable, "it may be 
asked why there was a need for any further EC legislation 
at all in the form of directives or anything else, to 
enable firms to exercise these freedoms in the financial 
services context.3?
"Entirely unclear is the level of regulation that 
will result from the new approach. Opinion is divided as 
to whether securities regulation and, in particular, 
investor protection rules will be relaxed or
s t r e n g t h e n e d . ®
Concern has been also expressed for the so-called 
"race to the bottom" : an increased competition between
the national markets that could encourage member states
to impose the minimum standards possible under the EC
Directives, "The division of the responsibilities between 
home and host countries for the most part follows the
expected pattern for international regulation, although 
there remains some concern that the European Court may, 
by restrictive interpretation of the general good, unduly 
favour home country regulation and thereby encourage a 
competitive rush to the bottom. It is too early to tell 
if the expansion of the passporting system will lead many 
European banks and investment firms to move their UK
business out of UK subsidiaries and into home country
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regulated branches, in order to take advantage of a more 
relaxed regulatory regime" ... "the ISD does recognise
the possibility of host country regulations imposing
their own home structural rules on pass ported credit 
institutions’ own investment firms' branches; but with 
competitive forces pushing the European market towards
greater concentration into integrated houses and a 
European Court favouring unified home country regulation 
over close host country supervision, fear it will take a 
major scandal to reopen the whole basis for the single 
market in investment services."'’’
At this point it is useful to verify whether the 
funda.raental thrust and spirit of EC legislation and 
particularly of investor protection are being adequately 
integrated into national legislation. Parts of this
complex question will be discussed in the remaining parts 
of the present Chapter 8 below, as it is useful to 
scrutinise how investor protection has been integrated 
and interpreted into national legislation in the member 
states and what objectives have been achieved, for the 
purpose and scope of the present thesis, in France, Italy 
and the United Kingdom.
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2. Investor Protection in France
Although the French, in international comparisons,
are not renowned as so to speak great promoters of
savings, they have in the last decade of the 19th century
and more precisely starting 1878 generated abundant 
financial savings,*® even if in the second half of the 
20th century the level of savings has been lower as a 
result of investment in private housing. On the side of 
investment, demand has been relatively modest as around 
1880 major railway lines and major urban renewal or 
development projects had been completed. In the second 
half of the present century, demand or need for 
investment capital was greater than the supply of it. It 
is also noteworthy that in 1890 55 per cent of savings
were generated by property owners and only 6.5 per cent 
by wage earners; in 1967 the category of so to speak 
"inactive" part of the population contributed but by ten 
per cent to the accumulation of savings, while wage 
earners increased their comparable share to 55 per cent. 
In the meantime developments at the legislative level had 
shifted from the protection- of savings to the protection 
of investors.
i. From the protection of savings to the protection 
of investors
The trend towards investor protection is a major 
characteristic accompanying the restructuration process 
of financial markets in France; there has been a 
promotion of rules affecting the protection of investors. 
The result is that investors alleging to be victims of 
irregularities ascribed to companies or to those active 
in financial markets may turn to the COB, Within the 
category of investors individual shareholders constitute 
a numerous group; institutional shareholders are 
represented at a stable level, while the numbers of non- 
French shareholders is increasing rapidly, having reached
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at the end of March 1992 31.2 per cent of capitalisation 
in French stock m a r k e t s . I t has also been noted that 
institutional investors have the capacity to mobilise 
more rapidly investment capital, while individual 
investors distinguish themselves by a trend towards so to 
speak "loyalty", keeping their acquired shares for an 
average of four years against a comparable standard of 24 
days to 10 months for institut!o n a 1 investors, according 
to a study undertaken by the COB. Hence, it may be said 
that individual investors constitute a factor of 
stability in the market, financially enriching economic 
tradition in France and in a way also playing a 
determining "educational role".4% In the 1980s there has 
been a considerable increase in the number of individual 
shareholders, from 1. 7m\ in 1982 to 6,2^ in 1987.4 3 
After 1991, individual shareholders have decreased from 
5.4M to 4.5M. More men than women are shareholders; 55 
per cent of individual . shareholders are more than 65 
years old; 53 per cent are retired.**
The function of protecting savings Invested in 
transferable assets consists essentially and principally 
i n
—  upholding the principle of equality between 
shareholders ;
-- promoting transparency at the level of operations 
and transactions.
The principle of equality has been an inspiring 
force underlying the reform of 1969. No shareholder may 
claim any particular conditions of privileged treatment 
with respect to access to transactions or to quotations 
or prices. The notion of transparency concerns not only 
information which the COB requests companies to supply on 
themselves, on their operations, but also concerns exact 
information as to the competences and powers which 
diverse author ities may exercise in the market,
y'- • -r:-y ________ ______
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particularly available measures of control - effected by 
the COB. All these points are related to the scope of 
enabling investors to understand where protection ends 
and risk taking begins. In other words, it is professed 
that only an exact identification of the relevant rights 
and duties of the issuing companies and of shareholders 
will permit to act and transact with optimal reliability 
or security. The corresponding programme of investor 
protection of the COB is articulated in the form of three 
fundamental points :
““ security for savings invested in financial
markets ;
transparency of the financial markets ;
-- simplification of procedures.
The security of invested savings depends essentially 
on the professional integrity and ability of the
intermediaries and on legal guarantees accompanying the
transactions of investors. If the development of
financial markets is based on trust by investors in the
markets, it is necessary to organise the professional 
activities of the intermediaries in such a way that the 
reliability and the integrity of the markets is
guaranteed. Therewith the need to dispose of modern
standards of professional conduct moves from the sphere 
of a logic of economic expediency to that of an awareness 
that respect for determined standards of conduct binding 
financial intermediaries represents one of the 
fundamental criteria for determining the international 
reputation of a stock market. On the basis of such an
approach in France an ample process of réévaluation of
professional ethics (deontology) is taking place.
Already in its report for 1986 the COB enunciated 
two general principles :
i.) The interests of the client shall prevail. This 
postulates that the intermediary shall not take his own
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particular interests in consideration when involved in 
making a decision for his client ;
ii.) Information in the possession of the client
that a plurality of interests may exist. This principle 
comports an obligation for the intermediary to bring to 
the attention of the client the existence of ail relevant 
interests and to inform him on the respective roleCs) or 
function(s) fulfilled by them, including or not excluding 
conflicts of interests which may emerge in the course of 
the operation or transaction.
In 1987 the COB formed a working group consisting of 
experts from the financial world, directed by Brae de I a 
Perriere, President of the Banque privee de Gestion
financière. The mandate of the working group was to 
identify and define the so to speak deontological profile 
of financial activities. In a first part of its 
programme, the COB intended to clarify the fundamental
principles underlying the deontology of financial
intermediaries. The second part was dedicated to the 
elaboration of more detailed rules regulating conduct.
In July 1987 a first report*® pointed to two
fundamental principles which should guide professional 
operators in their activities: (i) the interests of the
client and (ii) respect for the integrity of the market 
shall prevail. In relation to a client an intermediary is 
held to observe obligations of diligence, loyalty, 
neutrality and discretion, to which attached itself the 
duty to let prudence prevail when managing the capital. 
The intermediary may not expose the client to excessive 
risks which have not been brought to the express 
attention of the client.
The duty to let neutrality prevail, imposed on an 
intermediary, assumes particular relevance to the extent 
it contributes to mobilise attention to problems of
conflicts of interest between the firm acting as an
- - 4-' '/J:' - ______
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intermediary, on the one hand, and its clients on the
other. For coping with this problem for the purpose of
resolving it, the system of separat ion of f unet ions, for 
a substantially preventive purpose, has been complemented 
by some legal remedies which may be invoked in a
situation of inevitable conflict.
In the second (and final) stage of its agenda, the 
working group induced the formation of four commissions, 
prevailingly composed of sectorial operators, with the 
task of defining in specific terms the deonto1og ica1
standards applicable to financial activities. With 
reference to conclusions submitted by these four 
commissions, the working group edited a final general 
report as a basis for guiding the activities of
professional operators as well as the activities of
directors of firms operating as financial intermediaries.
In the firs^ of its two parts, the general report 
dealt with the deontological principles which should 
guide the activities of its intermediaries; the second 
part contained 44 rules as the first phase towards the 
establishment of a corpus of rules of professional
conduct. It is important to underline that the contents 
of the report are not intended to be binding. The COB, 
after approving the general thrust of the report and 
publishing its unabridged text, limited itself to 
recommending a rapid application of the rules of conduct 
by the market authorities, including application by firms 
and interested persons.**
This way of proceeding by the COB reflects how in 
France elements of a process of self-regulation are
emerging. On the one hand it is possible to deduce that
much relevance is attached to the role of professional 
conduct after the reform of 1968, and to see on the other 
hand how once more the central importance of firms acting 
as intermediaries and not of the market authorities is
I
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confirmed in the process of generating and applying rules 
of conduct. Moreover, it can be said that the purpose of 
deontology is not understood to be not only one of 
morality but as a factor for stabilising the rules of the 
game as rules of professional conduct.*’ The COB, while 
having authority to lay down rules of professional 
conduct (as deontology),*® has preferred Instead to 
abstain from invoking this authority and has preferred to 
promote the interest of the members of the profession 
themselves in setting up the rules. This approach has 
conditioned the genesis of some of the principles 
elaborated by the group working under Brae de La Perriere 
in March 1983 and September 1989. It could be said that 
the COB could itself have inserted such principles in a 
system of regulation. The COB has preferred instead to 
accept in deontological standards the existence of a 
c u 1tural rather than legal phenomenon and has decided to 
agree with the conclusions of the working group and has 
turned to the professional bodies to elaborate rules of 
conduct and attach consequences to their violation. This 
deontological approach has not intended to create a new 
source of law like the codes of good conduct; it has made 
use of existing legal standards which in relation to the 
rules represent a type of "natural law". The 
deontological standards are composed principally of
-- internal rules affecting the financial
intermediaries, generated in application of Art. 19 of 
the Law of January 1988 ;
rules and decisions by professional bodies active 
in the market, for example, the general rules of the 
Conseil de bourse des Valeurs, general rules of the 
Council of the futures market, and decisions by both 
bodies ;
-- contractual rules which govern relations between 
the intermediaries and their clients.
--------
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i1. Deontology of f inane tal Activities ; Objectives, 
Principles and Rules
Among the two basic objectives of professional 
deontology, namely, (i) primacy of client’s interests and 
(ii) integrity of the market,*’ the latter usefully
complements the first in situations involving
relations between different professionals ; 
advantages offered to a client in violation of a 
professional standard : and
conduct which, while not causing any damage to a 
client or to a group of clients, detrimentally affects 
the proper functioning of the market.
The 44 rules already mentioned earlier (above), were 
set up between September 1967 and February 1988 by the
four appointed commissions (already mentioned above),®® 
They constitute the substance of deontology which in turn 
consists of a body of principles and recommendations. 
Their implementation is entrusted to the financial
intermediaries, to their professional bodies as well as
to the market. They all together are entrusted with the
task to elaborate them, secure their control and to 
attach consequences to their violation.®’ Deontological 
standards are conceived as a necessary but distinct 
complement to legal rules and regulations.
With reference to principles, there are six of them 
with respective recommendations. The first three
principles (1-3) concern relations with clients; the
fourth principle relates to those who intervene on the 
market, the fifth to those who work together with
financial intermediaries, and the sixth principle refers 
to the internal organisation of the financial
intermediaries. These six principles, established by 
professionals involved in the work of the group Brae de 
La Perriere, synthesise the 44 propositions tabled in
 ' ___  ___
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March 1980. They are treated in the document with the 
title /in our translation / "Balance of the proposals 
sutam i tted by the group chaired by Mr Gilles Brae de La 
Perriere", published by the COB in September 1989.
Principle 1 prescribes that a financial intermediary 
should have adequate means and resources necessary for a 
proper execution of services offered to his clients. The 
corresponding Recommendation 1.1 proposes that adequate 
means and resources should be at the disposal of 
employees who are both competent and informed ; the 
existence of an internal organisation which permits with 
precision the initiation, transmission and implementation 
of instructions ; a level of feasibility which permits to 
define and identify the various parts of an operation or 
transaction effected in execution of an order 
communicated by a client or his representative.
Recommendation 1.2 suggests that a financial 
intermediary should have at his disposal the means to be
in control of his activities. The establishment of such
an obligation relating to resources is one of the 
principal messages set up by the group under Brae de La 
Perriere, as a deontological exigency since an 
intermediary has a wide mar g in of discretion in order to 
do justice to what Recommendation 1.2 prescribes. The 
availability of adequate means can be effected with the 
creation of an adequate internal organisation which also 
provides for the availability of an internal control.
Such a control can be exercised by a person who, aware of
its demands, is in a position also to advise. Therewith 
authorities of protection, be they at professional or 
public levels, can then exercise their control functions 
in an efficient way.
The function of internal control has been largely 
inspired by the British-Ameri can institution of the
2 2 0
"compliance officer", introduced first in the USA some 20 
years ago and transplanted to the United Kingdom by the 
Financial Services Act of 1986.“’ Currently in France 
only stock market firms are obliged to designate a person 
in charge of control, sanctioned by Art, 2.2.6 of the 
General regulation of the Conseil de Bourse des Valeurs,
According to Principle 2 a financial intermediary 
shall guarantee the availability of adequate information 
for the needs of his clients, for which purpose 
Recommendation 2.1 indicates that he should endeavour to 
be well informed about the relevant situation and about 
the objectives of his clients. Recommendations 2.2, 2.3,
2.4 and 2,5 deal respectively with the contents of duties 
of an intermediary in relation to his clients (they 
should be defined as clearly as possible); with 
guaranteeing the availability of information for the 
clients ; the duty to inform clients about any risks to 
which they may be exposed; and in each case the duty to 
indicate to clients the existence of eventual conflicts 
of interest.
It should be noted that Recommendation 2.1 may meet 
resistance within the framework of the stock market, 
because for a long time it has been taken for granted 
that an exchange agent may pass on an order without 
preoccupying himself with the question as to from whom 
the order comes. The change introduced by Recommendation 
2.1 is conditioned particularly by two factors : (1)
stock exchange firms above all, beside those who deal 
with arbitrage, frequently act as agents for third 
parties; (2) the access to the much riskier parts of the
traditional markets makes it necessary for an
intermediary to know who his client is for proposing
transactions which adequately correspond to the material 
objectives of the client.
Recommendation 2.2 also raises demands in terms of
________
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professional ethics. It was already included in rules 
laid down by stock market authorities, for which 
reference may be made to the contents of chapter 3, title 
2 of the general rules of the Conseil de Bourse des 
Valeurs, (with respect to accounting conventions and 
management) and the decision of the Council of the 
futures market of March 1st, 1989, relative to management 
agreements which permit intervention in futures markets.
Principle 3 points out that a financial intermediary 
should seek to execute in the best possible way the order 
of a client. Recommendation 3.1 deals with the so to 
speak temporal dimension of this point by indicating that 
the intermediary should reduce as much as possible delays 
in the execution of an order after its initial 
registration up to the phase of accounting for it. Orders 
are to be registered chronologically from the moment of 
their arrival up to the phase of execution, is the 
message of Recommendation 3 , 2 , while Recommendation 3,3 
states that effected transactions should not be subjected 
to a posteriori changes, except when specific 
dispositions anticipatorily provide for such possible 
modifications. Referring to the necessity of fair 
allocation of a quantatively limited offer,
Recommendation 3.4 says the financial intermediary should 
ensure that a fair distribution of the available stocks 
is ef f ected.
Recommendation 3.3 deals with professional habits 
which cannot be said to have completely disappeared. They 
concern the attribution of a transaction to an account, 
which may be that of a client or clients, or the account 
of the intermediary himself or the personal account of an 
employee, as soon as the conditions of a transaction 
become known. The abuses which may be committed are 
evident. The attribution of a transaction to a client 
should be a first point to
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execute. However, in certain cases it may be for the
client of a stock market firm acting as an intermediary 
convenient to have his order treated as part of a global 
order which may be accredited then to the individual
clients once the transaction is completed. A general
decision by the Conseil de Bourse des Valeurs has 
confirmed the acceptability of such a practice, affirming 
particularly that the contents of global orders may not
be credited taut to the clients accounts.
Principle 4 establishes for the financial
intermediary a duty to seek to respect the transparency 
and security of the market, by seeking to contribute to
them (Recommendation 4.1 and 4 , 2 ). For example,
concerning futures markets, intermediaries may not hide 
the identity of clients if the market authority demands 
that their identity should be r e v e a l e d . ^ *
Referring to the internal relationship of an 
intermediary with personnel who assist him, Pr i nci p 1e 5 
says he should establish a regime and a system of control 
governing the operations and transactions effected by 
professional employees. Recommendations 5.1 and 5.2 deal 
with some of the technical details related thereto. 
Recommendation 5.3 makes an interesting point : financial
intermediaries should not knowingly execute, for
employees of other intermediaries, transactions which 
breach principles and rules of professional conduct. This 
recommendation is supported by the contents of Art. 19 of 
the Law of January 22, 1988. This means that the
standards laid down by law are to be supplemented at the 
level of profess iona1 ethics by corresponding
arrangements. The law does not define, however, the exact 
contents of this duty. In conformity with the spirit 
underlying the conclusions of the working group chaired 
by Brae de La Perriere, it is individually left to each 
intermediary to elaborate the deonto1ogica1 standards he
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specifically needs in a manner which the law abstains 
from defining for him. The contents of Art. 19 of the Law 
of January 22, 1988, are to be applied in the light of
two Circulars issued by the French Ministry of Labour on
January 9, 1909 and October 16, 1969.
Principle 6 prescribes that if conflicts of
interest, which are to be avoided, arise, they are to be
resolved in an equitable way. Elaborating this point, 
Recommendations 6,1, 6,2, 6.3 and 6.4 put an
intermediary under an obligation to guarantee an
organisational structure which reduces the risks of
conflicts of interest, avoids the circulation of
confidential information, and resolves conflicts of
interest with due regard to the interests of the clients. 
Recommendation 6.4 indicates that the remuneration of 
professional persons should not violate the primacy of 
clients’ interests. This involves one of the most
important principles but it is at the same time possibly 
a principle which lends itself less for translation into 
positive law, because the best preventative shall be that 
adopted individually by a financial intermediary and the 
solution(s) he shall opt for. On this point the working 
group under Brae de La Perriere concentrated their
analysis on the way bodies of collective portfolio
management (OPCVM) operated. Some solutions preferred in 
British and American practice could possibly be of
assistance as guidance in the consideration of
professional persons. They concern in concrete terms the
so to speak ’’Chinese walls” , the famous walls which
should separate between functions susceptible to generate 
conflicts of interest. Mention should also be made here 
of ’’restricted lists”, lists of transferable assets with 
respect to which a firm with a particular interest in 
them or with particular information on them, undertakes 
not to transact.56
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As a first result®^ in the integration of the
principle of professional ethics with legislative texts 
and national regulation standards, some of the principles 
generated by the working group have already been
translated into normative rules:
The Law No. 88-1201 of December 23, 1988, relating
to portfolio management firms (OPCVM), provides that an 
intermediary shall have at his disposal the means and 
resources necessary for the proper execution of services 
offered to clients, (See particularly Article 12.) 
Relevant hereto is also COB Regulation No. 90.06
concerning individual or collective portfolio management.
Art. 20 of Law No. 88-70 of January 22, 1988,
regulates the duty of an intermediary to insure that the 
cl lent(s) get all the adequate information they need. For 
such a purpose written guidelines are to be produced 
prior to the management of clients’ accounts, (See also 
the General Regulation of the Conseil de Bourse de 
Valeurs, Arts, 2-6-3, and 2-3-1 to 2-3-3; the general 
decision No. 89-18 of the same ; General regulation of 
futures markets, Art. 4-1-3; Decisions of CMT No. 89-3. 
(Conseil du Marche a Tenure).
The Cour d ’appel de Paris of February 28, 1994,
decided that the client has the right to be informed and
advised on the risks inherent in the nature of the
transactions planned by the financial intermediary. The 
Court, accordingly, sentenced the Société France 
Compensation Bourse (FCB) to pay damages because the
intermediary did not WARN the client, at the time of 
opening the account, on the serious consequences that 
could arise with respect to transactions with futures. 
The decision is related to the Conseil de Bourse general 
Regulation that, in the chapter dedicated to deontology, 
establishes the principle that the Intermediary must make 
efforts to know the wishes of the
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clients and to give them a clear, prompt and complete 
information on the transactions effected in the behalf of 
the clients. The intermediary should, in addition, check 
that the clients are aware of the nature of the risks
involved. The duty to inform, as a general and permanent
one, reflects a principle rooted in deontology. 
D u cou1oux"Favard"® observes that the duty to inform is an 
ancient one: there is reference to it already in a
decision of 1893 (Appeal of Bourges of June 17, 1893).
The duty to inform is a principle of the contract law. 
The deontology principle has only reported the law of
contract, as the duty to inform is a general principle
applicable to all kinds of contracts.
Regulation of the COB No. 89-05, relative to the 
execution of clients’ orders stipulates that these shall 
be fulfilled in the best possible way by a financial 
intermediary. Regulation No. 90-12 of the COB, of July 
25, 1990, deals with the standard of the chronolog!ca1
implementation of orders.
Concerning the duty of a financial intermediary with 
respect to setting up a regime governing the operations 
of professional assi s tants helping him, including means 
for exercising control over or monitoring them, Art. 19 
of the Law No. 88-70 of January 1988, prescribes that in 
terms of professional ethics rules applicable to the 
activities of assisting personnel shall be set up. On the 
same point the General regulation of the CBV contains 
provisions in Arts. 2-6-5 to 2-6-9. (See also the 
instructions of the COB on bodies active for the sale of 
stocks.) The instructions are on the application of 
regulation No. 89-02 of September 30, 1969.
Reference to the duty of a financial intermediary to 
prevent conflicts of interest and to resolve them in an 
equitable manner can be found in COB Regulation Art, 6 of 
No, 99-06, It puts those who offer quoted stocks under an
 :   ____ 7 r
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obligation to have an internal procedure suitable for 
avoiding the spreading of privileged or sensitive
information, thereto related is also Art, 2-6-2 of the 
General Regulation of Conseil de Bourse des Valeurs 
relating to the organisation of stock market firms and 
independence of certain functions. Regulation of the COB, 
No, 90-05, concerns the abus ive use of powers and orders.
Thus, investor protection in France has involved 
substantia 1 input by profess iona1 experts and bodies for 
a system which consists partly of elements of self- 
regulatory standards inspired from the notion of 
professional ethics (deontology) and partly of elements 
of legislatively codified standards. As to the
application of deontological principles elaborated by
experts representative of the profession, it is the COB
which in the first place verifies that cases brought to 
its attention as test examples are in conformity with the 
principles laid down by the work done by the group 
chaired by Brae de La Perriere and suitable for achieving 
the objectives laid down in the sphere of investor 
protection. The control exercised by the COB is expected 
to check also the internal coherence of the whole body of 
deonto 1og ica1 measures. In this respect the COB has 
already intervened in various ways. It has approved the 
ethical code of the ASFFI (Association des Sociétés 
financières at Fonds français d M n v e s t î s sment ), With due 
regard to the fact that the ethical code of collective 
portfolio managers prepared by the ASFFI strengthens the 
protection of investors rights, the COB has recommended 
and supported the extension of its application to all 
managers comprised in the OPCVM (Organisme de Placement 
collectif de Valeurs mobilières). For this purpose it has 
decided to check the conformity of the way the OPCVM is 
structured and functions with standards established by 
the deontological code laid down
______
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by the ASFFI as one of the conditions to extend its 
consensus and has included this condition in its 
instructions of September 30, 1989, relative to the
procedure of approval for OPCVM as bidues dealing with 
the collective placement of stocks. The COB has in 
addition considered a violation of professional conduct 
rules to be sufficient to request, in the meaning of Art. 
33-1 of the Law of 23 December, 1988, the intervention of
the disciplinary council of the OPCVMs.s?
In general the COB endeavours to facilitate the 
adoption of professional ethical standards by diverse 
professional associations and professional financial
institutions. This corresponds to dealing with numerous 
questions which arise in the daily application of 
internal control functions. The COB collaborates 
similarly with all those who initiate, in conformity with 
the requirement anchored in Art. 6 of the COB Regulation 
No. 90.08, to generate internal procedures often in the 
form of deontologica1 standards related to the activities 
of administrators and directors of firms, for the purpose 
of averting the circulation of privileged or sensitive 
information. In 1992 efforts mobilised in earlier years 
to define profession by profession the significance and 
practicability of the first basic principle upholding the 
primacy of clients’ interests led to a concrete result : 
the deontological code was adopted by portfolio
management firms. Discussions on professional ethics, 
conducted within the AFSGP (French Association of 
Portfolio Management Firms) led to the adoption of an 
ethical code specifically applicable to the problems of 
portfolio management firms. The code is based on the
general principles contained in the report of the group 
chaired by Brae de La Perriere. To be sure that the 
ethical code can be extended to all portfolio management 
firms, the COB has decided that compliance with it as to
228
the proper functioning of a firm shall constitute a 
condition for granting it an approving concession and 
that in cases of an enquiry concerning a firm the code in 
question shall be used as source of professional
standards.6 0 All portfolio firms undertake as members of 
the AFSGP to respect and require their personnel to
respect duties anchored in this code. In case of
violations of this approach a firm may be excluded from 
the AFSGP, A further point of principle is that portfolio 
management firms have to provide for a proper atmosphere 
of cooperation. It is also worthwhile to point.to the way 
the principle of respect for the integrity of the market 
is expected to be applied. The COB undertook an enquiry 
on the use of polls conducted on the occasion of the 
referendum related to the Treaty of European Union 
(Maastricht). In a communique on August 20 1992 and in a 
further one issued jointly with the commission on polls 
on September 11, 1992, it has been established that the
publication and distribution of opinion poll results 
should have proper regard to a few principles : the
publication and distribution of results shall be excluded 
in the week preceding the referendum, in the meaning of
Art. 11 of the Law of July 19, 1977, and organs
supervising the press shall see to it that the above 
principle is complied with.^^ These points may seem to be 
a little far fetched but they have been deemed to be
important with regard to the proper functioning of the
market. The COB has made it clear that a violation of the
relevant obligations may be investigated in the light of 
its regulations and in the light of penal law.^z
It is at this point relevant to enquire what the
efficacy of deontological rules is in relations between a
financial intermediary and his clients. A first
circumstance which may not generate problems may arise
when professional ethics are explicitly included in the
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text of the management contract. In such a situation the 
given standards will be actionable in relation to any 
other contractual clauses or terms, A second circumstance 
may arise when a management contract represents simply 
the framework of legal support for the application of a 
series of specific duties anchored in deontological 
standards. In such a situation French law provides for 
the sanetionabi1ity of such violations affecting the
professional ethical duties to apply due diligence, to
act loyally and with prudence and discretion, provided
that a court recognises and accepts their actionability. 
At the current level of developments such a solution 
seems to be fundamentally accessible, as has been the 
case with respect to a duty to supply adequate
information as a natural part of a management contract,
including all the related duties based on professional
ethical standards. In this respect the role which
deontology may have in consolidating the binding
authority of common law, that is, when courts would
proceed to accept and sanction more amply violations of
duties related to the completion of financial
transactions. This approach is confirmed by the opinion 
of some leading scholars as well as by judicial
p r a c t i c e , 6 3 This may be due to the fact that the major 
part of the relevant duties can be reduced to or 
translated into duties to inform, to consult, to apply 
due diligence and prudence as duties enshrined in common 
1 a w .
A weak point in the above outlined solutions relates 
to the way of proceeding with respect to protection. If 
it is true that investor protection can be achieved by 
means of procedural remedies, it is equally irrefutable 
that for a client it is difficult to prove
satisfactorily that duties of professional conduct have 
been breached by the intermediary, for example, with
    '
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reference to the duty to maintain neutrality in the
t r a n s a c t i o n . 6 4 Seeking a solution in the contractual
relationship does not constitute in all cases the only 
way of dealing with the way professional ethical
standards are expected to operate within the ambit of
relations between investors and their financial 
intermediaries. In the relevant French literature it has 
been affirmed that the violation of a professional duty 
may lead to an assumption of delictual liability by a 
firm of intermediaries if a causal nexus is proved
between violation and damage. In contrast to this, a
court takes directly into consideration the deontological 
principles in question for using them as a technical 
category in support of its decisions. Of particular 
interest is the distinction^^ between cases of violations 
of deontological obligations in relations between
professional operators, on the one hand, and cases of
violation which concern relations with third parties. In 
latter cases there would exist, in addition to a
disciplinary liability, civil l i a b i l i t y . ^ A  On its part, 
judicial practice continues to insist that all conditions 
related to civil liability should exist, affirming in 
such a sense that non-observance of rules of 
professional conduct /in our translation / "does not per 
se justify awarding compensation for damages to a person 
applying for them". It can thus be said that for claiming 
civil liability it is consequently necessary that a 
violation of professional conduct implies also a 
violation of a legal standard protected by common law.^? 
This raises for the topic of our thesis, investor 
protection, grave questions. To seek solutions for them, 
the COB has promoted as desirable, for strengthening the 
protection of investors, the search for a simpler way of 
proceeding for indemnifying investors.
-i
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In 1991 debate on the problem of awarding damages 
derived from failure to observe legal rules and 
regulations was initiated. The Law of July 24, 1966, had
instituted specific procedures in favour of minority
shareholders, but the procedures in question had proved
to be too limited, as a ' result of which there re ma ined 
the necessity to resort to the contents of common law; 
but such reference to remedies available under common
law is a very costly matter for a single shareholder. In 
a report prepared by Alain Viandier it was rightly 
observed that the perimeter of offenses within the 
financial markets has become extended and that
opportunities for committing fraud have become multiplied 
while, paradoxically, there has been an almost total 
absence of available remedies for compensation under 
civil law. This is a problem which does not concern 
F ranee only. In a meeting organised under the auspices of 
the Council of Europe in Milan in 1993, it was concluded 
that "civil actions are little used in Europe". Truly, 
if in certain cases it would be possible to prove easily 
the existence of a committed offence, it would be more 
difficult, in contrast, to prove its prejudicial 
consequence and the nexus of causality between the 
offence and the ensuing damage.
Tunc*® observes that the COB could generate pressure 
for having investors compensated for errors committed at 
their expense. For this purpose a procedure of mediation 
has been instituted, but the function of mediation is 
solely to act as a form of conciliation and not of 
arbitration. In such a situation the legal services of 
the COB would get preliminary information on the 
intention of the involved parties as to proceed or not to 
proceed with conciliation before transmitting the 
relevant files'to the department of public relations of 
the COB.*9 It is thus evident that there is an urgency to
----- ____
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seek legislative solutions which provide for simple, 
accelerated and economical procedures.
ill. Information for Investors : the Prospectus
In matters related to information, French 
legislation has been marked by a notable delay compared 
with the situation in other countries like the USA and 
Belgium where a legal obligation to supply information to 
investors has existed since 1934-1935. The COB exercises 
the control of the quality of information in accordance 
with the control procedure laid down in Arts, 6-7 of the 
Ordinance of 1907 and in a manner clearly inspired by the 
example of the USA Securities Act 1933.7 0
The prospectus constitutes the most complete and 
relevant i nf or mat i on prescribed by law for the benefit of 
stock buyers and is, in the wording of the law, the most 
fundamental document put at the disposal of the public.
Various types of prospectuses exist, differentiated 
in terms of quantity of their contents (as complete, 
abbreviated or simplified); others are distinguished in 
terms of the modalities and procedures to which they make 
reference.7: In France, in application of standards
established by the EC, a single terminology is used, 
"prospectus" which may include such other terms as "note 
abroge", "note d ’operation préliminaire", "note 
d'operation definitive", "r^sum^", as the source of much 
confus ion.
Standards governing the edited form of the 
prospectus remained unchanged from 1907 to 1966, having 
been limited and strictly related to the offer of a 
(publicly subscribed) company, or at the time of 
increasing the corporate capital, subscription of bonds, 
introduction of stocks on the market or at the stock 
market. The prospectus had therewith an elementary 
function to fulfil; to inform the public (publicly or 
through the banking community) on data relative to the
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intended transactio n (s ) and to the publication of notices 
In bulletins dealing with compulsory legal notices or 
announcements. If the data were erroneous, they involved 
(civil) liability and penal offenses for the issuers. 
With the reform effected in 1966 the prospectus assumed 
an obligatory character, including, summarily, its 
contents in a more amplified form and with disciplinary 
measures foreseen for promoting compliance with them. The 
Ordinance of 1967 provided for the supplementary editing 
of a "note d ’information" different from the prospectus
required by law with respect to the reform of commercial
companies. Its contents have not been defined ulteriorly 
with precision, but the COB is competent to establish 
them. The COB has defined in binding form the various 
types of "notes d ’information", without evolving,
however, a standard system applicable to all types. In
addition, the COB has laid down the standards subsequent 
to the adoption of an EC Directive providing for the 
Community wide harmonisation of standards applicable to 
the editing of a prospectus. Initially, even the best 
informed authors did not distinguish between the 
prospectus on the one hand and the "note d ’information" 
on the other and has equated both types to the earlier-
type of the prospectus.72
Subsequent to instructions issued on February 2, 
1982,7 3 3 distinction has been introduced between
a. an ordinary "note d ’information” ;
b. an abridged note, for the benefit of the public,
to be compiled when shares or convertible bonds are
issued and published in the daily press ;
c. a "simplified" note for professional investors. 
Companies which in a preceding year may have offered 
transactions similar to those offered in a current year 
may be dispensed from the publication of a prospectus.
The note is submitted as a project or p I a.n to the
,
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COB as a measure of provision; it is scrutinised and if 
amendments are proposed, it is resubmitted to the COB as 
a definitive note, which is equally checked, approved and 
deposed in the files of the COB. In the meantime, after 
approval the note is made available to the public. The 
Law No. 83-01 of January 5, 1983, extended the
requirements of Arts. 6-7 of the Ordinance No, 67-833 of 
28 September, 1967 (duty to issue a prospectus) to every 
issuer or intermediary making a public offer for 
investment, thereby the only exception being the French 
state.
The guidelines of July 31, 1987, have been inspired
by the necessity to keep pace with the rapid evolution of 
the financial markets and, above all, to respond 
favourably to the requests of company managers to shorten 
and simplify the procedure governing the admission of 
transferable stocks. This procedure has become longer and 
complicated subsequent to the adoption of rules dealing 
with the preparation of notes d'informations. Against 
such a background the COB experimentally instituted a new 
procedure which provided for the preparation : of a 
"document de reference" registered with the COB, Such a 
document contains all the information required for notes 
distributed to the public by companies appealing for 
investment. The document may consist of the annual report 
of the management council (conseil d ’administration) of a 
company, complied in accordance with existing guidelines. 
Within four months after the end of the period of 
corporate activities, the company submits to the COB a 
draft document which is scrutinised and if needed 
completed with additional information; it is registered 
and then made available for the public at the seat of the 
COB. Copies may be had by those who request them.
The note, published in compliance with rules in 
force and applicable to issues of securities and to any
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other financial transaction, as a "note d ’operation", 
contains the contents of the doc urn en t registered with the 
COB for reference. The "note d'operation" contains 
information on the modalities of the financial
transactions and a summary of the main corporate
characteristics and, if needed, the financial situation 
of the company, with updated information taken from the 
document of reference. As a general practice, the sign of 
approval is attached to the "note d ’operation" on the 
second day of the stock market after the draft text of 
the note d'operation has been submitted. In addition to 
publication as laid down by Art, 6 of the Ordinance of 
1967, the note is also published in a daily paper with 
financial information distributed at a national level, on 
the same day on which the transaction is launched, unless 
other forms of publication have been approved by the COB. 
The prospectus for new issues of shares and bonds must be 
signed also by the Commissaires aux Comptes (Auditing
Commissioner).^*
Judicial practice, to the extent it has dealt with
cases involving liability for the omission of diligent
and proper c o n t r o l , h a s  qualified such negligence 
concurrent with that of managers of a company who had
omitted, in the succinct note d ’information for launching 
bonds, to point out that serious losses had been incurred 
in the course of fulfilling a contract for the
construction of four platforms for oil prospection for
the Brazilian government. The note d ’information had not 
in any way dra.wn attention to the thereto related facts 
of exceptional nature capable to have an impact on the 
financial situation of the company. The inspectors too 
had not detected this missing detail.’* It should be
pointed out?? that the COB attentively controls the 
transparency of a given transaction and that the
scrupulous respect for it, on the basis of the literal
_____
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contents and eventually of the spirit of what is said in
terms of direct statements concerning the protection of 
the rights and interests of minority shareholders. It may 
thus be said that the protection of minority shareholders 
constitutes in the normal course of stock operations as 
well as in the case of exceptional transactions a 
constant preoccupation in the activities of the COB. It 
may be added that the COB has known how to deploy its 
control powers affecting adequate access to information 
in order to be active in areas in which it probably has 
not had an initial possibility to intervene. In this way 
it has noticeably influenced the financial press by 
constraining companies to show in the press whether they 
are supplying objective information, or an opinion, or a 
study prepared for publication upon request by a given 
company, or whether the given information are supplied on 
the basis of personal opinions. Moreover, in this way the 
COB has played a determining role for improving standards 
of control affecting the accounts and balance sheets of 
companies applied by the auditing commissioners 
(commissaires aux comptes). In 1967 such a control was 
often a formal matter, or at least superficial. By 
mobilising its powers to refuse approval of a note which
fails to correspond to standards of guaranteed
reliability as to its contents, the COB is in a position 
to promote higher and more serious standards of control. 
In collaboration with professional bodies, the COB 
controls the nomination and dismissal as well as the way 
in which the given functions are exercised.
In the new programme of privatisation, differences 
between the three kinds of shareholder (individual, 
institutional and foreign) have become more marked and
the 90-02 Regulation enables to shape the prospectus as 
different documents, the COB has revised the structure of 
the prospectus and has developed the practice of
■ ■Vi V i i " :  ."M 'N
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resumes The "note d ’opération préliminaire" and the
"note d'operation definitive" are addressed to the 
institutional investors.??
1V. The Regulations of the COB
Regulation 90.02 : Equivalent Information ;
Regulation 91.02 ; Mutual recognition ; Regulation 92.02 
: The Simplified Prospectus.
Duties laid down by the COB do not address the same 
group of persons: some are for issuers soliciting
investment by the public, others for professional persons 
like the commissaires aux comptes; and still others 
concern intermediaries who manage individual and 
collective portfolios, and lastly other are directed to 
all operators, be they physical persons or companies
active in the market. For the sake of clarifying their 
respective obligations the COB published in 1991 a 
collection of texts comprising all rules relevant to 
transactions with securities.
Almost all of the regulations in question are
subject to revision in the wake of EC Directives, for 
example on the prospectus, or in the wake of reforms. On 
such occasions the COB has endeavoured to secure a
greater transparency within the market while avoiding at 
the same time rendering the relevant procedures too 
cumbersome and heavy generating additional work for 
issuers and hampering their access to the market. The COB 
has accordingly undertaken a series of revisions of 
guidelines and regulations concerning the notes 
d ’information, for the purpose of standardising the 
schemes governing the contents of information documents 
and thus rendering them more similar to those intended as 
desirable by virtue of what is expected from a 
prospectus by virtue of the contents of EC Directives.
A first phase was completed with the adoption in
 ; ______  ‘________     _ . r
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1991 of a regulation and a guideline of application 
intended to harmonise or approximate standards governing' 
information affecting admission to official listing of 
securities with standards prescribed by EC Directives. As 
a technical term the prospectus is used as a single term 
in the new regulations. In 1993 no new regulations were 
issued.GO
3- • Regulation 90.02 ; Equivalent Information
In implementation of an EC Directive 80/390 on 
"equivalent" information, Art. 7 of the Regulation 90.02 
provides that any one intending to issue stocks in France 
must guarantee that the information supplied is complete, 
that is, "equivalent" to that guaranteed abroad. This 
provision aims at insuring that . investors in all the 
various countries in which a company has applied for the 
official quotation of its shares enjoy equal treatment 
with respect to information available to them. For the 
COB,®’ good or adequate information for the public and 
the market implies that the systems used for 
standardising the data in question and making it 
available for the public are reliably clear. On the basis 
of Art. 2 the supplied information has to be "exact, 
precise and authentic". Art. 4 lays down that the public 
must be given the opportunity to acquire knowledge of a. 11 
the important facts susceptible to affect, if known, in a 
significative manner the quotation of the given shares.
The COB applied sanctions for the company VEV for 
not having rectified information made available to the 
public in 1991 while having internally at its disposal a 
document which established that reported losses were 
noticeably higher than for the balance in 1989 when the 
said losses were consolidated for the year 1990; 
moreover, the company was considered to have failed to 
report any matter which would establish that a correction 
of the corporate results would have been of a nature to
___
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be prejudicial to the. legitimate interests of the 
company.92 The company VEV had made public, with respect 
to results for the first half of 1990, and moreover in an
information document intended for the shareholders
general meeting and dated December 28, 1990, that the
losses of the corporate group had markedly diminished in
comparison with those of 1989 and that consolidated
results of the group indicated for 1990 a notable 
improvement in comparison with 1989. Because internal 
corporate documents of VEV referred to performance 
results which did not correspond to those made available 
for the public, the COB concluded that information made 
public in November and December 1990 had neither been
exact nor precise and sincere.”3 Consequently sanctions
were imposed on the company and its managers. In appeal 
proceedings initiated by Dervoley in his capacity as 
corporate director, the Court of Appeal of Paris annulled 
the unfavourable decision of the COB. The Court concluded 
on formal or procedural grounds that the contents of a 
communique issued by the COB a few days prior to the 
beginning of the proceedings, for informing the public on 
the nature of the inquiry, were of a nature susceptible 
to be prejudicial to guaranteed defence and to the 
principle of presumption of innocence until proven 
otherwise. The COB had developed the dangerous practice
of publishing in a communique the results before the
decision of the sanction and before the adversarial 
objection to it. The Cour, d ’appel de Pours (dec. of
January 15, 1993) has condemned tfiis practice as being
contrary to the principle of presumption of innocence. 
The court accepted, however, that the COB had not 
infringed the duty of impartiality.®'’
In another case the COB imposed sanctions addressed 
to the company Les Beaux Sites and its director, Pierre 
Dehaye, for having made public on many occasions in the
_____________________________________' ■ ' I
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financial press news relative to the existence of 
negotiations concerning the control and transfer of a 
significant part of the company’s capital, and relative 
to a request to the Société des Bourses françaises, in 
the form of a letter dated May 22, 1991, the suspension
of quotations of the company’s shares given the imminent 
conclusion of a financial transaction. The COB, having 
controlled and discovered that no document evidencing the 
imminent conclusion of an ongoing transaction nor 
negotiations existed, applied sanctions in relation to 
the company and its director. The Paris Court of Appeal 
upheld the decision of the COB,®® The COB published a 
letter addressed to the directors of the Schneider 
company with respect to the communication of unfavourable 
information without having preliminarily published it in 
the press.®* BY 1993, the COB had applied two 
administrative sanctions for violation of its Regulation 
90-02.°? The first sanction of 400.000 F concerned Pierre 
Conso, President of the Ciments Français.®® The second 
for the amount of 250.000 F, affected the French company 
Métrologie Internationale.®?
b . The Regulation 91.02 ; Mutual Recognition
The adoption of an EC directive relative to 
transferable securities has enabled the COB to replace 
its Regulation 88.04 with the Regulations 91.02 and 
92,02, With reference to the adoption of EC Directives
it has been observed that there has been an increased use
of formalism,?® In the new regulations a single technical 
term, the prospectus, is used as terminology, as a 
substitute for "note d ’information", the "note succinte", 
the "fiche d ’information", the ,"note abrege",, as 
technical terms which had generated much confusion.?’
Regulation 91.02, made binding by the Decree of 
December 23, 1991 CJ.O, Dec, 27, ; 1991), confirmed on
February 1st 1992, concerns all information which must be
 ] : ’  :____________________
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divulged for the admission of transferable securities to 
official quotation, and implements the contents of the
Directives 80/390/EEC, 87/345/EEC and 89/298/EEC.
Therewith the procedure for the mutual recognition of the 
prospectus within the EEC is modified,; the scope of its 
application is extended and aspects of the relevant 
modality are clarified. This new development should 
permit the effective application of the therewith
supplied procedure (thus far little used). The
approximated or harmonised presentation of prospectuses 
in accordance with the new standards should constitute a 
motivation for using the procedure of mutual
recognition,? ’^ Consequently, Regulation 91.02 permits the 
acceptance of documents or prospectuses, approved by the
COB in Frsrnce, by the relevant authorities in other 
member states of the EU/EC (Arts. 19-20 of the Ordinance 
of 1967), Therewith a. Iso the transparency of the markets 
w i thin the EC would be promoted.
Regulation 91-02 eventually extends the range of
persons as relevant for financial information. Under the 
old regulation based on earlier F’rench law, the
information was directed more specifically to
s ha r etio 1 de r s ; currently the information is aimed at the
investors and the market. The Regulation extends the 
scope of public scrutiny and imposes consequently a major 
element of formalism in the manner certain transactions 
o', re presented particularly with regard solely to
s tiar- e tio 1 de r s a nd activities w tû ch were earlier considered
to be internal compa.ny ma.tters (transactions reserved to 
the internal sphere, to proposals addressed to w age
ea.rners, related to restructuration, as examples).?’’ As 
to transfrontier mutual recognition of relevant
documents, it is the COB which issues the certificate of 
approval requested for submission to the relevant
authorities of the ottier EU member states for access to
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official listing and quotation.
c . Regulation 92.02_; the s implified Pros pectus
Regulation 92.02, confirmed by the Decree of March
3, 199 2 (O.J., Marcti 15, 1992) concerns offers to the
p u b 1 i c o f 11' a VI s f e r* a t) 1 e assets, in imp I e m e n t a. t i o n of 
Directives 89/293/EEC and 9 0 / 2 1 1 / E E C , ? *  makes access to 
public offer possible for investment known as so to speak 
"secondary".?® Earlier French legislation did not deal 
with public offer of investment effected on occasions of 
cession of already issued stocks. The new Regulation 
continues to treat public offers as primary if an offer 
of stocks is extended to a number of persons exceeding 
300, as was provided for in the abrogated Regulation 88-
04. The term "offer to the public" or public offer 
concerns not on 1 the offer of new stocks (as appeal to 
the primary investment public), but also the cession of 
stocks which are a I rea.dy issued (offer to the secondary 
investment public).
The Regulation prescribes the preparation of a
" s i m 1 i f i e d prospectus". As a document of information the 
"simplified prospectus" assumes a role considerably less 
important than the prospectus needed for admission to
official listing; it is simply "deposited" with the COB, 
that is, without the need for a preliminary scrutiny of 
the transaction plan.?* It bears the signature of the
c o m jit a. n y directors an d of the intermediaries entrusted 
with the execution of the transaction. They can be stock 
market firms or banks. With their signatures the 
corporate directors and the firms testify that data
contai ned in the prospectus correspond to the facts and 
are not vitiated by omissions which may distort the scope 
of the contents. Lastly, the commissionaires aux comptes 
add t l"i e i r signatures.
The Regulation provides for new possibilities for
eliminating 1;fie pr epa.r-a.t i on of a prospectus, the most
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important among them being referred to in Art. 4(a): /in
our translation/ "The preparation of a simplified
prospectus shall not be required if the offer is
addressed to persons within the framework of their
professional activities." Therewith Regulation 92.02 has 
introduced into the French system the notion of 
"professional investor" already known in the British and 
USA systems,?? wherewith a differentiation is established 
between professional investors, on the one hand, and non- 
professional on the other.
For the COB?® the currently valid laws and
regulations do not extend any derogations from the
general standards as applicable to professional
investors. The system points out when an offer is
addressed to persons with a number higher than 300, the 
distinction between profess!ona1 and non-professiona1 
investors becomes irrelevant and the planned operation is 
classified as one addressed to the general investing 
public. However, the common investment transacted by 
professionals is treated as that of a single person, an 
innovation which definitely is in favour of the interests 
of professional investors.
V . Approval by the COB
It constitutes the last stage that seals the
procedure of control effected by the COB.
Approval is obligatory and preliminary to the
execution of the intended transaction(s ); in addition the 
validity of an approval is limited to the proposed and 
defined transaction. With its approval the COB
contributes to the reliability of the necessary 
information supplied in conjunction with a proposed 
investment by appeal to the public.
The approval testifies that control of the company 
has been effected in conjunct ion with the admission of 
new stocks to the market and that the control concerns
i
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also the conformity of information supplied with 
reference to the financial situation of the offering 
corporate body. This in no way implies, however, an 
appreciation of the merits of the proposed investment nor 
an appreciation of the merits of the overall situation of 
the appealing company.?? Approval means that the 
reliability of the supplied information is testified to 
but the liability or responsibility of company directors 
preparing the prospectus is left in relation to the 
Investment subscribers, untouched; this remark applies 
equally with respect to the commissionaires aux comptes 
who are in charge of scrutinising to see whether 
accounting informât ion is in agreement with standards of 
corporate and consolidated accounting,’®® Obviously the 
COB may before approval point to improvements to be made 
and ulterior information to be added. It may moreover 
demand explanations and justifications relating to the 
s i tuation of the given company, on its activities and
financial results. In some cases the COB expresses its
views related to the approval in the form of a
communication or note attached to the approval. Such 
supplementary views or notes are to be included in all 
publications related to a proposed transaction. For
facilitating the process of financial transactions also
with regard to their relevance abroad, the COB has
simplified the procedure leading to the grant of approval 
and intends to promote the use of standardised documents 
as reference. Therewith time required for getting
approval by the COB may be shortened.’®’
Vi. Investors Associations
Law No. 89-421 of June 23, 1989, concerning
information for and the protection of consumers, has
supplemented Law No. 88-14 of January 1st, 1988, on the
capacity of consumers' association to appear as a
claimant party in court proceedings. Therewith the
___  ____
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possible establishment of a procedure of recognition for 
associations of savers investing in stocks and financial 
products and possibility for them to avail themselves of 
judicial remedies in a manner similar to that enjoyed by 
profess iona1 consumers’ associations has been
p r o m o t e d . T o  such investors’ associations recognition 
may be extended in conjunction with approval by the COB 
and the Ministry of public affairs under conditions laid 
down in Decree No. 90-235 of March 16, 1990. if they have
been in existence for a minimum of two years, have at
least 1000 members or another level of membership in
accordance with membership conditions specific to a given 
individual association, deploy effective and public
activities for the protection of investors. Recognition, 
granted for a period of three years, is renewable under 
the same initial conditions. It enables the associations 
in question to appear as a party in court proceedings, to 
make claims for damages for facts directly or indirectly 
prejudicial to the collective interests of investors, and 
to request the President of the Tribunal de Grande 
Instance to impose an end to irregularities or practices 
incompatible with legislative provisions or regulations 
and capable to cause damage to investors’ rights. If 
claims are found to be well-founded, the court may rule 
that the defendant pay compensation for damages to the 
CO 1lective interests of the association members but no 
compensation for damages with respect to each individual 
member of a given association,’®’
It is observed that there is a tendency among 
minority shareholders to propose asserting their rights. 
For example, the Federation nationale des Clubs 
d ’ investissement CFNACI)’®* has applied to the Procureur 
(prosecutor) of the Republic and has claimed to have the 
legal capacity to appear in court for raising claims for 
damages against the ASYSTEL company.’®® In addition an
_____ ___
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association for defending the interests of minority 
shareiiolders has been formed with reference to the Beaux 
Sites affa.ir, for the purpose of finding an honourable
solution affecting the minority shareholders. Lastly,
mention may be made of the Association for the Protection 
of Minority Shareholders with investments in the company 
Mines et Produits chimiques de Sal signe,
vil. T he C 0 B and 1 n v e s t o r Protection in France
1n 1991 the reorganisation and mergers of stock
market firms continued under the pressure of an
imperative to reduce operational costs. From 61 in 1988 
the number of firms has dropped to 57 in 1991 and of 
these, 13 had been dropped from the list of the
Commission de Bourse des Valeurs. Currently some firms
ate operating only with institutional investors as
clients. Few firms are able to operate independently. 
After the merger of the Pinatton and Wargny, the number 
o f ind e pe nden t firms had been r e d uced t o t hi r ee ori J anua r y 
1st, 1993.'06
Concerning monitoring and control activities, the 
COB had initiated in 1990 75 enquiries,'"? with two 
reports transmitted by the COB to the Procureur
(prosecutor) de la Republic on October 30 and December 
11. 1990.'00
In its control activities the COB is able to depend 
on the cooperation of professional bodies and authorities 
as well as on the assistance of judicial organs. In 1992 
it opened 17 sanctionary proceedings. Ten of them were
concluded with decisions. T hi e r e were four appeals from
thiese ten decisions at the Appeal Court of Paris.'"'’ The 
pecuniary sanctions or penalties imposed varied from FF 
10,000 to 10m. In 1993 the COB opened 10 sanctions
proceedings and too 1< 10 decisions imposing sanctions.''" 
Regarding marl; et supervision there were in 1993, 85
decisions against 101 in 1991 and 90 in 1992.''' On
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December 31st 19.93, there were 72 pending enquiries 
against 70 i n 1992 and 68 in 1991, Tliese figures concern
also ma. t. ters of collective management.' Twenty-four
communications were sent to judicial authorities in 1992 
33 in 1 9 9 3 ' ( 2 1  in 1991). In ten cases in 1 9 9 3 ' six 
cases in 1992 (three in 1991), the COB proceeded for the 
applications of administrative sanctions.'
1y\ the sphere of measures against stock market
offenses, the COB intends to supplement the resources it
c u r- r e n t 1 y has at a na t i ona 1 level with transfrontier
cooperation. A policy of cooperation agreements is being 
deployed with respect to North American countries (Canada 
and Mexico), Asia (Japan). In 1992 a cooperation 
agreement was concluded with the Commission des Valeurs 
mobilières of Q.uebec, Canada, and the Ontario Securities 
Commission as well as with the Commission Nacional de 
Val ores in Mexico. In 1993, within Europe the COB has
concluded bilateral agreements witli the stock market
commissions of Belgium, Italy and S p a i n . ' I n  completion 
of its functions and actions of supervision with 
sanctionary measures, the COB is studying the possibility 
to institute civil court actions, available for 
shareholders and their associations for the pur jd ose of 
facilitating the procedures of compensation.''? In this 
way the protection of investors is susceptible to 
continue the chronicle of remarkable progress in France, 
with respect to security and reliability of conditions 
for achieving control over quoted stock market companies. 
The COB has prompted adequate information for investors 
as well as a better understanding by them of such 
information. In turn quoted companies a wider 
distribution of shares among a more diversified public. 
Lastly, a better level of relationship between quoted 
markets and the shareholding public has been the result.
At a comparative level, it has been enquired whether
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information supplied by French companies could be 
quantatively and qualitatively comparable ' with 
information supplied by non-French companies abroad. D. 
G r a n g e r ' h a s  been of the opinion that without any doubt 
the answer would be in the affirmative i'n favour of the 
French companies, adding that British requirements for 
such information may seem to be more demanding, but only 
apparently, because the pragmatic way in which British 
standards are applied renders them less severe. Granger 
admitted, however, that with respect to systems as that 
of the USA, the French system is deficient by not 
providing for the requirement that the supplied 
informa.tion should be regularly and automatically
updated. The explanation for this deficiency in France is 
tfiat France has no sources of centralised information. 
This nonetheless positive balance seems to be in contrast 
with more cautious if not directly critical opinions 
expressed by some experts.
Even if standards of professional ethics
(deontology), applied to financial activities in France 
as an instrument of auto regulation, amount to a
privileged option available for professional operators, 
it seems that the French system does not have the
necessary disciplinary (sanctioning) mechanism capable to 
guarantee an efficient protection of investors rights if 
a rule of professional conduct is violated, because such 
a violation would but with considerable difficulty 
constitute the ba.sis of a negligent intermediary. In
contrast the Britisft system provides that the violation
of conduct of business rules can be directly sanctioned
in the meaning of Section 62A of the Financial Services
Act, even if it is limited to cases involving private and 
not institutional investors,''?
In France a so to speak contractualistic solution 
generates serious difficulties of an evidential nature
_____________________________________ _ _
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for a client who may be invoking before a court the 
violation of a norm of déontologiea 1 nature on the part 
of the intermediary. Adopting a tortious (delictual 
liability in Scotland) approach does not seem to offer a 
better approach to the extent French court practice is 
generally oriented towards the exclusion of civil 
liability on the part of an intermediary who has failed 
to apply principles of professional conduct. The 
efficiency of reliance on professional deontology for 
consolidating investors’ trust in intermediaries is 
challenged with a negative conclusion. Seen in the light 
of the modernisation of financial markets involving 
increased movements of capital, recourse to standards of 
professional ethics offers currently but a hardly 
trustworthy solution to the need of having at our 
disposal adequate instruments of investor protection. As 
to the proliferation of regulations, it is emphasised 
that excessive regulation may affect detrimentally the 
usefulness of distributed standardised i n f o r m a t i o n . I t  
is, however, on the other hand accepted that the absence 
of adequate regulation could lead to heterogeneous 
dimensions in the quality and quantity of information,
again with detrimental effects as to the proper use of 
available information. With due regard to these points it 
has been the endeavour of the COB to establish acceptable 
minimum standards so that issuing companies shall not be 
overburdened, by too many details in their operations and 
their competitiveness shall not be adversely affected. As 
a good pragmatic example is cited the arrangement made by 
Saint-Gobain.'^* It seeks to stabilise its relations and
dialogue with its individual shareholders totalling
750,000. The company has established a specialised 
service for relations and contacts with individus. 1 
shareholders. The office of this service gets some 1,100 
telephone calls and more than 500 letters yearly, from
___
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shareholders, in addition to some 6,000 consultations via 
the minitel network.
Referring back to the COB, it is observed that the 
margin of its discretionary powers is relatively narrow. 
Rules applicable to matters related to the prospectus 
are expressed in minimally defined terms as found in the 
EC directives; the discretionary margin given to the 
competent national authorities can be but a widening one 
for the minimum standards provided by the EC system. The 
same applies for conditions governing admission to 
official listing, in Fr an c e embedded principally in a 
system of general regulation established by the COB,- also 
with respect to duties to supply periodic information and 
deal with accounting standards. It is emphasised that as 
to financial Information what is provided for is not 
only contained in regulations but also in a so to speak 
pyramid o f diverse (various) tests.
A further aspect concerns the utility of information 
supplied to the public for the public itself. It can be 
said that in spite of much effort the public does not 
(derive much betiefit from the regulated system of 
supplying information: the prospectuses are
comprehensible but to those who are particularly
competent to understand their contents against a 
background of legal and financial knowledge, with an 
awareness that such documents do exist and are eager to 
enquire about them and procure copies of them. In reality 
few persons are able to respond satisfactorily to all 
these conditions. The duty to publish informa.tion has 
been extended to notes d'information relative to public 
offers for acquisition, exchange, sale or withdrawal of 
stocks.
In some European countries, for instance Germany and 
Luxembourg, the printed publication of all prospectuses 
is required, but numerous exemptions thereto exist. It
  . . .
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does not seem to be reasonable to require in France the 
gene r a. 1 publication of prospectuses as voluminous 
documents with due r e g s. r d to tiie very high costs which 
publishing involves. Current rules are in fact based on a
traditional conception of (financial) operations and
transactions which presuppose the existence of an 
homogeneous public with the implication that therefrom 
both professional as well as private investors should be 
treated the same way. The exigence of transparency
involves a risk of overemphasising the technical 
characteristics of supplying information at a. public 
level if the information in question concerns complex
pi'o duct items wfiich necessitate the availability of
information not easily accessible for a single average 
investor. Progress toward effective access by the public 
at large to controlled financial information does not 
seem to be sufficient as far as the distribution of 
documentary materials is concerned, and even less
sufficient is the progress in the light of the question
as to how comprehensible or digestible the contents of 
such documents are for a not particularly expert reader. 
The traditions. 1 approach to financial information has 
been discussed in terms of
-- how to respond to such diverse information needs 
as those needed by the public at large and those aimed at 
financial specialists ?
how to permit the public at large to have access 
to all the relevant information within a useful time ?
--- how to make information immediately available on 
a fina.ncial operation the modality of which is not yet
or the completion of which is as yet
but may nonetheless develop within a brief 
time, without harmful prejudice to the
of the market and without binding the 
investors definitively prior to having
formulated 
uncertain, 
period of 
integrity 
interested
..
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knowledge about the conditions of the operation ?
Such questions need thorough discussions for the purpose 
of offering concrete solutions, above all for the purpose 
of a major transparency applicable to the whole of the 
contents of rationally and selectively enriched financial 
information. The improved access to financial information 
needs only changes in existing rules, but presupposes,
essentially, ability to inform the public in an objective 
and useful w a y . This point may concern the sphere of 
techniques used for spreading stocks on the market and 
the role of intermediaries in making access to 
transactions widely accessible for their clients. May be 
the establishment of a data bank easily accessible by any 
interested person, for collating and coordinating all the 
available informa.tion on companies in the stock market 
could be a step in the right direction. May be the COB 
could play a role in this respect by directing more 
attention to new configurations of information derived 
from the evolution and the growing sophistication of 
financial techniques.
Some authors'22 are of the opinion that the
desirable solution may consist in the preparation of a 
so to speak "intermediary" document conveying to 
individual investors easily understandable financial 
information, on the basis of a regulation designed by the 
COB or on the basis of an initiative by experts of 
financial communication entrusted with the task. Possibly 
therewith the burden of professional duties weighing on 
the shoulders of professionals could be reduced by 
increasing existing expectations from the increasing 
functions which diverse information documents are 
expected to fulfil. Lastly, considering the fact that 
modern financial markets are fundamentally characterised 
by the existence of institutional investors, one may 
conclude justly, that it is not easy to be critical
 :_________________
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toward intermediaries who privilege the interests of 
institutional investors as their most important, 
clients.'23 However, having mentioned at length 
professional ethics as an instrument for protecting 
investors, and among them not least the weak, it sounds 
disconcerting that the distinction between institutional 
investors on the one hand and non-institutional or 
private investors on the other can sanction the 
privileges of the institutional investors as a category 
of the strongest investors. Such a distinction may 
paradoxically strengthen the factual privileged status of 
institutional investors, instead of making place for a. 
better protection of private investors who even if they 
may individually contribute relatively modest savings and 
investment sums to the economy, nonetheless constitute 
the masses of an economic democracy. If such a 
consideration is neglected, the conclusion may be that of 
"much ado about nothing".
____ t v .
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Investor Protection and the new Financial Intermediaries
in Italy
i. Investor Protection in the Italian Constitution 
The Italian constitution of December 27, 1947 refers
to saving as a social v a l u e . T h i s  is based on an 
awareness that it is necessary to protect citizens who 
save also as investors, hence also as conscious and 
informed investors. Therewith it is agreed that the 
protection of investors in relation to public investment 
offers is also included in the protective function 
attributed to Art. 47 of the Constitution which leaves to 
state institutions the function of providing for 
protect i o n .  ^ ®
The Constitution seems to refer to protection which 
is wider and irjore elaborate in its scope than the term 
saving. It seems to favour the protection of the 
interests of a muItitude of indivi d u a 1 investors. The 
terms "encourages and protects" used in the wording of 
Art. 47 are sufficient to indicate an intention directed 
not only toward an objective generic form of savings, taut 
also toward interests which are collectively protected, 
that is, in the interests of individual savers beyond the 
notions of transparency and information, postulating thus 
systems of control able to promote real protection with 
duties of decent management addressed to those who are 
responsible for financial operations. Those soliciting 
public investment should be considered bound by a duty to 
observe good faith, decency and professional ethics not 
only as matters of moral duties. The protection of 
savings stands as a term referring to the interests of a 
large community, that is, of savers.
A recent theoretical approach'^" has tried to give a 
new interpretation to Arts. 41 and 47 of the
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Constitution, It has assumed the contents of these two 
Articles to be constitutional values underlying t ii© 
existence of the economic market and has shifted the
accent from the protection of savings to the protection' 
of the confidence which savers have in the system.
According to this approach, therefore, no direct 
protection of investors would exist, but simply an 
indirect protection which is effected by means of 
protecting the market. .The reality is that thus far 
nothing has been undertaken to transform the relevant 
contents of the Constitution into applicable reality. 
The Italian Big Bang has been above all a big bang of 
words, px'op os 3. Is, projects of regulation, like a 
whirlwind of discussions which on the one hand testify to 
the topicality and urgency of the relevant problèmes),
and on the other constitute symptoms of a so to speak
schizophrenic pathology.'%? Nonetheless, already the 
first programme of the first centre left government, 
approved by Parliament, contained in 1963'?° a provision 
for the establishment of a body as a watchdog for stock 
companies, with the duty to protect the interests of 
investors and small shareholders by monitoring companies 
listed on the stock market.
ii. Investor Protec t ion under Law No. 1/1991, 
relating to Stock Market Intermediary Firms (Societa dl 
Intermediazione M o b iliare) - (SIM)-
a.. From static to dynamic protection
Law No. 1/1991 has replaced the protection model of 
a static type with a dynamic model. The central part of 
which is taken by the question of the complex 
relationship prevailing when dealing with investors. The 
control of the private autonomy of firms is exercised by 
influencing a firm rather than the operations, with 
reference to honesty, professionalism, independence and 
stability. A Circular by the Bank of Italy on August 6,
'V Y-y- . ■’'"■•'■■If- Yv-Y-Y: . y  -
1993, explained what the understanding of the CIRC
(Cornitato Interministeriale per il Credito e il
Risparinio) (Interministériel Committee on Credit and
Investment) was on the integrity and honesty of agents of 
banking and financial companies and recommended specific 
standards of conduct to be applied in concrete terms Ibut 
not yet contemplated by the law.'?? As to the law itself, 
beyond laying down a network of rules aimed at 
guaranteeing the supply of information, it tends to
guarantee also the professional qualifications, the
adequacy of material resources and solvency of the
operators. The law has been preoccupied with guaranteeing 
to the investor that persons called upon to manage the
financial assets of others shall have a correspondingly 
high qualification for the fulfillment of his functions.
The relationship between an intermediary, on the one 
hand, and the client on the other does not involve 
compliance with duties in one direction, that is, from
the intermediary to the client as investor, in which the
intermediary is more properly under an obligation to 
provide for tfie proper r-esour'ces for the fulfillment of 
his functions, rather under an obligation to achieve
results while acting correctly and diligently. The 
investor in turn is expected to make his decisions
consciously and in an informed manner as his part of the 
contribution towards the establishment of a proper
relationship. Consequently, investors’ expectations are 
not 1 i nked to the good outcome and "results" of the 
transactions; they are linked to an adequate flow of 
information whiich facilitates a well considered decision 
wit hi T'espect to a transaction and its further 
development. I t should be added that the new i nf o i’ma 1 1 on 
system does not vouch for the simple transmission of 
data, but for the possibility of the investor to be in a 
position to understand the complexity and specific
--- ____
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aspects of the financial instruments which the 
intermediary makes available with regard to the cl i e n t ’s 
interests. Thus, the protection of the multitude of
savers as investors may not be exclusively based on the 
availability of information and market transparency.
Transparency in turn, to the extent it is necessary, 
may prove to be insufficient in the absence of a proper 
care in the relations between intermediary and client, 
and the discussion of transparency may turn out to be 
ambiguous. Adequate transparency is an aspect of a
gUEir an tee which is ampler and more comprehensive and 
requires above all a balance in the relationship between 
the two parties. Thereto related is also the exigence to 
supplement rules on transparency with arrangements which 
promote investors’ interests entrusted to the care of 
the intermediaries.
Law 1/1991 provides for the strengthening of 
protection guarantees in favour of clients of firms
acting as intermediaries also in the pro-contractual 
phase of the relationship (Art. 6, para. 1(b), (g) and
(d)). Standards of professional conduct laid down for the 
promoters of financial services, rules directly
regulating activities involving transactions at the level 
of the regulated markets, the management of material 
assets including those involved in the conduct of 
operations dealing with moveable assets, provision for a 
national guarantee fund and indeed all standards relating 
to the organisation of the stock markets, together 
constitute a complex system directed a.t guaranteeing the 
operability of the market and at protecting the 
investors. As to vigilance, it is directed at verifying 
that activities evolve in accordance with standards of 
conduct and transactions with stocks are effected with 
regularity (Art. 9 of the Law on the SIM).
Chapter II of the Law No. 1/1991, regulating the
.Y/s)
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activities of companies acting as intermediaries for 
stocks, (Arts. 20-23) entrusts the CONSOB with exclusive 
powers relative to the organisation of the financial 
markets and market institutions at local levels and of 
products related to the markets. It appears to have been 
strongly influenced by EC legislation and in particular 
by the EEC Council draft directive on investment services 
in the securities field (OJ 89/C43/10, as amended on 
February 8, 1990 and definitively adopted as Directive
93/22/EEC). Among new elements in the Law No, 1/1991, 
which may be related to the contents of the Directive, 
reference may be made to Art. 3, para. 2(e) which 
prescribes that standards of high professional 
reputation are to be treated as matters of capital 
importance with respect to firms operating as direct 
intermediaries for stocks or through persons acting as 
their agents or through trust firms or through firms
governed by the contents of Art. 2359, para. 1(2) of the 
I talian • Civil Code, When controlling agent is a legal 
person or a company managers and general directors of 
such legal persons.must be in possession of the required 
standards of professional reputation. The protective
network guaranteeing investments is thus additionally 
reenforced: not only management organs of intermediaries 
taut also physical persons or management organs of 
entities exercising a control over them must be in 
possession of the qualities of honesty as required by
the law. Otherwise a firm acting as an intermediary would 
not be put on the relevant registry and would not be able
to operate on the market.
b . Inversion of the Onus of Proof
A rule intended directly to be a key standard in 
investor protection concerns the inversion of the onus of
proof provided for judgments governing compensation for
damages (Art. 13 para. 10 of the Law No, 1/91).
 :  :
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Thereunder it is up to intermediaries to prove that they 
have acted with due diligence. It is noted that this, as 
an inversion of the onus of proof, constitutes a double 
derogation from codified principles relating to 
contractual or non-contractua1 matters: the client is
exonerated from demonstrating the existence of a nexus of 
causality between the violation or offence committed and 
the given damage; for the intermediary on the other side 
of the relationship it Is not sufficient to give the 
contrary proof: he is held to prove in positive terms
that he acted with due professional diligence.'s" Some
authors of the relevant literature have submitted that 
the rule is not drafted in a most unambiguous and clear 
way and it may hence lead to noteworthy differences as to 
the sphere of its applicability and its effective 
capability to strengthen the protection of a client.'"i 
The inverted onus of proof may have an effective purpose
for reinforcing the protection of the damaged side with
respect to liability in non-con tractua1 relationships; 
however, when reference is made to contractual liability, 
t It e same rule seems to have little influence on the 
regime anchored in common law (Art, 1218 of the Italian 
Civil Code).'?? With some concern for the protection of
the intermediary more than that of the client, it has
been criticised that the intermediary would have no other 
choice but either to accept liability or to be able to
prove to have acted with the due diligence of an
agent.'?? Such a construction ma.y be, however, overcome
by realising that the rule has been conceived for 
strengthening investors’ protection and not for 
protecting the intermediaries. This can be gleaned from 
the contents of the travaux préparatoires.'?^
With reference to contractual liability, the 
discussion has been on the links between Art. 1176 and 
1218 of the Italian Civil Code. It would seem that the
■
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way Art. 13 para. 10 of the Law No, 1/1991 is drafted 
adds little to what the substance of the existing connnon 
law is.' ? ° Undoubtedly the impact of the rule will depend 
much on the way the courts uses criteria for ascertaining 
the contents of the notion of diligence. Consequently,
the current state of affairs in Italy with respect to 
"diligence" is marked by a position of moderation.
Annunziata observes that the French model without 
pleading for the adoption of class actions has 
nonetheless laid the foundations for guaranteeing an
effi. cient intervention by investors' associations. Such 
an approach does not exist within the Italian system.'??
c . Information____and Transparency; informative
P r o s in e c t u s______ an_d_______ informative______ Document :_______the
Respons i b i 1 ities of the CONSOB
The custom of issuing information prospectuses has 
old roots Itx Italy. In 18 48 the provisional government of 
Venice published a prospectus for subscriptions to a fund 
for helping the revolt in the provinces Lomba.r do-Vene t e 
and for contributing to the defence of Venice. The
investors’ protection was assumed and guaranteed by the 
provinces and as a pawn the Doge’s palace in Venice was 
offered for a mortgaged guarantee for repayment with all 
its masterpieces of art, its paintings and all new 
acquisitions by Venice (See Appendix "B" at the end of
t h e present thesis).
EC legislation can be credited with the great iTierit 
of reviving since 1972 the so to speak prospectus 
tradition in Italy, encouraging at the same time
discussion on information for investors and on the 
essence of transparency essentially anchored in a
prospectus. The latter as an informative instrument is 
consequently the result of legislative efforts, above all 
at EC level, to pursue objectives of optimal
transparency.
------- ____________
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The first regime of prospectuses was introduced in 
Italy by the Law No. 49 of 23 February 1977 relating to 
transactions with stocks not officially quoted and traded 
at the second level market know n as the "restricted 
market" ("mercato ristretto"). This Law is meritorious 
mainly for introducing investor protection into the 
Italian financial market system. Art. 4 provides that the 
CONSOB (as the supervisory body) may establish standards 
concerning data and notices necessary for informing the 
public, with the exclusion of such information which may 
be as sensitive pre-judicial to the interests of a
company. The thereto related Regulation approved by the 
CONSOB by Decision No. 23.3 on June 24, 1977 and amended
by Decision No. 2725 of February 19, 1987, prescribes the
publication of an information prospectus in accordance 
with the pattern established again by the CONSOB (Art. 
6(8)).
Art. 12 of the Law No. 77 of March 23, 1983,
amending Art. 18 of the Law 216/74 and adding thereto 
Arts. 18-bis, 18-ter and 16-quater, is inspired by a
philosophy of transparency and extends the duty to 
publish a prospectus (introduced by the CONSOB for the 
first time in a Regulation of June 24, 1977, with
reference to the restricted market) to appeals to the
public for investment. The CONSOB was endowed with
competence to determine as to what the contents of a 
prospectus should be. Therewith the legislator
established a first grid of protection in favour of the 
"weaker" contracting party in all forms of appeal for 
investment by the public, also prescribing what bundle of 
notices generally associated with the notion of 
"transparency" should be considered. As Minervini has 
observed,'?® the 1 aw achieved therewith an exceptional 
jump, both doctrinal as well as practical: from a
protection of shareholders to the protection of
--- ■LY .ri.: ____
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investors; from the contractual phase to the pre­
con tr actual phase. For Guido R o s s i ' t h e  new law marked 
a real break or' rupture in the system of investor 
protection under Italian law.
With CONSOB Decision No. 4173, July 18, 1989,
relative to general conditions concerning the preparation 
of informative prospectuses and the manner in which an 
offer should be made to the pu Id lie for investment in 
accordance with Art. 18 of the Law 216/74, the system of 
informative prospectuses for public offers was renovated 
in connection with Directive 89/298/EEC of April 17, 
1989. '40 While the CONSOB asserted to iiave followed the 
contents of the EEC Directive within the limits of 
possibility, it has been claimed that C ONSOB’s Decision 
constituted an over-regulation beyond what had been 
intended by the EEC Directive.'*'
Art. 3 of the CONSOB Decision 4173/89 excluded fr-om 
the category of offers for public investment, 
transferrab1e stocks offered to professional Investors. 
The exclusion has been founded on the consideration that 
a necessary level of information has to be secured for 
the investing public in order to enable its members to 
make choices and decisions against a sufficient 
background of informed and conscious selection. Such an 
approach is not considered necessary with regard to 
professional investors.
Concerning the quantity and quality of the 
desirable information, Art. 6 para. 1 of the same CONSOB 
Decision No. 4173/89 distinguished the so to speak 
"transparency indices" and laid down that an informative 
prospectus related to a public offer should contain the 
information which according to the characteristics of the 
offered stocks, issuers and offerers are necessary for 
enabling investors and financial advisors to evaluate 
thoroughly the economic and financial situation, market
any
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results and trends in the activities of the issuers or 
their agents, not excluding thereto relevant rights and 
stocks. The CONSOB has limited itself, in substance, to 
reference to Art, 4(1) of the EEC Directive 80/390, In 
its circular 37/90, Assonime'*? pointed out that adequate 
criteria of transparency also imply in their generality 
the need to avoid loading the prospectus with weighty
data not necessary for the proper and informed assessment 
of an offer; such data may confound the investor or 
distract his attention from fundamental issues.
The prospectus has to bear the signature o f  those 
who are responsible for its publication, immediately
under the declaration or statement of responsibility at 
the end of the contents of the prospectus. Art. 4(2) of
the same CONSOB Decision, prescribes as an amendment to
existing practice, that if the prospectus is produced by 
3. company or association, the signature of the chairman 
of the corporate control organ is required. In 
implementation of tlie EEC Directive 79/279 of March 5,
1979, Art. 20 of the Law No, 281 of June 4, 1985 provides
that t he whole administrative procedure for t tie admission 
of securities to official publication of a prospectus
informing, with data and notes, on the company or firm 
the stocks of which are to be admitted to stock market 
quotation. Its contents and the modalities of the 
publication of the informative prospectus are determined 
by the CONSOB (Art. 20(3)).
Aware of the limited capacity of investors to 
evaluate and understand the significance of the 
information conveyed by a prospectus, the legislator has 
sougtit to help them with an informative instrument, more 
flexible and hence more purposeful as to its contents for 
the investing public than an informative prospectus in 
general. With this in mind, the provision of Art. 6(b) of 
the Law No. 1/1991 has been adopted. It aims at providing
 - — — _______________
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potential investors with more direct and relevant 
information by firms acting as financial intermediaries. 
The CQNSOB insists on the Inclusion in the text of an 
informative document as a warning that the CONSOB shall 
not be in any form held to be liable /in our translation 
/; "The publication of the present informative document 
is not dependent on prior verification as to its contents 
by the CONSOB. The completed publication /of the
informative document/ does not entail any valuation by 
the CONSOB on the suitability of the proposed service," 
Art, 10(2) of the CONSOB Regulation No. 5386/91 directs 
that the informative items of the document shall' be 
presented "in a clear and unequivocal" manner and tha.t 
before initiating the proposed financial operation a copy 
of the published informative document shall be sent to 
the CONSOB (Art. 11, para. 1 and 2 of the Regulation). 
Art 12 deals in minute detail with the circumstances and 
mode of postponing the publication of the document should 
a reason for it prevail.
Some authors in the literature on the topic'*? make 
a c 1 ea.r distinction between the prospectus, on the one 
hand., and the informative document on the other as to 
their respective functions and contents. The informative 
document is intended for those who wish to have it 
without being a potential client. It is a summarised 
p r e s e n t a t i o n by the intermediary, while the prospectus 
contains more elaborate information relating to the one 
launching the operation, or to the issuer or on the 
proposed operation.'** If divergences emerge between the 
two documents, preference is to be given to the more 
recent one,'*" The CONSOB is under a.ny obligation to 
control, verify and ascertain the veracity of the 
contents of an information document as to absence of an 
express item as the one provided for under Arts. 18 f f of 
the Law 216/1974 \-/ith respect to the information
Lilt
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prospectus.'*6
The f une t i on of the information document, directly 
com pax a b 1 e v/ith a. similar document in the United Kingdom, 
is to condense in compiled form such information as is 
essential on the intermediary.'*? In appendix D of the 
CONSOB Decision related to No. 5306/01, as amended by
Decision No. 6165 of May 31st, 1992, the CONSOB has
diluted the normative requirements prescribed by law, 
adding only the requirements to indicate the sum of 
subscribed or paid capital, to refer to cover by the 
Guarantee Fund, the composition of the administrative 
council, secure liabilities, persons in charge of the 
control of the company etc.'*® In the meaning of Art. 13 
of Regulation No, 5386/1991, the informative document 
should be available, prior to the conclusion of a
contract, only to "unqualified" clients.'*? The criterion 
for the need for protection has been considered by the 
CONSOB in the Regulation on informative prospectuses, 
approved by Decision No, 6430 of 26 August, 1992 (Italian 
Official Journal No. 208, September 4, 1392), amending
the Regulation adopted by Decision No. 6243 of June 3, 
1992.'?® The problem of liability by the CONSOB seems to 
have been overlooked in the relevant literature. When
determining the obligatory contents of information (in an 
informative prospectus), the CONSOB disposes of an ample 
discretionary margin. This may be necessary and useful, 
but such a competence to operate within an ample 
discretionary margin should be accompanied with a 
corresponding ma.rgin of adequate responsibility. Since 
1966, ixonetheless, at a doctrinal level some
differentiated effoi'ts have been made to remedy 
legislative gaps affecting the effectiveness of control 
(until then considered to be a formal matter), in an
endeavour to extend, suppie men ta rily, powers and thereto 
connected responsibility by the CONSOB, also to the
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(economic and financial) merits of a proposed operation 
(substantive or material control). For Libonati'"' this 
concerns the issue of the completeness of the contents of 
the prospectus and not only the merits of that which is 
published. According to some authors, the control by the 
CONSOB should concern the comp 1eteness and an a l y t i c a 1 
scrut iny of the supplied data, but it should not be 
extended to the merits and veracity of the offered
points; but others argue that this should not be 
sufficient. They refer to Art. 18-quater, which refers to 
Art. 3(c) there where it is stated that the CONSOB is not 
competent to undertake controls for the purpose of 
ascertaining the exactness and completeness of the data, 
whereby exactness corresponds to veracity. For
Minervini'52 the control of the CONSOB extends from
completeness and clearness also to the veracity of the 
data and notes included in the prospectus. It should be, 
however, pointed out, as to completeness and veracity of 
supplied information, administrators are held to be under 
civil law as well as penal law liable under Art, 2621(1) 
of the Italian Civil Code.
Judicial practice inclines toward a solution for the 
limited powers of the CONSOB, to restrict itself to the 
merely formal, being aware that an Insufficient public 
control system for preventing the possible publication of 
prospectuses with unreliable contents exists, but that
the same insufficient system does not hamper the access 
of private companies to the financial market, by setting 
up onerous bureaucratic hurdles. Thus the legislator has 
been keen to emphasise the regulatory powers of the 
CONSOB as a control body, without endowing it, however, 
with more incisive instruments of control, as stated in 
the penal tribunal in Milan on February 27, 1988. The
same judicial authority agrees that the CONSOB, not 
exercising a control function over companies in the
•:j|y
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strict meaning of the term, does not guarantee the
truthfulness and completeness of information. Such
responsibility rests with those who furnish the
information, just as it remains the responsibility of the 
investor to assume and evaluate the furnished
information. * ? ?
The United Sessions of the Corte di Cassazione'?* 
have maintained that, with respect to shares claimed by 
investors from the CONSOB in compensation for damages 
suffered in the wake of omissions in the control of the 
prospectus of an offer to the investing public, appeals
for remedies may be made to ordinary courts, but that
the claim would be rejected on the grounds of its merits, 
because the investors would have solely a legitimate 
claim with respect to the proper handling by the CONSOB 
of its functions and not with respect to a genuine
substantive right. A violation of the latter by a public 
administrative body would be able to justify a claim
under Art. 2043 of the Italian Civil Code, The facts 
of the case were as follows : buyers of capital shares in
the Hotel Villaggio Santa Teresa, a limited liability
company, complained that in the prospectus information 
relating to an allegedly already effected increase in 
capital had been incorrect; that in addition the 
prospectus contained inexact or false information on the 
proposed financial operation; and that, lastly, the
CONSOB had not forbidden the proposed operation in spite 
of alarming news published in the press; nor had the
CONSOB provided for the acquisition of ulterior
justifying documentary materials.
The Tribunal of Milan,'?? while rejecting the 
argument that the financial intermediation of the bank 
could be held as a ground for making the bank responsible 
as a guarantor for the solvency of the issuer of the
securities, admitted the request of compensation for
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damages on the grounds that a precontractuaI liability by 
the bank was involved in the meaning of Art, 1337 of the 
Italian Civil Code, owing to the diffusion of
prospectuses containing incomplete and false information. 
The case from 1970 concerns an investor who had solicited 
a copy of a prospectus edited by the American Express 
Bank. The text underlined the high returns on the shares 
of a company which had acquired a package of convertible 
stocks and after the payment of the first two
installments financially failed.'?* The first instance 
(prima Sezione) of the Penal Tribunal of Rome rejected by 
ordinance the request of the State Advocate (Avvocature 
dello Stato) to exclude the civil liability of the 
Ministry of Industries. This decision of the Tribunal was 
taken within the framework of the proceedings against 
Lucid Sgarlata who as a (trusted) (management) fund
manager had generated damages amounting to 3,000m
Ital.Lire for 22,000 investors. The decision of the 
Tribunal confirms that if a Ministry as a body in charge 
of the control of management trusts does not act with due 
vigilance foreseen by the law, is liable together with 
the defendants for damages caused to investors. This 
concerns a principle sanctioned in 1992 by a
revolutionary judicial decision, No. 6667 of the Sezione 
Unite Civili della Corte di Cassazlone called upon to
deal with the merits of liability by the Ministry of
Industry within the framework of the Sgarlata scandal. 
This principle was applied for the first time by a Penal
Tribunal, by a decision of the Tribunal of Rome which
said the principle could be validly introduced as
applicable to penal proceedings. If the principle of 
liability by supervisory organs would be further applied 
by judicial authorities, investors would be able to get 
damages from the same authority from case to case called 
upon to act as a control body. In addition to the
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Ministry of Industry, the CONSOB Itself and the Bank of 
Italy (for credit institutions) may act as such organs 
responsible to let prevail In their supervision, due and 
sufficient vigilance, otherwise they may have to 
indemnify for damages.'??
2. Principles, Objectives, Conduct Rules
The most innovative contents of the Law No. 1/1991 
concern the principles, objectives and conduct rules 
relating to the activities of the intermediaries.'?® The 
Law, beside specifying some principles, enunciates also 
objectives, with reference to which the relevant rules on 
conduct would be applied (Art. 9, para. 2). Investor
protection is not a matter limited to reference to single 
acts or contracts. It concerns the complex activities of 
intermediation.
Law No, 1/1991 sets on the one hand the most
relevant general standards and rules of conduct for 
transactions, and circumscribes the way the competent 
authorities are entrusted with the adoption of rules of 
more specific contents.'?? In spite of the lack of
clarity in the statutory texts, particularly in Arts. 6 
and 9, the Italian system seems to concern three levels:
a. The level of principles (Art. 6) ;
b. The level of objectives (Art. 9 para. 2);
c. The level of rules of conduct.
A first distinction between them concerns their
sources: the principles and objectives are laid down by
the legislator, while rules of conduct are adopted
through regulatory decisions of the CONSOB. In agreement 
with the Bank of Italy it determines the rules of conduct
and publishes them in the Official Journal for observance
by firms of financial intermediation in their activities 
for which they have the necessary authorisation. The 
relevant rules shall be compatible with the principles 
laid down in Art. 6 and shall be inspired by the
_ _
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objectives included in Art. 9 para. 2. Thus two of the 
above mentioned three levels of the system are marked by 
a rigidity and i minu ta.b i 1 i ty which only the legislator may 
modify. The third level is characterised with 
flexibility, because the CONSOB may amend the rules of 
conduct in accordance with the exigencies of the
situation. Therewith the CONSOB is empowered to react
promptly to the demands of the market and the needs of
the operators. It should be noted that the regulatory
functions of the CONSOB shall always be in agreement with 
the principles and objectives laid down in Arts. 6 and 9, 
respectively,'*® and that principles and objectives imply 
I'e fere nee to secondary regulation by the CONSOB and the 
Bank of Italy,'*' whereby secondary regulation by the 
CONSOB shall be "in conformity with" the principles and 
be "inspired" by the objectives. In this respect there 
should not exist divergences and discordances between all 
three l e v e l s . " I n s p i r e d "  in turn means motivated to 
find a model of proceeding for promoting their 
translation into reality,'*? Hence, the CONSOB enjoys 
freedom and discretion for achieving the objectives 
anchored in law, by measures it deems suitable, but it 
enjoys no freedom and discretion in the application of 
the principles.
Concerning the relationship between Arts. 6 and 9 
and questions it may generate, a noted theoretical 
approach'** has pointed out that a narrow interdependence 
prevails between the two Articles, and that they should 
be treated conjunctively, as the sum of general criteria 
to which both intermediaries and also the control body 
should attend. No hierarchical relationship can be 
established between the contents of Art. 6 and those .of 
Art. 9 para, 2, as any attempt to reduce them to a scheme 
would risk to generate incongruencies. The same author 
raises,'*? in addition, the question whether the level of
---- --- ‘"'it'.__ __
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principles should also include the complex accounting, 
administrative and organisational standards in the 
diverse activities of the intermediaries, because, 
according to him, the standards or rules in question do 
not represent an autonomous principle but a tool for 
promoting respect and monitoring such respect for rules 
governing the conduct of intermediaries, Minervini
observes that there is no good coordination between
directly generated rules and objectives considered as 
underlying the regulatory activity of the CONSOS.'^* 
Principles
d f 1 Principle 1 involving Diligence, Correctness a nd 
P rofessional Ski 1 1
The first principle postulated in Art. 6 refers to 
diligence, correctness and professional skill
(professionalism) while Art. 3(2) specifies that 
authorised intermediaries shall possess knowledge of the 
transferable securities included in their services, in a 
manner adequate to the type of service they are expected 
to supply. Thus, diligence or diligent conduct shall be 
assessed on the basis, as to correctness, with reference
to a parameter commensurate to the type of the activity.
An intermediary firm (SIM) is held to act with due 
diligence, correctness and professional quality when 
dealing with the interests of its clients. It is useful 
to emphasise that a rule of conduct should also include 
the duty of an intermediary to observe general principles 
relating to contractual matters with reference to the 
applicability of Art. 1176 of the Italian Civil Code.'^?
Diligence expresses maximally an operative va. lue in 
the non-execution or the inexact execution of investment 
duties in relation to an investor, while correctness is 
operative at a different level involving ulterior duties 
as provided for in a contract and with reference to 
specified limits in the exercise of competences by the
__
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entrusted intermediary. The principle of correctness 
prevails undoubtedly in the first place with reference to 
information for the client; to conduct one's self in this 
respect correctly means, in the first place, to give 
knowledge to the client on the nature and risks of an 
operation, their implications, including knowledge on an 
action or circumstance which a client may need to know in 
order to make well informed choices of investment or 
disinvestment,(Art. 6(e)) It should be, however, added 
that correctness does not exist solely for supplying 
information. In the complex activities of intermediaries 
there exists also a parameter relating to stabilised 
concrete conduct expected from an intermediary in the 
course of developing the relationship, not least implying 
a quasi-contractual relationship of continuous service, 
such as that dealing with fund management (Art 5), As 
such correctness includes also a rule which governs the
use of discretion which an intermediary lets prevail in 
his activities related to stocks.
Professi onaI Skill / Profess!onalism
Professionalism or professional, skill is included in 
a corresponding canon of professional diligence, as 
provided for in Art. 1176 para,. 2 of the Italian Civil
code, which defines as something which should be
commensurate with the specific nature of the exercised
activity. ' ^  ?
Cor rectness
Rules of conduct inspired from the principle of 
correctness intend to guarantee the flow of information 
while diligence guarantees the fulfillment of a contract 
in accordance with the criteria of professionalism of an 
intermediary. Correctness actualises itself not only in 
the form of some typical obligations, such as that of 
publishing and transmitting to clients an informative 
document of the particularities and description of the
----- ------------
--T-rr
273
proposed operation (Art. 6(b) of the Law 1/1991), or 
drafting a written contract (Art 6(c)), taut equally in 
the form of regulating the criteria affecting conduct 
related to specific aspects of the continued relationship 
between an intermediary and a client (see Art. 9(of the 
Law 1/1991).
The principle of correctness includes a penal 
standard for door to door sales. Regulation No. 5378/1991 
obliges the offerer to indicate with precision the 
deadline for the five days during which the client may 
decide to withdraw from accepting the offer (Art. 33),
For its contents see S.ii.c above (pp 260 - 269) on
information and transparency, the informative prospectus, 
in the light of the responsibilities of the CONSÜB.
d .3 Principle 3, relating to the written Contract
The principles of correctness and good faith include 
also the obligation to adopt a written contract
indicating the nature of the services offered, including 
the mode of executing the services in question as well as 
the unit of currency and the calculation basis for the 
renumeration, and other particular conditions agreed with 
the client. Art. 6(1)(c ) provides that the contract 
stipulated between an intermediary and his client shall 
be in writing and shall contain all clauses which are 
current 1 y included as relevant i n any contract of
investment in securities. The scope and purpose of the 
written contract have been ulteriorly defined in Arts. 9 
and 33 of the CONSGB Regulation No. 5387/1991.
The principle of correctness imposes on the
intermediary the adoption of a contract in written form. 
This form is not used so much in the interest of the 
contractual relationship as in the particular interest of 
the weaker contracting partner. The written form is also 
considered to be the best vehicle of information conveyed
'1
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to the weaker partner. The existing 1 aw does not foresee 
any consequences if the requirement of the written form 
is not observed. It may be deduced that, according to Di 
Majo,i7o i f Art, 9 of the Law No, 1/1991 provides that
intermediaries shall be able to supply services related
to securities to a client only on the basis of a written 
contract, the absence of a written contract implies that 
the alleged contract is null and void through failure of 
its approval by one of the parties. Maisano too^’ ‘ notes 
that in conformity with what is enshrined in Art,
1350(13) of the Italian Civil Code, the form is necessary 
for validating the substantive contents of the agreement, 
Annunziata is equally of the view that the formal
requirements for contracts, imposed by Arts, 6 and 0 of 
the Law 1/1991 constitute an element the absence of which 
entails the nullity of a contract.
d .4 Principle 4, concerning relevant information 
The novelty of Art, 6 is based on the contents of 
its sections under the letters d, e, f and h. They are 
intended to create a relationship between an intermediary 
and a client strongly based in trust. The intermediary 
should not limit himself, under Art 6(d), to receiving 
the stocks or the money of a client and then use them for 
an operation; he shall acquire, as a preventative 
measure, the relevant information of the financial
situation of the client for the purpose of his activities
as an intermediary. The rule seems to be based on a 
personalised approach: a firm acting as an intermediary
shall make the investment and disinvestment choices with 
due regard to the specific exigencies of each single
client or of his financial situation,
d .5 Principle 5, governing Information on Risks 
With due i-egard to the personal nature of a 
contractual link with a client, the intermediary is 
expected to inform a client not in abstract terms In
_____________ ------
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general, but with specific reference to the proposed and 
intended operation, such as investing in state bonds or 
in stocks involving risks, so that the client may be in 
a position to become aware of the opportunities and risks 
inherent to the specifically proposed operation.
d . 6 Principle 6_, a ffecting excessive risks
In the light of the notion of excessive operations 
does the content of Art. 6(l)(f) assume a significance : 
an intermediary shall not intend and effect operations of 
excessive proportions compared with the specific 
financial situation of a client. The written contract
should, in the meaning of Art, 8(i)(e), yield reliable 
information as to what operations the client intended to 
have effected in relation to his effective financial
possibilities.
The content of the text under Art. 6(f) has 
benefited from the British experience in' suitability and 
churning.173 According to Annunziata the rule tends to 
have priority over churning and suitability, even if it 
seems to put the accent more on the first than the second 
rule of conduct. The CONSOB, by Decision No. 5387/1991 
has explicitly laid down (Art. 11) the applicability of
the second rule of conduct. By virtue of an express and 
binding formulation the solution adopted by the Italian 
system seems to be more to the point than that found in 
the French system in relation to the progressive
emergence of the obligation de conseil. Once more the
Italian system looks to be more similar to the British 
system. Annunziata considers the British influence on the 
Italian system very relevant.'?* In the core rules the 
range of the suitability rule is a priori limited to 
discretionary operations and consultancy activities.
Respect for a client’s instructions (Art. 9 para 2(d)) 
cedes priority to the duty to let correctness prevail a n d 
to collaborate.'7= The suitability rule points to
I
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responding to exigencies other than those which have 
inspired the contents of Art. 1711 para. 2 of the Italian 
Civil Code.3 76 If Art. 11 of the CONSOB Decision No. 
5387/1991 seems to be suitable for dealing with 
operations based on client’s instructions, Art. 8 can be 
a ]D p 1 le 1:1 with reference to discretionary operations, and 
it represents as such the natural ground for the rule on 
churning. The regulatory rule can be used with precision 
to the delimitation of the relevant fact. In substance. 
Art. 8 lends itself to dealing with churning or with 
suitability while Art. 11 appears to be more suitable to 
deal with suitability.^"?
d .7 Principle 7 concerning Conflicts of Interest 
Some specific rules anchored in law are directed 
towards the prevention of situations involving conflicts 
of interest, while some other general rules are intended 
to guarantee a correct conduct on the part of an
intermediary firm. Art. 6(g) deals with such a rule of 
genera, 1 nature.
An investor normally finds himself exposed to 
suggestions by the intermediary because of the high 
technicality of the matters concerned and the involvement 
of risk in them. He is the weaker partner in the
contractua1 relationship in which his interest on the 
receiving side of intermediations may not be completely 
satisfied by the prevalence of the interests of the 
counterpart. The option of law for the polyfunctionality 
of intermediaries increases the possibility of situations 
involving conflicts of interest, indicating the adoption 
of suitable caution interfering with private a,ijtonomy.
The thereto related solution anchored in Law 1/1991
provides for the disclosure of the conflictuel situation, 
to which is added the need to secure the specific consent 
of the client. The logic underlying it corresponds also 
to what is foreseen under Arts. 1394 and 1395 of the
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Its. lian Civil Code.‘?° A 
absolute duty to secure
conflict of interest needs an 
information and transparency.
Art, 6 para. 1(d) and <e) put an intermediary firm under 
an obligation to procure, as a preventive measure, all 
the information available on the financial situation of 
the client and to secure that the client in turn is 
always adequately informed in the course of the financial 
operation.
As to clients’ groups, Art. 6(1)(b ) applies a larger 
notion to what a group is, subjecting intermediaries to a 
duty to inform the relevant clients on the structure of 
the group to which they belong. Art. 8 ( 1 ) (L) bars 
intermediaries from invoking the right to vote inherent 
to managed securities, except when specific authorisation 
for it is granted from case to case for each investors’ 
meeting or in writing.
CONSOB Regulation No. 5307 of July 2, 1991, refers
to conflicts of interest and imposes a duty on authorised 
intermediaries to identify potential conflicts of 
interest (Art. 4(1)). It also provides for a prohibition 
to execute operations with or on behalf of accounts of 
own clients if such operations are directly or indirectly 
related to group interests or to intermediaries’ own 
interests, unless previously written notice has been
given to the client(s) on the nature and extent of the 
operation and the client(s) has (have) consented 
expressly in writing that the operation in question may 
be effected (Art. 4(2), Lastly, already printed forms 
may partly be of help to confirm, as graphic evidence, 
that the proposed operation involves conflicts of 
interest (Art. 4(3)). Art. 9 para 2(b) of the Law No. 
1/1991,, concerning the delimitation of the regulatory 
powers of the CONSOB • provides that the system of 
separation of interests should help impede the exchange 
of information and management responsibilities between
S
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those engaged in diverse activities. Art. 9 para. 5(c) of 
the same Law entrusts the Bank of Italy with the task of 
determining the accounting and organisational criteria to 
assure the separation of various activities and connex 
management responsibilities. In conclusion it can be said 
thaf, as in the British and French systems, the entirety 
of rules on professional conduct contribute to regulation 
and resolve conflicts of interest.'?? The Italian system 
seems to be much more closer to the British than to the 
French system. The Italian system reflects of the British 
system the more general approach and, in particular, 
attention to disclosure as well as to the superability of 
the prohibition to operate with an authorisation secured 
from the c l i e n t . ' so Disclosure prescribed by the rule on 
the conflicts of interest is evidently preventive in 
nature, binding the intermediary . to abstain from 
operating if the nature and extent of the conflict to the 
client and the latter has not explicitly consented to the 
execution of the given operation.
The French system does not include rules analogous 
to those on conflicts of interest. In France the 
challenge of conflicts of interest has been resolved by a 
marked strengthening in the scope and application of 
clauses and rules of general nature.'®' The major 
affinity between the British and Italian systems consists 
in the fulfillment of a function of so to speak Chinese 
walls at a first level. Beyond it the Italian system has, 
however, a more accumulated level of analytic contents 
than the British approach.'®^ In the Italian system there 
is a. reflection of a greater inquisitiveness as to the 
relationship between the means and ways of dealing with 
conflicts of interest, on the one hand, and rules thereon 
on the other; the information to be supplied to the 
clients, on duties to cooperate by virtue of the common 
1 aw or by virtue of other legal rules enshrined in Law
____ ____ --- ______ ____
-v ':.H‘' -y:'
279
No T 1/1991, and on implementation rules. The herewith 
implied problem is the object of special consideration in 
the British model in which the relationship between rules 
particular to professional conduct and rules of common 
law is treated as an important point.
d .8 Principle 8, related to internal Organisation
The Italian system contains no precise rules on
personal operations executed by assisting personnel. 
CONSOB Decision No, 5387/91 limits itself in Art, 18 to 
provide for a duty of intermediaries to establish 
’’conditions and procedural modalities” . This Is 
significant in that it may represent an opportunity for 
trying to experiment with techniques of auto-regulation 
and auto-superVis1 o n . This may involve a solution similar 
to the one adopted by the French system.'®*
The listing of principles included in Art. 6 of the 
Law No. 1/1991 cannot be treated as exhaustive, because 
diligence, correctness and professional skill have to do 
with ’’general clauses”
e . Regulations of the CONSOB
The secondary normative function (competence) of the 
CONSOB at the third or inferior level (See above p. 269), 
concerning rules on professional conduct, has been 
exercised essentially through (i) Regulation No. 5387 of 
July 2, 1991; it regulates the activities of stock market
intermediaries; (ii) Regulation No. 5386 of December 
1994, adopted by virtue of Arts. 2 and 9 of the Law no. 
1/1991 on rules of conduct for financial intermendiaries 
that came into effect on January 1st, 1995 (See II Sole 
24 Ore of December 13, 1994, p. 30). As mentioned
earlier (above), the secondary normative authority of the 
CONSOB is circumscribed by the framework of principles to 
comply with, and objectives to be inspired from. 
Regulation No. 5387/91 (replaced by Regulation No. 8850 
of December 9, 1994) points to such rules of professional
conduct which may as criteria assist to
—2 8 0
establish and distinguish what is professionally correct 
from what is not as a standard from which intermediaries 
have to abstain "as any conduct which may extend an 
advantage to a client at the expense of another" /our 
translation/ (Art. 8 ( 1 ) (b). As to professional skill or 
professionalism, Art. 3(2) of the Regulation states that 
an intermediary should be in possession of knowledge of 
transferable stocks object of the services and also 
knowledge of the economic and financial situation of the
issuers, and that such knowledge shall be "adequate to
the type of service to be rendered". The same statement 
has been repeated by Art, 3(d) of the Regulation no. 8850
/1994. The new Regulation seems to be a detailed
repetition of the dispositions of the Law no, 1/1991. An
exception is Art, 11 that confirms the differences 
between institutional and private investors already made 
by Art. 13 of Regulation no. 5387/1991. Accordingly, most 
of the articles of the new Regulation are not applicable 
to institutional investors. Art. 23 authorizes the 
intermediary to communicate by telephone to the clients 
the refusal to execute an order. A synthetic core of
information is required by Art, 25.
e .1 Duties relative to Cooperation by the
Intermediary
They are contained in Art. 6(d) and (f) of Law 1/91. 
The "know your customer rule", by the way found also in
the French system, laid down in Art. 6 of Law 1/91 shows 
once more a strong affinity of rules in the Italian
system with rules of professional conduct laid down in
the British system.'®® The way the rule in the Italian
system is drafted betrays a generic approach.'®* The more 
creative provisions of the Regulation are undoubtedly
found in the texts of Arts. 5 and 13.'®? The provisions
in question, not found in Law No. 1/1991, are considered
to be the product of creative work by the CONSOB,
T T - -
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Art, 5 of Regulation No. 5387/91 made the 
determination of remuneration in favour of intermediaries 
conditioned by criteria of "congruity and reasonableness" 
and has ruled out any form of return to payments of
commissions. In this way the CONSGB has effected a
substitution of defined rates with a liberal system which 
takes into consideration expenses, taxes, standardised 
fees of the firm as publicised and not higher than fees 
when publication is requested. As has been underlined,*®® 
no upper limits for claims for remuneration from clients 
have been set, but rather a control on information 
supplied to clients in due legal form has been
introduced. The choice of substituting a liberal system 
of remuneration to a schedule of fixed fees has to do 
with the globalisation of the markets, involving high 
levels of investment and professional skills, high 
standards of efficiency among the operators, resulting in 
minor margins of profits per single transaction.
In difference to the British system, the Law No. 
1/1991 does not contain a provision consenting to adjust 
the rules of professional conduct to the characteristics 
of the clients with regard to their preparation 
background, experience and other relevant factors. Art. 
11 of the CONSOB Regulation no. 8850/1994 provides 
instead the non-applicability, unless various contractual 
arrangements exist, of some of the rules of the 
Regulations with respect to "qualified" clients. The 
CONSOB has in substance deprived whole categories of 
persons from the protection given by the rules on 
professional conduct, in the absence of an explicit 
intention on the part of the legislator. The logic 
underlying and justifying this situation seems to be 
essentially that there is no need to extend the 
application scope of rules beyond their range of utility 
and necessity. The rationale of Arts. 13 and 11 is a very
i'-'
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clear one: they deal with a distinction of professional
operators from non-professional investors, whereby the 
protective system provided by the law s.pplies only to the 
latter. The specific professionality of some of investors' 
defined as "institutional" or "professional" renders 
superfluous the application of the standards in question, 
and through Arts. 13 and 11 the CONSOB has laid down a 
clear distinction between "qualified" and "non-qua1ified" 
investors, a distinction not found in Law No. 1/1991.
In adopting the contents of Arts. 13 of the two 
Regulations, the CONSOB has been clearly inspired by the 
British and EC experience. The ISD has definitively 
consecrated the distinction between professional and not 
professional investors.
f . System of Control
Regarding the system of control, the Law No. 1/91 
has adopted a mixed system: legislative and
administrative, whereby the administrative components 
have assumed an enormous significance. Therewith, for the 
first time in Italy basic administrative considerations 
have prevailed over basic judicial ones. This does not 
mean that judicial control has been wholly excluded.'®?
Opting for administrative control is a product of a 
statutory regulation crisis generated by the
unsuitability of a specific statutory regulation 
concerning a complex and changing reality of legal 
relationships. Preference of administrative control is 
essentially conditioned by the possibility of 
administrative authorities to intervention generally and 
preventively in a manner clearly preferable to 
traditional judicial intervention in individual cases 
without leading to good general results. As has been 
remarked in general, control systems can be distinguished
in terms of three 
judicial and (i i i)
main types : (i) legislative, (ii)
administrative. Obviously, with
---- _________ __
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reference to legality and legitimacy sanctioned by Arts. 
97 and 10 1 of the Italian constitution, primary input at 
the legislative level is necessary, but such input may 
take the forni of extremely detailed and rigid specific
precepts with no margin of appreciation, in individual
cases, to assess the validity of contractual clauses laid
down by law or of general statutory rules for control
without indicating the purpose, the criteria and the 
procedural dimensions of the intended control, nor equip 
administrative or judicial authorities with any adequate 
margin of autonomy of assessment and eventually the 
burden of control is still left to be carried by 
administrative or judicial organs. It is generally 
accepted that detailed statutory regulation may be 
precise and clear as a text, but it may introduce into 
the system elements of rigid contrasting and unable to 
keep pace with rapid evolution and rapid and variegated 
changes in legal relationships in modern society. The 
questions, problems and challenges which the latter
generate cannot be relatively quickly overcome by 
amending the less fortunate parts of the existing law. In 
such situations it is expected that judicial intervention 
may be helpful.
In Italy there is a notable resistance to the
approach that legislative texts (of positive law) should 
contain general clauses providing for a type of "dynamic 
equilibrium" and leaving their adaptation to the needs of 
evolving social relationships without continuous resort
to legislative adjustments which may not prove to be the 
right approach at the right time. It is, however, right 
to argue that while general legislative clauses respond 
to the needs of flexibility, they may at the same time 
conjure up the risk of generating judicial decisions
which may inter se be inconsistent and unhomogeneous,
Administrative controls may vary too. Italy seems to be
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currently moving towards a logic of intervention of the
"regulatory" type, but the existing challenge in the
discussions is distorted by the backwardness of judicial 
remedies in diametrical contrast to administrative 
remedies. The distortion is a product of the fact that
not only supporters of the pro-administrative remedies
ca.mp but also supporters of the judicial remedies camp
have failed and are failing to consider the possibilities 
of strengthening traditional individual and other 
judicial remedies which no longer seem to be 
satisfactory, with collective and preventive judicial 
remedies which would prove to be very effective. In any 
case, techniques of autonomous administrative control at 
private, administrative or mixed levels will continue to 
presuppose a. predetermined legislative foundation not
only for providing for legality, but also for outlining 
the scope of the autonomy of the competent authorities.
Currently, even though legislation has opted for a 
mixed control with administrative dimensions, there is 
still a margin for judicial control,'?®
g . A Statute for the Rights of Investors
Some authors'?' have proposed drafting a statute for
the rights of investors to enable them to make 
knowledgeable choices among diverse for'ms of investment, 
in stocks, with due consideration of the comprehensive 
diversification of offers on the in a r k e 1: and of risks 
connected with portfolio choices. It is argued that such 
a statute has political legitimacy already found in the 
Italian constitution. Art. 4L should also be valid for 
firms operating within the financial economy. Not to be 
eventually neglected are the fundamental contents of Art. 
4 7 of the Constitution, which qualifies savings (and 
investments) as social assets and also as macroeconomic 
c o n c e p t s not only in relation to the interests of the 
individual citizens but also to the collective interests
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of an investing family. These interests require and merit 
protection guaranties which in Italy are as yet far from 
having the scale and contents which are enshrined in 
Italian constitutional teleology.'?® 
h . Results; critical Remarks 
h . 1 Re s u 1t s
While in 1993 the Italian stocic exchange index had 
been marked by an increase of 37 per cent compared with 
the situation of 1992,'?^ the CONSOB as a monitoring and 
inspection authority had initiated 57 investigations and 
47 audits. In five cases related to SIMs, it had made 
corresponding reports to the judicial authorities. In six 
cases the activities of SIMs were suspended or 
authorisations withdrawn. In four cases the CONSOB 
recommended to the Ministry of Finance to apply
administrative measures provided for under Arts. 11(12) 
and 13(3) of the Law No. 1 of 1991.*?'' On March 31, 1993,
it laid down the definition of what constitutes a 
"censurable fact" (fat to cenurabile) with reference to 
the activities of auditing companies.*?® The penal
authorities received, from the CONSOB, reports on 127 
cases.*?* From the public t li e CONSGB received 600 
individual petitions, of which about ten per cent were 
a no n y mous,'?? Co n corning the Ferruzzi affair, it
submitted to the competent Procurators of the Republic 
criminally relevant complaints and declined to give its 
approval to the auditing report prepared by Price
Waterhouse, It also approved the Montedison decision for 
revol<ing an assignment to Price Waterhouse; it declined 
to approve a. Ferruzzi Finanziaria decision which would 
have confirmed the assignment of auditing to Price
Waterhouse. On September 14, 1993, the TAR rejected an
application for revoking the annulment of the requested 
assignment of auditing to Price Waterhouse, thus
confirming once more the decision to withdraw the
_ __ ___________________
286
assignment.'?® In spite of its monitoring and supervisory 
activities the CONSOB is of the opinion that its
competences to act and intervene are of little incisive
impact because it lacks power to ask directly civil
judicial authorities to act.'??
h.2 Critical Remarks
The Law No. 1/1991, awaited with many expectations, 
has generated doubts and perplexity. Art. 6 enables rules 
to coexist side by side; general standards of conduct 
affecting diligence, correctness and professionalism are 
followed by rules of specific duties, such as that of
publishing an informative document or of using a written
contract. Then comes a reference to a more general duty
to inform (Art. 6(e)), Art 8 governing the management of 
assets provides for dealing with specific tasks, such as 
depositing transferable assets in accounts designated as 
managed on behalf of third parties (Art, 8(f)), or
prohibiting a firm from entering into obligations on 
behalf of a client beyond the limit of managed assets 
(Art. 8g)>. Art. 9 in turn enunciates objectives which 
are to inspire the establishment of rules of conduct. 
These rules shall in turn have the task to specify, 
subsequently, the purpose and modality for the
fulfillment of the intended duties. M i n e r v i n i ® h a s  
made the observation that proper coordination has not 
been achieved between rules laid down directly, on the 
one hand, and objectives preestablished as linked to the 
regulatory activities of the CONSOB on the other. The 
intended system evidently aims at avoiding that the rules 
of correct conduct and diligence are applied by judges, 
with due regard to the margin of unpredictability and 
uncertainty always associated with judicial decisions.®*' 
It should also be noted that the Law no. 1/1991 sanctions 
the absolute domination which banking intermediaries can 
deploy: there is good reason for "a definitive feeling
AAA ,A ■::7a.AA'      _ .
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that the newly created system is strongly
bankocentric, ® Furthermore the legislator has not 
defined the specific contents of C ONSOB’s inspection
powers, as the law restrictive!y attributes to the CONSOB 
a. competence "to effect inspections". Therefore, the 
general rules governing administrative procedures s h a. 1 1 
apply, that is, without endowing the CONSOB with special 
competences or powers.®*® It' has additionally been 
observed that no attention has been given to self­
regulation of the professions, be they with respect to 
standards of conduct .or with respect to professional 
organisation and discipline on the markets,®**
It may in conclusion be asked, as Maisano does,®*® 
whether investors’ protection has been considered to be 
excessive as to scope and rigour. It can be fundamentally 
stated that the preliminary phase of (investor 
protection) cannot be said to be excessive; the regime of 
intermediation on the stock markets does not provide for 
the publication of contractual provisions, a matter which 
in turn is prescribed by standards governing the 
transparency of banking transactions. Art. 6.1(d) of the 
Law No. 1/1991 and Art, 6 of the CONSGB Regulation No, 
5387/91 limit themselves to establishing that the 
intermediaries shall request a client to supply
information on his financial situation and on his
investment plans. This information is to be attached as 
an appropriate descriptive document to the contract, 
unless the client declines to supply the requested 
information. In this case an appropriate written 
statement, signed by the client, is to be appended to the 
contract. All this does not amount to much in terms of 
investor protection.
The requirement that a contract should be in written 
form also cannot be considered to be excessive and 
inappropriate. The prerequisite of minimum contents of a
 , : :________________
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contract is of fundamental importance for securing 
transparency. Independently from this important point, 
the intermediaries have at their disposal an ample margin 
of autonomy. For example, the contract shall indicate the 
mode of rescinding it, but the determination of the mode 
is left to the parties and therewith ultimately to the 
intermediaries ; CONSOB Regulation No. 5378/91 and 
Regulation no. 8850/1994 (art 7 ( c ) )  (G.U. no. 295
December 1994) lay down clearly that a contract shall
also indicate the manner in which it may eventually be 
modified, but again this is a point exposed to 
determination by the intermediaries ; the generic 
provision of rules affecting contractual amendments can 
prove to be extremely insidious, because it may involve 
an implicit recognition that a unilateral amendment may 
be admissible; as to fees for the intermediaries, the new 
rules do not prescribe transparency, but only their 
determination within maximum limits laid down by the 
CONSOB, wherewith an ample margin for initiative by the 
intermediaries may exist.
Concerning conflicts of interest, again as a non- 
excessive standard, the Law No. 1/1981 has sanctioned 
the rule that information between persons involved in
diverse activities shall not be communicated. This 
represents a standard of elementary but insufficient 
precaution for Impeding most serious abuses,®** The new 
Regulation No. 8850/1994 (art 4) (G.U. no. 295 December
1994) has confirmed that the prohibition of operating in 
conflict of interest can be overcome by a written 
authorisation of the client.
On June 7, 1994, the CONSOB celebrated 20 years of
its existence. Even if the Italian economy if founded 
rather on the existence of small and medium sized
enterprises, the influence of the public sector and 
public intervention continues to be strong compared with
'A' . ' , . ' ' ' , ; . .______________________________;......... ..
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t he influence of private initiâtive.^*? The modest 
dimension of the institutional investors is a most 
relevant factor which completes the picture as to the 
backwardness of the Italian financial markets.=0* As in 
France for the COB, the main problem in Italy is that of 
delineating the correct or proper insertion of the 
CONSOB within the ambit of the (financial) constitutional
scene of the Italian state. The legitimacy and the 
constitutional significance of the CONSOB, alongside 
other authorities, is currently a question which cannot 
be easily e v a d e d . T h i s  concerns legal entities which 
make politics to the extent they govern markets, 
determine their existence and their functioning. They 
have their respective competences which may exist to the 
extent they govern markets, determine their existence and 
their functioning. They have their respective competences 
which may exist separately from state competences, that 
is, independently from the state and on a scale which is 
larger than that of the state at the level of the EC 
legal order.*** It has been rightly noted that the 
legitimation of CONSOB's powers is derived from EC legal 
sources: the CONSOB is considered to be an institution
operating at an EC level, and as such it may directly 
invoke EC Directives as sources of the law it shall apply 
(on the basis of Art. 4(d), law of January 27, 1992, No.
89). Therewith the CONSOB may be defined also as an 
institution resting on EC foundations. As has been 
rightly said, the coordinated vigilance of the CONSOB in 
Italy and of the corresponding bodies in the other EC 
member states constitutes the first stage of a process of 
constitutional development towards an administrative 
system of supranational dimensions. Hence, corresponding 
thereto, the CONSOB is an institution which has a key 
role to play in the EC wide process of integration of
financial markets.***
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4. Investor Protection In the United Kingdom
a. "Private” and "institutional” Investors
The first question considered in G o w e r ’s Green Paper 
was why it is necessary to protect investors. Referring 
to the saying that if they burn their fingers, that is 
their fault, Gower underlined that "this robust 
affirmation of laissez-faire principles has long since 
been rejected and it has been recognised that it is the 
investors’ own fault on 1 y /emphasis added/ if they were 
in a position to judge the extent of the risk."***
Since 1938 the Prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act 
has prohibited dealing in securities except by persons 
who have obtained a licence from the DTI. A member of a 
recognised stock exchange or recognised association of 
dealers in securities was not required to obtain a 
licence. The prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act has 
been essentially by its name and terms an anti-fraud 
statute, as emphasised by Section 13 of the Act. It has 
made it a crime for any person to induce another to enter 
into an investment transaction by misleading, false or 
deceptive statement, promise or forecast or by' any 
dishonest concealment of a material fact. Although the 
wording reflects an apparently wide provision, it has 
been rarely used and has to some extent been emasculated 
by restrictive interpretation.**^ The new rules 
introduced later in the Act lacked too any real sanction 
other than an unlikely disciplinary jurisdiction vested 
unenthusiastically in the D T I .* *^
The new system anchored in the PSA 1986 had to 
strengthen and render effective investor protection which 
the Prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act had not 
succeeded to guarantee. Under the PSA, with standards of 
investor protection, SROs are required, as an example, to 
have rules and other provisions affording "an adequate 
level" of protection for investors. Moreover, again as an
 !   [
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example, standards of regulation in general terms require 
SROs to have "adequate arrangements and resources for the 
effective monitoring and enforcement of compliance with 
its rules". As Large has observed,**® these requirements 
do not help a recognised body to know, with any
precision, what it is expected to achieve, because
i ) Their vagueness makes a measurement of
performance difficult;
ii) They do not provide an adequate basis for 
holding the regulator to account for performance; and 
accordingly,
iii) they do not provide an adequate basis for 
supervision by the SIB, As such they do not provide an 
adequate basis for the SIB to hold a recognised body
accountable for its performance.
It has been ironically observed that "The
deregulatory impetus on both sides of the Atlantic 
together with the ’New Right’ philosophy of ’popular 
capitalism’, leading to the development of the equity- 
owning democracy’ changed the ’paternalistic’ tradition 
utterly /.., / At the same time, former protectionist
concepts enforced by statutory authority and punishable 
with imprisonment would be replaced by self-regulatory
bodies who would oversee rules intended to ensure
compliance with such nebulous concepts as ’best practice’ 
and the voluntary avoidance of conflicts of interest, all 
the while being financed by the very practitioners they 
regulated. As a recipe for incomprehension and 
inactivity, it had few equals, and so it quickly 
proved."**6 Investor protection cannot be left to an 
unpreclse concept. "It cannot be directed at totally 
eliminating market risk." It is concerned, however, with 
ensuring that risk is identified and managed and 
appropriately disclosed for providing a clear market for
risk investment."*** In other words, the main problem of
i
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investor protection consists in reasonable ba.lance 
between the extent of protection to be afforded to the
customer. Comp fete protection is impossible to achieve,
too burdensome.; and unfair to finance and probably
counter-productive. Overprotection may permit bad 
practice while over-regulation may inhibit innovation and 
product development. As to the extent of the duty of care 
owed by business through its advisors and salesmen, 
clea.rly honesty, probity, integrity and f a. 1 r dealing are 
essential, equally that degree of competence which is
necessary to avoid gross or persistent negligence; but
there is a limit to the degree of competence that may be 
realistically achieved through regulation.**'*
With the Big Bang in 1906, the strategy of investor 
protection has been radically changed. It is now based on 
an increasingly marked distinction between
"institutional" (or "professional” or "business") 
investors, on the one hand, and "private" investors on
the other. There has been increasing recognition for such 
a distinction since the early days of the FSA, comparable
with similar developments in France and Italy a. a
examples. The distinction is based on the consideration 
that the informed professional, regularly active in the 
market, is less in need of protection than the private 
individual. The professional investor too needs a 
regulatory framework governing the conduct of business, 
but this will be different, and In many respects lighter 
in touch, than a regulatory framework appropriate to the 
private investor.**’
These differences have been recognised in the 
formulation of the Core Rules, with the result that 
specific rules, such as those dealing with suitability 
and best advice, do not apply to business transacted 
between professional investors. The same rationale lies 
behind the 1989 amendment by the UK Parliament to the FSA
#
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to limit the right of action under Section 62 to private 
investors.
"Private investor", as a person n o t carrying on 
investment business, is within the meaning of the 
Financial Services (Conduct of Business Rules 1967), not 
a professional investor. The term "private investor" is 
defined by the FSA Regulations 19 91(SI n. 489) in the 
foilow ing terms:
"For the purposes of s.62(1) of the Act, the expression 
"private investor" means an investor whose course of 
action arises as a result of anything he has done or 
suffered
(i) in the case of an individual, otherwise in the course 
of carrying out an investment business,
(ii) in the case of any other person, otherwise than in 
the course of carrying on business of any kind, but does 
not exclude a government, local authority or public 
authority"
Thus, employees of investment businesses, as they do 
not themselves carry on investment business, would be 
"private investors". Furthermore, a human person is a 
priva.te investor wtiether he/she carries on other types of 
busines's or not. Even a human person who does not carry 
on investment business will be a private investor if 
he/she acts outside the course of that investment 
business. As an example, an investment advisor who does 
not carry on the business of actually dealing in 
investment would be a private customer insofar as he/she 
did occasionally deal in investments; or a permitted 
p e r s o n * w h o  does not carry on the investment business 
of investment management would be a private customer 
insofar as he/she occasionally managed management 
investment for, let us assume, a family trust. The term 
"private investor" covers any other kind of person 
"acting otherwise than in the course of carrying on
---------- _______ _
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business of any kind". Thus, legal persons such as 
corporations are only "private investors" insofar as they 
act outside the course of any business.
b . "Private Investo r" and "Private Customer"
The two terms should be compared. The Core Rules 
divide the customers into two classes : (a) private and
(b) n o n - p r i V a. t e customers, with half of the Rules 
applying to private customers only. The definition of a 
private customer is given in the FSA Glossary 1991. Not 
every person for whom investment business is done will 
be a customer. A glossary excludes a market counterparty 
as well as a beneficiary under a trust. Market 
counterparty is itself so defined that, as an instance, 
one broker or broker-dealer with another will be regarded 
as a market counterparty of the other unless one or the 
other of them (or both) is (are) dealing as an agent to 
an identified principal.*** A government local or public 
authority can never be a "private customer" or a "private 
investor" .
The term "private customer" includes any individual 
who is not acting in the course of carrying on investment 
business. So all natural persons investing for themselves 
(or for their families or otherwise) but not by way of 
business are covered. For individuals the only exception 
is where an individual himself is acting in the course of 
carrying on investment business. Thus, as an example, a 
solicitor in sole practice with a certificate from the 
relevant Law Society would be excluded as regards a.ctions 
in the course of carrying on investment business. A 
private customer also includes the so to speak " s m a l 1 
business investors",*** These are companies or
partnerships or trustees who are not excluded by a 
definition of "ordinary business investor". If by virtue 
of size a company or partnership etc, is an ordinary 
business investor, then it will be a non-private
______________
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customer, if it is a customer at all.
Moreover Core Rule 39 e n a bI es the precise border
between private customer and non-private customer to be 
adjusted slightly by one or more of the SROs where the
customer is sufficiently experienced to waive private
customer protection and gives his informed consent.**® A 
comparison between the SIB conduct of business rules and 
the Core Rules indicates the extent to which protection 
previously more widely conferred has now been restricted 
at core rule level to private customers.**'* Sir Cluoas 
explains**® that the term "private investor" is the same 
as defined by the Core Rules which includes within it 
small business investors. In the P l A ’s Approach to 
Regulation**6 the private customer is defined as:
a) a customer who is an individual and who is not acting 
in the course of carrying on investment business; or
b) unless he is reasonably believed to be an ordinary 
business investor, a customer who is a small business 
investor.
The 1SD Directive has introduced the figure of 
"indirect customer": wtier-e a firm is executing an order
it is the nature of the investor from whom the order 
originates (whether private, professional etc) that must 
be considered in determining how conduct of business 
rules should be applied, not the intermediary with whom 
the firm may be dealing directly.***
c , The Personal Investment Authority CPIA)
The formation of the PIA aimed at completing the 
process of distinction and separation between
"institutional" and "private" investors. This may be 
interpreted as a "segr-egatian" of private investors. Be 
that as it may, private investors have in the last decade 
contributed to personal investment business as a matter 
of significant national importance. However, with it has 
grown the possibility of risk(s), with respect to which
-- _
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the PIA as a new SRG is expected to bring together the 
regulation of investment business activities carried on 
for private c u s t o m e r s . p ^ p  this purpose the scope of 
functions of the PIA comprises the sale of life 
insurance, pensions and unit trusts to the private 
investor.229 Sir Clucas has made clear that the term 
"private investor” is employed in the sense of "private 
customer" as defined by the Core Rules, and includes 
small business investors while the term "professional 
investor" covers that class of customer commonly referred 
to as the "institutional i n v e s t o r " . S i r  Clucas uses 
the term "customer" to indicate the responsibility of the 
governing body "to safeguard the interests of 
consumers".  ^^ ‘
In October 1991, concerning the retail sector, the 
SIB had invited Sir Kenneth Clucas to examine whether it 
would be feasible and appropriate to set up a new SRO for 
the retail sector. The study of the scope, structure and 
organisation of a new retail SRO, focusing in particular 
on the regulation of the marketing and selling of pooled 
investment products, were to have regard to :
Ci) the continued delivery of high standards of 
investor protection ;
Cii) the continued availability to consumers of a 
wide choice of financial advice ;
(iii) the importance of self-regulation, that is, of 
those who are regulated, for having sufficient 
responsibility for and commitment to the development and 
implementation of regulation ;
Civ) the importance of cost-effective r e g u l a t i o n . 232
The Clucas Report on Retail Regulation Review, 
published by SIB i n March 1992, proposed to divide the 
SROs into two categories and reduce their number from 
existing four to the fallowing three ;
Ci) A new SRO, called PIA, for the "private
___________. - j
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investor" ;
Cii) I MRO for fund management ; and
Ciii) SFA for exchange related activities.
The last two were conceived as SROs for the 
"institutional" investors, with a division between them 
on the basis of functions. Consequently, LAUTRO and
FIMBRA would cease to exist. IMRO would lose between 20
and 30 per cent of its members to the new SRO, while SFA 
would lose a few members to the new SRO and gain some 
from FIMBRA.233 The new SROs would ensure a proper 
balance between the interests of the organisation or its 
members, on the one side, and the interest of the public 
on the other.
According to the Clucas Report, in the interest of
self-regulation, the proportion of seats filled by
practitioner members should not fall below two-thirds; as 
principal providers of the SRO funds, the product 
providers should have a majority among the seats filled 
by practitioners ; the number of persons appointed to 
represent the public interest should be such as to enable 
them, in combination with either the product providers or 
the independent practitioners to constitute an overall
majority and, at least initially, the chairman should 
come from outside the industry.2%* The role of the public 
interest members was assessed to be crucial, as such 
members should effectively hold the balance between the 
two main groups. The Report also proposed to adopt a 
special voting system in which, instead of one vote per 
member, the number of votes would be calculated by 
reference to the number of the registered individuals of 
the firms. It was moreover proposed that the chairman and 
the public interest members be appointed by the governing 
body itself. The governing body would also have 
competence to remove both the chairman and the public 
interest members from the board. In both instances the
19R
board would act with the agreement of S I B . 2 3 3  This 
proposal could lead to anomalous situations with the 
dependence of the PIA on the S I B  for exercising its 
powers to remove the chairman or the public interest 
members; or through a position of pre-eminence for the 
various public interest members. These assumedly 
represent generally the big economic and financial groups 
of the City in London. Such a powerful position for such 
groups to influence dismissals is not foreseen, or should 
it be assumed as implicitly given or intended?
The proposal that the chairman and the public 
interest members can be ad nutum removed from the board
also appears to be insidious, because the fear of
dismissal could inhibit the process of expressing the 
board’s will, although for dismissal, S l B ’s agreement is 
foreseen as necessary.
The Report proposed also that the enforcement of the 
rules through the process of monitoring should be the 
responsibility of a single organisation within the SRO
and not be divided by reference to type of membership.
Costs incurred by the PIA are of two )<inds : costs
of regulation and the cost of meeting claims for 
compensation- The (? 1 ucas Report underlined that "although 
not a 1 1 costs are capable of being passed on to the 
investors, so far as the product providers are concerned, 
the majority of them ca.n be and are." It is the inabil ity 
of intermediaries, who are paid by commission, to pass 
the costs on that has been the principal cause of 
FIMBRA’ s fiTiancial difficulties.
After the publication of the Clucas Report a new 
company, the Personal Investment Authority Limited, the 
PIA, was formed on December 13, 1992 with the intention
of preparing an application for recognition as an SRO. 
The board of' PIA was drawn from representatives of 
prospective classes of PIA members, and includes also
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pub 1 i c interest représentâtives.z^?
In April 1993, the PIA, in a report on standards, 
underlined the necessity that "Business and their staff 
must have regard to investor protection. This obligation 
stems from the right to do business in an area reserved 
by Parliament to those who are considered ’fit and
pr oper’. Business thus have the prime responsibility to 
ensure their staff deal with customers in an honest and 
competent manner. Business regard for the interest of 
investors could develop naturally into a more genera. 1 
concern to act in the public interest, one of the 
hallmarks of a p r o f e s s i o n . " T h e  regulator should act, 
as far as possible to prevent malpractice occurring
rather than to discover it after the event. The regulator
and business should develop and refine performance 
indicators that provide evidence of the reliability and 
quality of service to customers. The results should be 
made p u b l i c . in discussing the relevant framework 
there was a view that "PIA should restrict its scope and 
activity to the effective monitoring of clear standards
directed essentially at honesty and solvency. .Those 
holding this view have maintained that too detailed an 
involvement in the area of competence by the regulator is 
costly and difficult to regulate. Quality of service is 
better left to the industry where competition, media and 
customer expectations will ensure t h a. I: adequate standards 
continue to develop in the wider context; innovation and 
creativity may be discouraged to the disadvantage of 
/the/ financial services industry both nationally and 
internationally. The majority, however, expressed support 
for the development of a model on the lines outlined.
One can but agree with this approach. As to the 
description of the new regulatory regime, a few points 
deserve emphasis as to
no change in primary legislation ;
 ■  :  . .
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Responsibility for each member of the PIA should 
be allocated to a specific member of the PIA sta.ff, as 
the "monitoring officer" that should be in charge of 
monitoring data supplied by the members and of 
investigating any material fluctuations in any regulatory 
concern arising from the data,®^' To ensure an open and 
direct relationship with all members the PIA should 
nominate a monitoring officer to be responsible for each 
m e m b e r  ;
The PIA should publish a guide to ethical behavior 
for investment advisors. The guide should explain how 
S l B ’s 10 principles will apply as ethical standards for 
personal investment salesmen and ad v i s o  r s . ^ ^
The PÏA should publish a charter for investors,
establishing an outline for the personal investment 
marl<et, the investor's rights and the standards of 
service he/she should e x p e c t . The charter should 
include (i) S l B ’s principles and their application to PIA 
members; (ii) the compensation mechanisms available to an 
investor; and (iii) the question of the cost of 
regulation and compliance.
As to elected members, the criteria for assessment
cî.nd comments on recommendations contained in the Clucas
Report referred to (i) honesty and solvency, (ii) 
competence, (iii) conduct of business, (iv) complaints,
(V ) control environment and compliance regime, and (vi) 
reporting to the regulator.^^^
Responsibility for authorising the business (and 
their principals) as forming the potential membership of 
PIA is quite complex. Insurance companies and friendly 
societies derive their authorisation, particularly as 
regards solvency and honesty, primarily from statutes 
other than the FSA. PIA's rules of honesty are thus 
primarily directed at principals for firms other than 
insurance companies and friendly societies. As to
, gi
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solvency, PIA's rules on it will directly cover all firms 
excluding insurance companies and friendly societies. The 
Report looked carefully at the question of financial
security of businesses and has required that a business 
must have sufficient working capital so that it does not 
come under such financial pressure that controls and 
objectives are threatened in the quest for the next sale.
Concerning competence, P I A ’s rules will cover all 
Involved in advertising and selling, including staff of 
insurance companies and friendly societies, and, where
applicable, principals. Lastly, as transitional
arrangements to follow in approving members of existing 
SROs who wish to join the PIA, the Report has provided 
that "all prospective members of the PIA need to satisfy 
the criteria set by the PIA for admission" and that
"there will be no automatic transfer for members of
existing SROs."?*^ Thus, no one challenges the necessity 
of the PIA as an institution, even if critique and
complex remarks have been submitted: "the existence of
PIA /.,, / i s  inevitable because FINBRA is incapable of
maintaining an independent existence without continued
external funding; while its members,, whose depredations 
cause the largest hole in the investors compensation 
fund, need to be able to find another body who will
accept the responsibility for their regulation in order
to a, 1 low them to continue in business. The life companies 
on the other hand have found it in their interest to
maintain a separate source of business introduction apart 
from that provided by thei. r tied agencies /... / Both
sides will maintain their incestuous relationship all the 
time it is advantageous to them to do so." "The history 
of investor protection since the passing of the Financial 
Services Act 1986 is riddled with examples of investment 
industry prevarication over important reforms and shot
ttirough with illustrations of conflicts of interest. The
■s.
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proposal for the putative Pi A shows no signs of deviating 
from this well-worn path." "The concept of PIA is little 
more than another cynical public relations exercise in 
the reconciliation of the conflicts of interest /... /
foisted on the regulators and the investing public by the 
large insurance companies. There is little wonder that 
banks and the building societies have grave doubts about 
being forced to link up with it as, for them, nothing 
has changed."2*6 In February 1994 have been published the 
P I A ’s approach to Regulations^? and the Memorandum and
Articles of Association.z^e
Art 4.25 of the PIA Approach to Regulation contains 
the "Four-eyes" Principle: No firm will be eligible for
inclusion in a category which would permit it to hold 
client’s money or assets, or to act as portfolio manager, 
unless it is managed by no less than two independent
individuals who are engaged in the day-to-day conduct of 
investment business. This is a new regulatory requirement 
which the Authority considers to be necessary for the 
protection of investors.
Art. 9.1 of the memorandum states that the Board 
shal 1 consist of no more than 21 natural persons 
appointed as Practitioner Directors and as Public 
Interest Directors and a Chairman appointed by the Board. 
The Board shall determine from time to time the precise 
number of Board to be appointed in each category provided 
that at all times the number of Practitioner Directors 
shall be equal to the total of the Public Interest
Directors and the Chairman.
The Boa.rd with the consent of the SIB resolves by a; vote 
of not less tlian 00% of the members of the Board then in
office (excluding the Board member concerned) to remove
the Chairman or a Public Interest Director - p. 21 (Art. 
9.10. (10)).
The Board resolves by a vote of not less than 80% of the
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members of the Board tfien in office (excluding the Board 
Member concerned) to remove a Practitioner Director (pa g . 
22). (Art. 9.16 ( I D )
The Members of the Board hold office until the conclusion 
of the fourth annual general meeting following the date 
of their appointment or r e a. p p o i n t m e n t unless r e a. p p o i n t e d 
(pp.13 e 14) (Arts. 9.5., 9,8. and 9.10.)
Every Member of the General Meetings shall have one vote 
(Art. 7.1 p a g . 9)
In the case of an equality of votes, the chairman of the 
meeting shall be entitled to a second or casting vote
(Art. 6.10. p. 9)
The SIB’s recognition of PIA as long as July 17, 
1994 represents a victory of self-regulation on statutory 
Regulation. Indeed, several institutions were openly 
criticci 1 of the two-tier system and would prefer
statutory Regulation.
Smaller Financial advisors are worried about the
cost of PIA membership and describe it as an "expensive 
irrelevance".^ » o
It is here sub rn it ted that with PIA's constitution
the process of segregation of the investor has moved to a
higher level of sophistication. The front of investors,
now divided into two blocks, is certainly more
vulnerable, not only numerically. Above all, the private 
investor is more vulnerable as he/she no longer can count 
on the allegiance of the "institutional" investor and
thus is deprived of his most powerful sophisticated 
partner of defence. The first phase of the move toward 
separation has been concluded with the division between 
the categories of investors, effecting, as already said, 
the isolation of the private investor, 
d . The Three Tiers of Regulation
i. The new Sett 1ement
The amendment of the FSA in 1990 enabled SIB to put
7ŸT-
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in place a, new three-tier rule structure, as a so to 
speak new settlement. It was intended to extend a wider 
latitude for the rule-making of the SROs and RPBs, with 
SlB's corresponding function prevailing at a strategic 
level, so to speak one step removed from the front line. 
The innovation was welcomed by the industry,^^! with its 
three tiers of regulations ;
-- At the top SIB that lay down a s m a l 1 number of 
general principles a breach of which would lead to 
disciplinary action by regulators, without enabling an 
aggrieved investor to sue ;
-- A middle tier for core rules establishing the 
common regulatory requirements of the system and usable 
for the purpose of claims by investors as well as for 
disciplinary standards ;
-- A third tier of detailed rules tailored by the 
individual bodies to the business of their members. The 
SROs establish the specific of their own rule books 
relating to ttieir specia. 1 fields of operation. In 
propounding their rules, the SROs are obliged to take
into account the cost, to those affected, of complying 
with the relevant rules.
Tfius, rules of conduct rested on a three-layered 
structure with principles at a top tier; core conduct of 
business rules at the middle tier; and the detailed rules 
shaped by the individual regulatory bodies found at the 
t I'l i r d tier.
On the basis of Section 63 of the FSA SIB is 
authorised to designate rules in respect of members of 
SROs, This provision, used for core rules, can be used by 
SIB to prescribe rules if an SRO is unable or unwilling 
to introduce new rules.2=?
SROs and RPBs complemented first-tier principles and 
(for the SROs) core rules with their own third-tier rules 
and guidance as necessary to satisfy SIB that they had an
________________ :_____________________I................ .
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acceptable package of regulatory standards to provide for 
adequate investor protection. Each SRO operated on the 
basis of its own, very detailed set of rules. These had 
to comply with the core rules laid down by SIB, With 
respect to RPBs, SIB did not have the power to designate 
rules for their members as such power would result in an 
"anomalous situation" with regard to the existence of the 
RPBs in a traditionally so to speak autonomous sphere of 
self-regulation unconnected with financial business,===
ii. The Ten Principles
They came into effect in April 1990 as a universal 
statement of general standards expected to be honoured by 
all authorised firms, requiring high standards of 
integrity and fair dealing.
The 10 principles have a very wide field of
application concerning every firm authorised to operate 
under t he FSA 1986, be It by virtue of membership of a 
self -, r e g u 1 a t i n g organisation (SRO), or, as in the case of 
many solicitors, accountants, actuaries and investment 
brokers, by virtue of a certificate issued by the
relevant professional body (RPB). The rules apply also
to firms directly regulated by S 1B .  ^  ^ There are,
however, some inherent limitations affecting the scope of 
application of the 10 rules. The most important of them 
are r-elated to investment business. They are silent on 
the question of territorial application. There is, 
however, an implied limit in that the principles shall 
apply to a firm if it is authorised under the FSA
1986.253 The principles are to apply to an overseas
operator of an UCTS schemers & only in relation to
marketing in the UK.
The application of the 10 principles is specifically ' : t
limited with reference to a so-called "regulated
insurance company" to the marketing of life policie's and
■ the management of investments involving pension funds'
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(see Schedule 10 to the FSA 1986, para. 4.). Furthermore, 
this restriction to marketing and pension funds 
management is applied to the regulation of friendly
societies. !^The principles were adopted for achieving three 
g o a 1s ;
““ Encapsulate, express and build upon best practice ;
"" Be readily understood by all involved in the 
financial markets ; and
-- Be sufficiently general to apply readily to new
5 i t u a t  i o n s . * s 7
Being general in nature, the principles do not give 
rise to actions for damages against firms. Beyond it, 
failure to comply with application of a principle is a 
ground for taking disciplinary action or the exercise of 
intervention powers; but such failure does not of itself 
give rise to any right of action by investors or other
persons affected, nor failure to comply affect the 
validity of a transaction. In general, the principles are 
enforceable (i) by the regulator only, but not by the 
investor ; (i1) as a matter of regulatory discretion and
not as a matter of right ; and Ciii) if it seems likely 
to be in the public interest, for the maintenance and 
improvement of standards, as a higher priority than 
redress. Four types of discipline are set out in Section 
47A(4) of the FSA.^^s They are, however, only relatively 
rarely available, because very many of the firms 
concerned are authorised by an SRO or by certification by 
an RPB. As a result, in most cases the powers of the SRO 
and RPB will be more relevant.
The disciplinary action set out statutorily provides 
for the withdrawal or suspension of authorisation under 
Section 28 or the termination or suspension of
authorisation under Section 33. These two powers,
available to the SIB, are relevant only where the person
7______________1________ :_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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concerned is authorised directly by the SIB itself 
(Section 25), or the person concerned is a so-called 
"Europerson", that is, a person authorised, pursuant to 
Section 31, to carry on investment business in the UK by 
virtue of being authorised in another member state of the 
European Community (now the EU), The SROs or RPBs may 
exercise their disciplinary powers also for Issuing a 
disqualification direction under Section 59. All in all, 
it can be said that a wide power is available to the SIB 
in respect of any individual, because the fact that an 
individual is in or works for a firm authorised by an SRO 
or RPB does not remove S I B ’s jurisdiction. The latter 
shall be exercisable only if it appears to the SIB that 
the person concerned is not a fit and proper person to be 
employed in investment business of a general or of a 
particular kind. Therefore, although all 10 principles 
are specifically directed at firms, breach of them by a 
person, in his capacity as the alter ego of a firm, or as 
employed or appointed representative, will necessarily 
make them relevant to this form of disciplinary action.
Disciplinary action anchored statutorily as to 
"making a public statement" under Section 60 is 
restricted to a narrow class of firms authorised by 
virtue of Section 22 (insurance companies). Section 23 
(friendly societies not a member of a SRO), Section 24 
(operators or trustees of UCITIS scheme from another EU 
member state), Section 25 (persons directly authorised by 
the SIB, and Section 31 (already mentioned "europersons", 
Generally speaking, the power of the SIB extends only to 
those regulated by it in the conduct of their investment 
business, with. an exception applying to insurance 
companies, irrespective of the circumstance whether they 
ai^e members of the relevant SRO (LAUTRO) or not.
The SIB 'may apply for an injunction, interdict or 
other order under Section 61, in proceedings where there
-- ~
3 0 8
is a reasonable likelihood that a person will contravene 
or has contravened any provision related to the 10 
principles. The court may make an injunction (interdict 
in Scotland) averting or prohibiting the
contravention.^®'» it is possible that a, firm or 
individual not carrying on any investment business could 
be made the subject of an order under Section 61 if the 
Court were satisfied that there had been a breach of a 
principle by an authorised firm, and that someone else 
had been "knowingly concerned" in the contravention.
The power of intervention under Section 47A can be. 
unleashed not least with due regard to the desirability 
of protecting investors. The exercise of this power is 
referable to tribunal and the action can be taken 
immediately.***
As to the various SROs and RPBs, they have taken 
action to enable their disciplinary and intervention 
systems to take account of breaches of principles. This 
has generally been done by making the principles a matter 
of direct obedience and relevant to the "fit and proper" 
test. However, in the case of some of the SROs, it is 
possible to foresee that a breach of a principle might be 
relevant in the context of consumer redresses, whether in 
the course of the disciplinary system itself or in other 
way s,* * ‘
1) On June 21, 1990 SIB made the Five Core Rules for
Financial Supervision expressed at a high level of 
generality. They were different from the core rules 
because they did not give rise to civil liability,®** 
These rules were designed so as to apply to a 1 1 SRG 
members, save for the insurance companies, friendly 
societies, and those not subject to any financial
isupervision rules,
2. In January 1991 SIB made and deregulated forty 
conduct of business rules, generally known as Core Rules.
_____________________________ __
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Made by the SIB they are situated at the middle tier of 
the regulatory system. Expanding the 10 principles, they 
apply directly to firms regulated by the SROs.
Situated at the middle tier level, the core rules 
can be invoked for the purposes of claims by investors as 
well as for disciplinary purposes. They are, unlike 
principles, enforceable under Sections 62 and 62A of the 
FSA 1966, They give rise to civil liability in the same 
way as the conduct of business rules made by an SRO.
A so-to"speak polarisation rules has been proposed 
by the SIB as a safeguard for investors for guaranteeing 
the independence of intermediaries active in the field of 
life assurance and unit trusts. The purpose of 
polarisation has been to clarify the legal status of 
persons offering assurance, in such a way that a client 
may know whether he is dealing with a representative of a 
company limited to the sale of a determined series of 
products, or whether he has to do with an intermediary 
who is totally independent and Is acting as an agent for 
client. The Introduction of this rule was accompanied by 
an ample debate in Parliament.®*^ R.B. Jack® * ^ has 
rightly observed that specifically with respect to this 
rule the Director General of Trade has lost the battle. 
In spite of the danger pointed out by the Director 
General to the effect that the application of such a rule 
could generate distortions in competition, the Secretary 
of State preferred to give precedence to the protection 
of investors, Lloyds Bank was first in the application of 
the polarisation rule,®*®
The core rules were brought into force for members 
of IMRO and SFA, but in view of the expected recognition 
of a new SRO for retail investment business, they have 
not been brought into force for the members of LAUTRO and 
FIMBRA or for firms directly regulated by the SIB itself. 
In October 1991 SIB made two sets of Client Money
■
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Regulations, the Financial Services (Client Money) 
Regulation 1991 CCMRs) and the Financial Services (Client 
Money) (Supplementary) Regulation 1991 (SCRHs), which 
came into force on 1 January 1992. The CRMs were
deregulated so as to apply to all SROs; the SCRMs were
not deregulated for members of IMRO and SFA.
V . The Rules of the Third Tier
SROs and RPBs complemented the principles and (for 
the SROs) the core rules with their own "third tier
rules" and guidance as necessary to satisfy the SIB, that
they had a package of regulatory standards which would 
provide adequate investor protection. Each SRO had its 
own very detailed set of rules complying with the core 
rules laid down by the SIB, They were tailored by the 
individual regulatory bodies to the business of their 
respective members. Firms had to comply with the 
requirements set by the respective regulatory body and to 
make sure that individuals within their firms acted 
accordingly. The SIB itself had the task to ensure that 
the third-tier rules were in line with the core rules. 
Some have wondered asking whether this aspect of the New 
Settlement was a mirage,®**
4. The Report of May 1993 by A. La.rge, S I B ’s 
Chairman, explained the need for SIB to put greater 
emphasis on its role as guardian of standards of investor 
protection and to adopt a more restrained approach to the 
exercise of its formal legislative powers, so as to allow 
the recognised bodies more latitude in their use of rules 
and other mechanisms for securing practical observance of 
the requisite standards. Accordingly the report concluded 
that SIB should designate rules only when this would be 
clearly more efficient and effective for the system than 
rule making by individual bodies, and looked forward to 
the dedesignation of the existing core rules.
Then, the Financial Services (Dedesignation) R u 1e s
'1
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and Regulations 1994 that came into force on 1 December 
1994, dedesigna ted the Core Rules (with two limited
exceptions of Rule 5 (3) and Rule 36), the CMRS (with
certain exceptions) and the SCRMS and core financial
rules (completely).
6. Dedesignation is based on :
(i) SRO rule changes will be made only after appropriate 
consultation, with SIB and externally;
(ii) Where significant changes to the substance of 
dedesignated rules and regulations is contemplated, the 
SRO will spell out the standard of investor protection it 
is proposing to adopt, and SIB will need to be satisfied 
with the standards envisaged;
(iii) SIB will look to the SRO to demonstrate that, 
though a combination of rules and other delivery 
m e c h a. n i sms , coupled witfi effective enforcement, those 
standards will be maintained;
(iv) the setting of standards on issues which straddle a 
number of recognised bodies will be done in a way that Is 
sensitive to the interests of the recognised bodies 
concerned and to the value of reasonable coherence in the 
system as a whole; and
(V ) any changes to the rules will take account of the
requirements of EC directives and jurisprudence.
7. SIB believes that the Core Rules, the Client 
Money Regulations and the core financial rules by and 
large embody a sensible level of investor protection, and 
dedesignation should not be taken as a sign that SIB no 
longer subscribes to the standards that were built into 
these rules and regulations.
Dedesignation will, however, have an impact on S I B ’s 
enforcement powers. Before dedesignation, SlB could take 
action against an SRO member for breach or potential 
breach of a designated rule or regulation under section 
Gi(l) FSA. After dedesignation SIB is able to proceed
------------- ..................... .............. ..
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only if the SRO in question is unable or unwilling to 
take the appropriate action itself (section 61(2) FSA).
Vi , The Regulatory Rules and Common Law and 
Equitab le Rights
Among the powers conferred by the FSA on the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (now HM 
Treasury) and delegated to the SIB is, as a very
important one, the power to make rules and regulations 
governing authorised persons’ conduct in the fields of 
business, financial resources, clients' money and 
unsolicited calls. This raises the question of the
I’elationstiip between the regulatory rules, on the one
hand, and the general law in the form of common law and
equitable rights. The question may involve a big problem. 
For example, the fear is that compliance with the rules 
made by the SIB and by the SROs may not necessarily 
absolve firms from liability under the general 1 aw on 
tort (delict in Scotland) or contract, or for breach of 
fiduciary duty. This means that a firm may expose itself 
to liability under the invariable more onerous 
obligations obtaining under general law. "The most widely 
held view today is that the general law is not abrogated 
unless the FSA makes express provision for the 
modification of common law and equitable rights". The 
result is a double layer: the rules made under the
legislation and behind these fiduciary duties and other 
common law rules. In April 1992 an interim
consultation paper (No. 124, IIMSO) was published by the 
Law Commission on fiduciary duties and the regulatory 
rules. The relationship between the regulatory rules and 
the general law is still being considered by the Law 
Commission, albeit Professor David Nayton underlined the 
problems of interface between certain rules and the 1 aw 
of trusts in a. report commissioned by the SIB and IMRO 
over six years ago. Given the regulatory jungle which now
__________________
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exists, it is not surprising that sooner or later the 
relationship of regulatory and diciplinary proceedings 
and civil and criminal proceedings would come before the 
cour ts.2**
From "Equivalence" to "Adequate" Investor Protection
The emergence of investor protection in the UK has 
been shaped and characterised by "re-thinkings", "re­
assessments" not least related to a pragmatism that best 
solutions may be best found and adjusted by coping with 
an evolving situation and its challenges, as in English 
case law tradition, Instead of trying to shape it in 
final details through a priori meticulous regulation. In 
the sphere of investor protection, for a better 
understanding of developments since the 1980s, it is 
important to remember that prior thereto stock market 
regulation was from the beginning based on a liberal or 
laissez-faire approach, in which the market participants 
played a major role, and this tradition favoured the 
application of a corresponding principle expressed and 
sublimated in the notion of self-regulation.
After the FSA 1986 a first re-thinking or re­
assessment amending the FSA resulted in the Companies Act 
1989, changing the "equivalence" test into the "adequacy" 
test for protecting investors. The FSA initially provided 
investors with a protection at least "equivalent" to that 
provided by the SIB, Under the equivalence test the SIB 
needed to be satisfied that the rulebooks of the SROs or 
RPBs provided protection at least equivalent to that 
provided by the SIB rulebook (Schedules 2 and 3, FSA). 
Requirements for the recognition of SROs and RPBs 
provided that their rules had to afford investor 
protection at least equivalent to that afforded by the 
rules and regulations at the time established by and in 
force for the SIB. In its short history the "equivalence" 
process cond itioned that for initial recognition, the
____ ___
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SROs and the RPBs should have their own rulebooks for 
their own members In the light of an initial rulebook of 
the SIB covering the whole investment business. The 
result was that the rulebooks of the SROs, inspired after 
the original core rulebook of the SIB, were considered to 
be complex, hardly clear, very long, too detailed with 
legalistic formulations. The City In London, as an 
establishment with firm roots in tradition linked with 
practical experience, put up a compact front against the 
"equivalence" test. "A common view within the financial 
services sector was that SIB should have produced a much 
briefer set of rules, merely setting out general 
principles which SROs could take into account in 
formulating their own more detailed rules. This theory is 
strengthened by the fact that core rules have to apply to 
all the SROs which cover a wide range of different
financial services".^*’*' The rulebooks drafted under great 
time pressure and subject to considerable legal influence 
were widely perceived by the industry as too legalistic 
and detailed. The continuing pressure on the part of the 
firms and recognised bodies, for clarification, 
modification and explanation led in November 1988 to a 
proposal for a new approach to SI B ’s Conduct of Business 
Rules, and the Companies Act 1989 amended the FSA 
introduction to a New Settlement between the SIB, on the 
one hand, and the SROs and RPBs on the other. The three- 
tier system of regulation was adopted in a political 
climate favouring greater flexibility. It was influenced 
by SROs and RPBs favouring the recognition of the
"adequacy" test and the abandonment of the "equivalence" 
test.
The new adequacy test substituted a broad judgement 
to be delivered on the adequacy of the level of investor
protection. It responded to the question whether the
S R O ’s rules, taken together with the S I B ’s core rules and
_____
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principles provide adequate protection for investors. 
Therewii:li the test to be applied by the SIB to the 
rulebooks of SROs and RPBs revolved around "adequacy" 
instead of "equivalence", thereby providing a greater 
margin of flexibility.
The concept of adequacy applies to both rules and 
procedui'GS. Adequacy is not simply established at the 
point of recognition but goes further and must continue 
to be maintained. The assessment by the SIB of an 
individual S R O ’s or R P B ’s adequacy in meeting recognition 
standaids is therefore defined as an ongoing process 
w ti i c h the SIB assesses in a similar way.
In respect of rules the SIB will be concerned to
verify that the rules of an individual RPB continue to
provide an adequate level of Investor protection. This
will be look'ed at in the context of other rulebooks to 
ensure that similar standards apply to all
constituencies. While the FSA provides that core rules 
by the SIB shall not apply to the RPBs, all RPBs have,
nonetheless, to ensure in their rulebooks tha t the
requirements of the core rules are adequately reflected 
in ttiem. Of material relevance is the point that when 
legislating, the SIB, the SROs and the RPBs are to be
required now to take Into account costs of compliance in 
deciding how best a given investor protection objective 
should be achieved.
f . Ac tJ^ on_ for Damages ; From Section 62 to Sec t i on
62A of the Financial Services Act
The second "re-thinking" of the British legislator 
has concerned the restriction affecting private
investors’ right to bring an action for damages under 
Section G2 of the FSA that concerns an action for damages 
for breach of certain rules and regulations made under 
the FSA.27 0
It is here submitted that the effected restriction
, » :
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entails possibly incalculable damage involving a division 
within the category of investors, weakening the position 
of the "private investors".
The contraventions actionable under Section 62 are 
many and various. The core conduct of business rules, 
unlike the principles, give rise to civil liability in 
the same way as the conduct of business rules made by an 
SRO. This means that the core rules would be enforceable 
by a civil action under Section 62. Actions apply, in
addition, to breaches of restrictions on business or
dealing witli assets (section 71(1)), violations of
certain authorised unit trust provisions (Section 01(4)) 
and 95); failure to furnish Information as requested by 
the SIB (sections 104(4) and 176(5)); violation of 
certain provisions relating to the insurance business
(Section 130(7)); banking business (Section 105(6)); and 
violation of the Rules of Friendly Societies (Schedule 
11(22) (41)); contraventions of prospectus rules as to a
false or misleading prospectus (SS 171(6)); or breach of 
a DTI notice limiting a foreign power to conduct
investment business in the UK (Section 185(6)),
From the start Section 62 in its original version 
caused much controversy and generated much opposition. 
Young feared that Section 62 "might cause a flight of 
international investment business from London to
financial centres overseas".*?' Section 62 was also 
blamed for the fact that the original rule books were too 
long and legalistic. As they in effect imposed duties, 
breaches of which were actionable, the original draftsmen 
sought to define the duties in question very precisely.
Had they not done so, it would have been left to the
courts to define the precise scope of the liability in
question. This would encourage litigation and give the 
courts greater control over the liabilities imposed. The 
relevant business community of the City in London
 : : ' .
317
considered Section 62 to be a weapon too powerful in the 
hands of the business investor, and called for remedies. 
In consequence of such strong reactions the 
implementation of Section 62 was postponed as far as 
breaches of the SRO and RPB rulebooks were concerned. 
Section 62, rendering the S I B ’s rulebook actionable, was 
brought in the meantime into force on December 1st 1987; 
Section 62 to the extent it pertained to SRO and RPB 
rulebooks, was brought into force only on October 3, 
1980. Independently therefrom, the Government announced 
their intention to amend Section 62, and in September 
1990 the DTI published a consultative document on 
"Defining the Private Investor". After two and a half 
years,*?* the Companies Act 1909, which came into force 
on April 1st, 1991, amended Section 62 of the FSA 1986 by 
adding Section 62A.
The new Section 62A confined the right to bring an 
action for damages under Section 62 to private investors 
only: "No action in respect of a contravention to which
s62 applies shalI at the suit of a person other than a 
private investor". The SFA 1986 (Restriction of the Right 
of Action) Regulations drew a distinction between 
individuals and other investors in the sense that they 
provided for the case when an individual would be treated 
as a private investor and therefore will fall within the 
scope of Section 62A.
Effectively, Section 62A curtailed the availability 
of Section 62, providing that civil liability under 
Section 62 for breach of rules and regulations made under 
the FSA, which include, for instance, the conduct of 
business rules by the SIB and the rules of any of the 
SROs under the Act such as LAUTRO, FIMBRA and TSA (The 
Securities Association) shall not be available except at 
the suit of private investors. Thus, within the space of 
three years the Government had given access to a civil
_________________L____ :_________ :___  ■
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action to the victim of a contravention of the CBRs and 
then cancelled it before it was ever invoked and before
Its availability had been delineated properly in the
court,* ?’
The restrictions of the rights of action under
Section 62 was very welcome for the City of London. The 
reason for the restriction of the right of action to 
private investors was a matter of fervent concern 
expressed by both practitioners and institutions to the
DTI, with reference to the apparent breadth and 
considerable vagueness of the original Section 62. The 
DTI proved sensitive to the concern, and Lord Young
summarised the position of the proposed amendment to the 
original Section 62 by stating that "Section 62 would
lead to an excessively litigious approach /... / I have
therefore decided to legislate to remove the right to sue 
under Section 62 from practitioners and professional 
investors".*** Part of the interested expert authors 
observed more cautiously that it was feared it would 
encourage an undesirable litigious climate in financial 
services dealings. Such fears were probably exaggerated
as Section 62 merely adds a cause of action to others
likely to exist already at common law.**® Moreover, there 
was emphasised reference to some problems which the
introduction of Section 62A may generate, as the
definition of private investor has essentially relied on 
the old legal chestnut of what constitutes "carrying on 
business". The relevant DTI document stated that "most
charities and similar bodies do not carry on any form of 
business and would therefore retain their s 62 rights for 
all purposes". The Institute of Chartered Accountants 
expressed disquiet as to this aspect of the DTI 
definition document. It was felt that in fact charities
and similar bodies may well "carry on business". The
implication is that trustees for a class of persons who
__ ________
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might not sue individually, such as pension fund managers 
or charitable businesses, will be included in the 
definition of private investor for the purposes of 
Section G2A. It has also been observed*?* that one must 
question whether Section 62A goes far enough and, how fair 
its operation might prove to be. As it stands, the right 
of action is restricted to "private investors" acting 
other than in the course of investment business. 
Furthermore, any other person, such as a company but not 
including governments, local and public authorities, will 
only be eligible to take an action as a "private 
investor" where the loss incurred by them arose other 
than In the course of carrying on business of any kind. 
The effect of this is that a small company which, for 
example, subscribes for securities or unit trusts and 
does so other than in a professional capacity, will still 
fall outside the ambit of Section 62A, together with much 
larger or sophisticated or financially experienced 
undertakings, purely on the basis that it operates for 
the purpose of carrying on a business. At the same time, 
all private individuals will fall within the definition 
of "private investor" other than where they carry on 
investment business, irrespective of any special skill or 
knowledge they may possess. The term "private customer" 
used for the core rules extends to certain small 
businesses, that is, companies, partnerships or trustees 
which do not satisfy certain size requirements. Thus, a 
small company acting in the course of its business may be 
a. "private customer" for the purposes of the SIB rulebook 
but Would not be a "private investor" for the purposes of 
Section 62A. It is unfortunate that these differences in 
definition and terminology have arisen between the S I B ’s 
new rulebook and the Section 62A regulations. Although 
the two concepts, "private customer" and "private 
investor" are used in different contexts -- the S I B ’s
l|
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rulebook being concerned with the matter of according 
greater protection to "private customers" and the Section 
02A regulations being concerned with limiting the extent 
to which actions may be brought for breaches of the 
financial services regime it is not obvious why the
Section G2A regulations did not confine Section 62 
actionability to those persons who are treated by the SIB 
as "private customers", if such persons are regarded by 
the SIB as deserving greater protection, then the DTI 
could and should have well taken the view that they also 
are deserving of being able to bring an action under 
Section 62. In the event, the Section 62A regulations use 
slightly different criteria in drawing the limits of 
Section 62 actionability than the SIB rulebook in drawing 
the limits of its greater protection for certain 
investors. It should be, lastly, noted that the three 
justifications given for the introduction of Section 62A 
have been (i) simplification of the rulebooks; (ii) 
deterring "excessive litigation" and (iii) withholding 
the option of section 62 from those who could be expected 
to use other more suitable remedies. One may remark that 
the rulebooks could have well undergone simplification 
without the restriction in Section 62A. In reality, since 
the promulgation of the Conduct of business Regime in 
1967, there have been very few instances where Section 62 
has been pleaded in out-of-court dealings and no reported 
cases are known in which it has been invoked and 
successfully argued in court. This may suggest that the 
Government, in making the change, was attempting to 
restrict sizeable claims rather than truly unwarranted 
claims.*?? It may be also added that one of the motives 
behind the introduction of Section 62A may be that of 
splitting the until then compact front of investors.
The failure on the part of investors to make use of 
Section 62A was recently referred to by Andrew Large in
 '
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the following terms: "it is intriguing to me, in this
neglect, to note that Section 62 has very rarely been
used, to our knowledge, to seek redress where a private 
investor has lost out in consequence of a breach of an
FSA rule".:7B
g • .1 Jiy_g5.tigat i on and E n forcement
i, Compliance and Enforcement
Compliance has an essentially preventive meaning, as 
it is primarily concerned witii ensuring that tilings do 
not go wrong. Firms have to comply with the requirements 
set by the regulatory bodies and to make sure that
individuals within their firms act accordingly. 
Recognised bodies have to comply with the standards set 
by the SIB and the SIB has to comply with the
requirements of designation under the FSA.
Enforcement is essentially a reactive response to 
violation of a rule. It generally becomes relevant once 
compliance has failed. Enforcement is one of the means to 
achieve Investor protection from undue risk or abuse of 
counterparty insolvency and, where losses do occur, to
maximise recovery of private investors' assets within 
reasonable cost.
The British system attributes to the control
authority a series of administrative and investigative 
powers (sections 64-71 of the FSA) as well as sanctioning 
competences resulting up to the withdrawal of the
authorisation (Section 20 FSA).::'' The FSA enables under
Sections 12 (for SROs), 20 (RPBs), 37 (RlEs), 39 (RCHs) 
the SIB to go to the High Court to seek compliance orders 
where it believes a recognised body is not meeting the 
terms of its recognition or has failed to comply with any 
other obligation to which it Is subject under the FSA. 
The FSA enables the SIB, furthermore, to make an order 
revoking the recognition of a (recognised) body. They 
have been seen as something like a nuclear weapon,
________
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cumbersome, and in the case of de-recognition powers, not 
necessarily appropriate for use in relation to a
particular limited shortfall in standards.
In the area of enforcement, unlike that of rules and 
recognition, the FSA provides for a division of powers 
between the SIB, on the one hand, and the recognised
bodies on the other, rather than parallel or overlapping 
powers.:®* Some powers, for example, of investigation
(Section 105) or to petition for compulsory winding up 
(Section 72) are entrusted only to the SIB, They may be 
used at the request or with the consent of the recognised 
body, or in the case of Section 105, if the body is
unable or unwilling to act. Conversely, the SIB does not 
have the punitive power, for example, to impose a fine, 
over firms regulated by a recognised body. The initial 
reason for it was to obtain a clear distinction between 
public law bodies on the one hand and private law bodies 
on the other, and to create strong second-tier bodies. 
Large is of the opinion that such a division of powers 
leaves room for doubt.:®:
The SIB believes that itself and the SROs are 
provided w i t li a substantial armoury of regulatory 
sanctions,:®^ The SROs can issue warnings or reprimands, 
impose fines, suspend and, as an ultimate sanction, even 
withdraw authorisation from their members. The SIB has 
similar powers over the firms it regulates. In respect of 
SIB regulated firms and members of SROs the SIB can, in 
appropriate cases, initiate civil proceedings for 
injunctions to prevent breaches of rules and safeguard 
investors' money, and can, under certain circumstances, 
petition the Court for the winding up of companies, and 
for administration orders under insolvency
legislation.:®* With respect to firms which should be 
authorised but operate without authorisation, the SIB has 
powers of initiating criminal prosecution and can
_____ _____________________
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institute civil proceedings for injunctions to stop such 
firms trading and to restore clients' money. The penalty 
for the relevant offence can include up to two years
imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine.:»® The SIB has in
addition formal powers of investigation with criminal
sanctions in the event of obstruction, and can disqualify 
individuals from employment in the investment 
i ndus try.:»6
The SIB is responsible for investigating and
responding both to complaints about its own directly
regulated business f.DRBs) and complaints about all 
regulators operating under the FSA, including Itself. 
Under the FSA (schedule 7, para 5), the SIB has 
responsibilities to assist other regulators outside the 
FSA system, both within the UK and internationally. The 
SIB has also an interest in effective enforcement on
areas where the authority to prosecute and in some 
instances to investigate, lies with other institutions, 
for example, with reference to insider dealing or market 
malpractice prosecutions. These responsibilities and 
interests give the SIB a significant role in c o ­
ordinating investigations and enforcement across 
boundaries between the financial services system, on the 
one h a n d , and other systems on the other, for example, 
with respect to cases arising out of home Income plans, 
where in addition to firms regulated within the financial 
services system, also banks, building societies and law 
firms acting outside their capacity as authorised firms 
are involved,
SlB's enforcement role has been rightly considered 
weaker than its role in rules and policy making. The SIB 
has preferred to limit its involvement in matters of
financial fraud, for example, by not. requesting the DTI
to delegate to it powers to prosecute market manipulation 
offenses under Section 47 of the PSA. It is clear that
 ______________________________ ;__________________   - '7
3 2 4
enforcement is a crucial element in Investor protection 
and a regulatory system is difficult to enforce all the 
time effectively. One of the crucial points provoking the 
modification of the old system, based essentially on the 
Prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act .1958, was the 
failure to enforce the relevant provisions of the Act.^®^ 
A succession of scandals, symptoms of malaise in an 
agonising system have been decisive factors in inducing 
the end of the old system. The new system, expected to 
reach a prompt, effective and vigorous prosecution of 
securities law violations, "has not thwarted commercial 
fraud, nor created an aura of effectiveness".^®® It is 
still widely perceived as failing to "catch the crooks" 
and to prosecute effectively those who have been caught. 
The Roskill Committee of the Police Fraud Squads has 
reported that the public no longer had confidence in the 
ability of the criminal justice system to bring 
perpetrators of serious fraud expeditiously and 
effectively to book. The Committee has expressed the view 
that the public was probably justified in its view.^®?
It may be currently asked whether the situation is 
radically different. New scandals and above all their 
size and significance have inspired a lack of confidence 
in the ability of the system to deliver a regime which 
provides effective deterrents against fraud and other 
malpractice and, beyond it, appropriate retribution where 
wrongdoing occurs. The effectiveness and therewith the 
credibility of any regulatory system depends to a great 
extent on the sanctions which reliably underpin it.
Financial services enforcement has three principal 
e 1 ement s ; ^ o
Ca) Prevention, including screening and the
elimination from financial services industry of all
obviously unsuitable firms and individuals ;
Cb) Information gathering, consisting of the
 —
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creation of an effective monitoring and reporting system 
extending from within the firm itself to the self- 
regulating body up to the SIB ; and
(c) Deterrence, including prompt prosecution and 
sanctioning of violators.
Prevention is pursued primarily and prophylactically 
through authorisation of Investment business. Once a 
self-regulating organisation is authorised, it bears the 
principal responsibility for its own governance through 
the promulgation of its governing rules and discipline of 
its members. Monitoring and information gathering powers 
force firms to create procedures that will contribute to 
compliance. The full framework expected to achieve 
investor protection under the SFA 1966 comprises:^?' (i) 
entry vetting, (ii) authorisation only for those fit and 
proper, (iii) setting out in principles and rules 
behavior required of authorised firms, (1v ) insisting on 
compliance by firms with the principles and rules, Cv) 
procedures for proper handling of investor's complaints, 
(vi) enforcement against non-complaint firms, (vii) 
compensation for private investors suffering
irrecoverable losses.
The SlB's powers do not for the most part extend 
beyond the defined boundaries of investment business, and 
the SlB's own enforcement activities lie within these 
boundaries. Matters outside them are referred to other 
relevant authorities, often to the D T 1.® ^  Therewith it 
may be implied that there are other legal requirements of 
significance to investors, arising under other spheres of 
law, company law as an example, and within the SFA 
Sections 47 and 57 apply to the statements and conduct of 
any person, that is, not just to those of persons 
carrying on investment business. Beyond the financial 
services system, different bodies Involved in matters of 
significance for investors' interests include the
.  .
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Treasury, with responsibility for insider trading and
market manipulation; the DTI, with powers of
investigation and prosecution; the Bank of England, with 
responsibilities under the Banking Act; the Stock 
Exchange as a market surveillance authority; the SFO for 
serious fraud cases. Within the financial ' services
system, the SIB has certain powers of investigation, of 
supervision of the RIEs, and of SROs concerned with on- 
and“off exchange trading. It goes without saying that all 
are interested in ensuring efficiency in the spheres of 
compliance and enforcement,*^3 There is, however, concern 
at the multiplicity of the parties involved both inside 
and outside the system, as all inevitably have different 
and differing priorities. In its Report for 1991/1992, 
the SIB expressed concern at the complexity of the law 
and the fragmentation of powers among institutions
involved in prosecuting financial fraud, indicating that 
the situation would make success uncertain.*^* SlB's
priority is to stop always any continuing abuse or risk 
of abuse, and, whether it believes there has been theft 
or other serious crime, to refer the matter to the 
appropriate criminal prosecutor. Beyond it, the SIB is 
not a prosecuting agency for anything other than the 
offence of conducting investment business without 
authorisation.?*® It is responsible for following up any 
indication that a person or firm may be carrying on 
invest business without the authorisation. This activity 
of the SIB is often referred to as "policing the 
pe rimeter". =
In detecting "perimeter" contraventions, the SlB's 
role in investigating and prosecuting unauthorised 
investment business does not extend to prosecuting fraud 
which accompanies the most serious cases of such 
"perimeter" contraventions. The SlB's 'policy has thus far 
given priority to stop the offending a^otivity and seek a
-------------____
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court injunction or restitution of investment in
unauthorised business,?*? The SIB carries out also some 
enforcement work, with respect to "authorised" firms, 
that is, those within the perimeter or boundary of the 
system and authorised to be active.?*® i
7’he SROs and RPBs, to wliom the vast majority of
authorised firms belong as members, have in their rules
substantial enforcement powers over their respective
me mbers.
G . Re s uj_t s ; C r i tical Rema rks
1993/1994 enforcement continued to be a significant 
SIB activity, as reflected by increasing case figures,?** 
Fraud cases referred for criminal investigation decreased 
from 61 in 92/93 to 42 in 93/94. Of 217 cases referred 
for criminal investigation from 1908 to 1994, 67 are
still under criminal investigation.*®” To improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of its own and other 
enforcement work, the SIB has initiated a Shared 
Intelligence Service, of great significance with due
regard to the saying that God and the devil are in the
d e t a. i Is.
Enforcement in SlB's work is entrusted to a
specialist team of some 20 staff members, with additional 
external resources used for the largest investigations 
and on litigation and trusteeships.*” * In 1993/94 the 
total number of case files opened was 457,*®? In 1992/93 
it had been 410.*”*
In a period of five years in the early 1990s, the 
SIB and the recognised bodies have encountered over 150 
cases where the investment business abuse has been 
sufficiently serious to warrant referral to the police or 
the Serious Fraud Office; trials have been completed in 
63 of these cases with convictions obtained against more 
than 90 per cent of the defendants.
In spite of above positive results mentioned by the
 ] ' !  ^ , ■
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SIB in its report for 1992/1993, severe criticisms and 
grave doubts have been expressed on the incapacity of the 
enfo I-cement system in eliminating fraud and therewith 
defending investors' interests and also the national as
well as the international reputation and competitive
position of London as a traditionally very important 
centre for investment activities. Large*”® recognises 
that in the field of enforcement the FSA is not an ideal 
instrument, and that if, in practice, the present powers 
prove to be inadequate to achieve a fully efficient two- 
tier system, he will not hesitate to advise the
Chancellor of the Exchequer accordingly. He underlined 
that the SIB has not sufficiently used its power under 
Section 59 of the FSA to bar individuals from the 
i n d u s t r y .  * ” *■
On February 28, 1994 SIB used the power under
section 59 of the FSA for the first disqualification of 
unfit individuals,*”? This relates to Mr Roger Levitt. 
The SIB statuted that under s 59 the SIB Board was not 
permitted to refer to the disqualified person by name, Mr 
Levitt was sentenced to only 180 hours Community service, 
it has been pointed out*”® that "the naming of those who 
have broken the rules has long been the big gun of the 
more competent ancj braver self-regulators"
Why it has taken SIB so long to adopt the use of 
these powers, is a question which will no doubt continue 
to remain unanswered,*”*
Furthermore Large observed that SIB has not so far 
used its power enshrined in Section 60 of the FSA to 
criticise authorised persons publicly. The power in 
question is limited at present to persons directly
authorised by the SIB, presumably on the ground that
other bodies could and would take and include a similar
power in their rules to make similar statements publicly 
about their members. The result is that the statutory
_________________
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power is available only for a very small part of the 
regulated universe;**” and it may be prosaically wondered 
if hesitation or inhibition to use the power of "public 
exposure" has also to do with the otherwise commendable 
spirit of solidarity which members and "boys" belonging 
to the same Institutions and social or professional 
positions have cultivated and maintained in business and 
other spheres of human and professional activity. Large 
has also explained that the SIB cannot and should not 
confine itself to being the setter of standards;*** it 
should give greater priority to prosecution and should 
work even more closely than hitherto with criminal
prosecutors to achieve greater speed and efficiency, for 
example, through the use of plea bargaining,**? In
summary, Large does not see the SlB's role in seeking to 
take on the recognised bodies’ enforcement role.
Recognised bodies should take the lead in their own
enforcement cases,*'* He does not see SlB's enforcement 
role talcing it further into areas of criminal 
prosecution, that is, beyond the Involvement it currently
has in policing the perimeter and in preparing other
cases for transmission to the prosecuting authorities.**< 
More serious are observations by Fishman; "The
inability of British authorities successfully to uncover 
and prosecute commercial fraud has long been notorious.
The prosecutorial structure has been altered and
reorganised under the new framework of investor 
protection with little apparent result", "FSA has made 
only superficial changes In the mechanism of
prosecution."**® He envisages that "SIB should be solely 
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of 
commercial fraud and compliance with reporting
lequirements. It would still oversee the enforcement
efforts of SROs and other authorised bodies who would 
refer matters to it for prosecution.*'*** Lastly, he
____________
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concludes that "it is time to recognise that self­
regulation within a . statutory framework has failed. In 
its stead should be created a mixed system of 
governmental and self-regulation headed by a governmental 
body similar in authority to the SEC. The most sensible 
future role of the SIB may be as the Government’s 
compliance, investigative and enforcement arm or as a 
separate, independent governmental agency. Enforcement
should be apolitical." "All enforcement duties should be 
removed from DTI, Special courts should be created to 
handle sophisticated commercial fraud. This would allow 
judges involved in such, cases to develop the expertise
needed."*’?
All the above critical remarks may be justified, but 
they do not touch, at least, explicitly, the fundamental 
question of "dosage" or combination between statutory 
foundations, self-regulatory aspects and other so to 
speak components which together should constitute a
reliable network of, If possible, multiple checks and
double controls in order to produce a feasibly foolproof 
system, in which time itself would be if not of then part 
of the essence for catching any "behavioral deviation" 
before it could cause damage to investors and/or the
markets. Even If such a system were possible and
feasible, what would be its "qualitative" requirements,
for example, for securing the required expertise of the 
relevant judicial authorities in understanding the legal 
and no less non-legal technical sides of a given case, 
the expertise of administrative personnel able to read 
and interpret correctly the visible and invisible signs
of possible mischief before it is committed; how to
motivate intermediaries so that they beyond the 
boundaries of legal and institutional monitoring and 
control will be deonto Iog ica1 1 y convinced that honesty 
would be the best policy; how to make the punitive system
i/a
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into one with a message that it does not pay to commit
mischief; how to educate investors and other would-be
investors into knowledgeable and reliably critical
participants in and contributors to the quality of the 
market, not least the small investors among them as 
members of an investors' democracy; how to protect 
investors not as individuals in actions but as a class of 
participants in economic and financial life worthy of 
more articulate protection. Referring to the financial 
sides of what has been critically hinted above, it may be 
asked what the cost of Its operability and effectiveness 
would be; who would pay for it: the taxpayer, the
investors themselves, the participants in and operators 
of the market(s)? An adequate system of investor 
protection may seem to involve a gargantuan task, but 
such are its demands; or else the imperative limits and 
limitations of the existing system should be admitted and 
recommended, with a hint of the adage that even the 
informed investor may after all burn his fingers. The 
domestic enlargement of financial markets and their 
globalisation at an international level Indeed generate 
new challenges for establishing adequate mechanisms of 
market as well as investor protection, not only with 
standards of least common denominators.
...... ...
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5. Synoptic Comparison of Regulatory Bodies
The main similarities and differences between COB, 
CONSOB, and SIB can be summarised as follows:
i) In all three cases the regulatory bodies were 
constituted under strong governments: Charles de Gaulle
in France, Bettino Craxi in Italy and Margaret Thatcher 
in the UK ;
ii) All three bodies have been inspired by the American 
SEC and still now look at the SEC for solutions to their 
problems. The EG too can be claimed to be creating an EC- 
SEC system;
iii) The Big Bang has stimulated competition between the 
three bodies and, above all, between COB and SIB as a 
positive expression of economic development and as a 
search for better solutions in the financial fields* This 
competition has forced the national financial markets to 
adjust themselves to challenges from other national 
markets for attracting capital. An important aspect of 
the competitiveness of the national markets of the EC 
member states has to be investor protection. In such a 
competition atmosphere, with no barriers to the free 
movement of capital between member states, there will be 
a need to maintain adequate standards as a common 
denominator for the EC.as a whole;
iv) The Italian system seems to be the weakest of the 
three, because of exposure to political influence and 
interference. The French and the British systems seem to 
be better insulated, at least apparently, against such 
influences and interferences.
V ) All three financial systems are exposed to risks. The 
systems based on state regulation have to resist to
temptations of bureaucratic arrogance, hyper-regulation, 
sc 1erotisation and excessive intrusion or interference in 
operational and organisational selections of
intermediaries. A system based on self-regulation is
'y.f:  : ^______
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exposed in turn to a risk of corruption and capture.
There has been an extensive discussion in the USA on the 
problem of regulatory capture, that is, the effective 
control of the regulator by the regulated. In fact, it 
has been argued that "with self-regulation, regulatory 
capture is there from the outset"**® An "inevitable
tendency for the Regulators to seek an easy cohabitation 
with regulated" has been observed "but there is a cost: 
the high risk that the regulated will capture the 
Regulators."**’ "More serious still is the possibility 
that a captured regulated system may become a cartel 
which operates in the interest of established major firms 
within the regulated industry."*?” Against the danger of 
corruption and capture it has been suggested, as a
remedy, an association in a system of tripartitism.
"Business regulation is often modelled as a game between 
two players".*?* "Tripartitism is a process in which 
relevant public interest groups (PIGs) become the fully
fledged third player in the game between the regulatory
agency and the firm. As third player in the game, the PIG 
can directly punish the firm. PIGs can also do much to 
prevent capture and corruption by enforcing a norm of 
punishing regulators who fail to punish
noncompliance".*?* Tripartitism is defined as "a 
regulatory policy that fosters the participation of PIGs 
in the regulatory process in three ways. First, it grants 
the PIG and all its members access to all the information 
that is available to the regulator. Second, it gives the 
PIG a seat at the negotiating table with the firm and the 
agency when deals are done. Third, the policy grants the 
PIG the same standing to sue or prosecute the regulatory 
statute as the regulator."***
Such a tripartitism, in a simple form, has been 
applied in France, where powers are granted to the 
associations of investors. Art. 12 of the Law n. 88-421
.."if.
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of June 23, 1989 has recognised to consumer associations
the right to sue under civil law;
vi) The structure of the financial system is, like much 
else in France and Italy, more centralised than in the 
UK. This is due to their civil law tradition roots;
vii) In spite of the division of powers principle 
introduced by the French Revolution (1709) the COB has 
been invested with most relevant powers, especially in 
the judicial field;
viii) The main tools used in the field of investor
protection are self-regulation and deontology. In France 
beside deontology, self-regulation has been largely
adopted. The French experience demonstrates that self-
regulation processes can be controlled by the regulatory 
body and can supply, too, a re-enforcement and a
centralisation of its powers. The French system seems to 
prove that a larger participation of financial 
intermediaries in the se If-regulation processes does not 
necessarily reduce the regulatory body’s powers but
perhaps it does the contrary,
ix) Lastly, the presence of women in the regulatory body 
Boards has not been remarkable. Actually there are two
women on the S I B ’s Board (Rosalind Gilmore and Oonagh 
McDonald) both named in december 1st, 1993, On the C O B ’s
Board has been elected a woman until November 21, 1994.
No women have been members of the CONSOB’s Board,
________ -----
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3 6 1
C h a p t e r  9 
Cone 1 usions
The present thesis has concentrated on the role and 
Importance of intermediaries in investment protection in
an increasingly complex and global financial markets 
system. Processes of de- and re-regulation of the markets 
have affected the redefinition of the role and importance 
of intermediaries, with political dimensions which have 
even influenced the domestic economy of the states
concerned, with Italy as an example.
It is to be noted that when mention is made of the 
development and internationalisation of financial 
markets, reference is actually made to investors and 
their transnational access to stock markets. In such a 
framework it is implicit that the latter have to compete 
with each other in attracting investment capital. 
However, does the new and transnational regulation of 
financial markets offer adequate protection to investors?
An answer to this question depends on a comparison 
of the new national systems with the old ones in order to 
find out whether investors today are better protected 
than before. The pre-deregulatory system guaranteed 
protection to private and institutional investors
without any distinction between them, essentially through 
(i) unlimited liability borne by financial intermediaries 
and (ii) fixed commissions for their services to investor 
clients. If the then existing system was prima facie 
quite satisfactory, why has it been necessary to change 
it in the wake of market de- and/or re-regulation?
On the way to answering the above question it is
first necessary to have a look at developments on the
other side of the Atlantic ocean, that is, in the USA, in 
order to realise that much more has been at stake than
""I-' j-'-,:    _ .
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the isolated question of investor protection. In the 
1960s and 1970a a new development was promoted in the USA 
under the title of deregulation. It tended toward the 
abolition of the unlimited liability and the single 
capacity system. On May 1st, 1976, called "Mayday", fixed 
commissions for intermediaries in the USA were abolished. 
The purpose of deregulation in the USA was however a 
strategic and economic operation going far beyond matters 
relating to intermediaries. It pursued the objective of 
attracting international Investment capital and 
intermediaries in the first place from European stock 
markets, especially from London, to financial markets in 
the USA, for which the de- and re-regulation of the USA 
financial markets was an apt approach using three main 
i ns truments;
i) The abolition of unlimited liability applicable to 
financial intermediaries;
ii) The abolition of fixed commissions for the services 
of intermediaries, and
ill) Introduction of a more severe system for monitoring 
financial markets.
These developments could be considered to be a trick 
for attracting capital to the USA, Indeed, large amounts 
of investment capital and many of the Internationally 
well-known financial intermediaries shifted the centre of 
their activities from different parts of the world to the 
USA financial markets considered to be more attractive by 
offering
i) The privilege of limited liability borne by 
intermediaries ;
ii) The possibility for institutional investors to
bargain commission rates for intermediaries’ services, 
and
ill) Efficient and controlled financial markets.
In Europe the financial markets in the UK were the
______________________ .
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first to feel and fear the aggressiveness of the USA 
financial markets deregulation. Consequently, in 1986, 
for defending the reputation and position of London as 
the world’s most important financial place and in order 
to stop a financial haemorrhage caused by an exodus of 
capital and intermediaries to the USA, the Big Bang 
introduced into the British system the same changes as 
those effected in the USA: limited liability for
intermediaries, abolition of fixed commissions and the 
creation of a new watchdog authority in the form of the 
SIB. The Stock Exchange became a limited liability 
company whose owners had no longer unlimited liability 
for its debt. The Big Bang was thus a necessary and 
urgent answer to the challenge of deregulation in the 
USA.
For other European countries, especially France, the 
Big Bang in turn sounded an alarm. In July 1989, the
French Stock Exchange finally abolished fixed commission 
rates on smaller brokerage transactions. Commissions on 
orders of more than FFr 2 million for equities and FFr 10 
millions for bonds had been negotiable for several years. 
The results of this fundamental deregulatory step were 
expected to be similar to those that followed the 1975 
Mayday in the USA and the 1986 Big-Bang in the UK; a 
price-cutting war that would drive a number of the weaker 
or smaller brokerage firms out of the business; sharply 
lower commissions for institutional Investors; and no 
reduction in rates, or even higher commissions, for 
individual investors.
The ensuing deregulation in France was marked by a 
destructive fury against the symbols of the old stock 
market system. Also symbolically, during the night of 
July 14, 1967 the "corbeille" or place where brokers
operated at the Paris stock market was dismantled and 
wiped away by a caterpillar machine. Le Monde of July
 : : : '_
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19-20, 1967, reported "La Bourse a troque sa corbeille-
un crime de Iese-majeste". The traditional French agents 
de change were so to speak guillotined out of existence 
and were substituted by companies, while the new UK 
system maintained the two categories of intermediaries; 
(i) physical persons and (ii) companies.
The Italian Big Bang came later, in 1991, not least 
because the politically weak governments were opposed by 
a powerful lobby of stock exchange agents.
At the level of the EC, initiatives played a
stimulating and coordinating role by promoting changes in
the financial markets of the major states, Deregulatory 
legislation by the EEC started with a draft Directive 
(October 5, 1972), for coordinating the requirements for
the prospectus. As such, EC legislative initiative
anticipated in some respects the Big Bang. As a credit to 
the UK, it should be noted that after she joined the ECs 
on January 1st, 1973, a relative acceleration in EC moves
to deregulate and re-regulate financial markets in the EC 
became noticeable. This may be attributed to UK influence 
at EC 1 eve 1.
The new regulation of the financial markets in the 
EC, especially for the purpose of the present thesis in 
France, Italy and the United Kingdom, has been
essentially marked by a distinction between the
categories of Ci) institutional investor and (ii) private 
(small) investors. This distinction was adopted by France 
and Italy by following the example of the UK. At the 
level of EC too this distinction has been adopted, by EC 
Directive 1993/22. A further new proposed Directive on 
investor protection could definitively sanction the
distinction between the two investment categories, by
dealing exclusively with private (small) investors.
The historical process of formation and development 
of the new control bodies of financial markets in itself
__
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suggests that the current system refers more to the 
protection of investor’s trust in the markets than to the 
protection of the investor himself, because there is but 
an "Indirect" investor protection by the rules which 
regulate intermediaries. Investor protection is only 
indirect coming next to the protection of the markets, as 
a protection in turn effected through the regulation of 
financial intermediaries. The substance, the protection 
of investors can be currently conceived as a matter of 
interest complementary to promoting the protection of the 
markets and of competition in them; the efficiency of the 
intermediaries contributes to long-term stability on the 
markets and therewith to the protection of investors’ 
trust in them.
It is here submitted that the actual regulatory 
standard refers more to the investors’ trust and 
confidence than to investor protection, because an
indirect protection exists throughout the rules that 
govern the financial markets and the intermediaries. 
Thus, investor protection is only indirect, so to speak 
"filtered" and as a matter of second level relevance 
compared with the protection of the markets effected in 
the first place through a control system affecting the 
intermediaries. In substance, the protection of investors 
can be currently interpreted as a matter of interest
complementary to the promotion and protection of the 
financial markets and consequently to the protection of 
the trust and confidence of investors.
Concentrating specifically on investor protection 
and the new intermediaries, one cannot help being
critical with regard to the situation of the private and
small investor. The investor protection strategy, that 
changed radically after the Big-Bang, seems,: character 1 sed 
by a certain ambiguity featured in the discrepancies 
between statements of principles and the means used for
__— :   . '
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their application. In France, Italy, and the UK can be 
noted a disproportion between the "declared" objectives, 
on the one hand, and the "achieved" objectives on the 
other. Even in the Investment Services and Capital 
Adequacy Directives investor protection assumes blurred 
focus. Thus, investor protection seems to be only one of 
the objectives of the Directives. This implies that the 
challenge of investor protection, particularly of small 
investors is not yet satisfactorily met and dealt with. 
The shortcoming of a policy and strategy of investor
protection may be explained as derived from the fact that 
small and medium categories of investors, officially
considered as protagonists and addressees of the system
of disclosure, have turned out in reality to be but a
modest component in the concrete structure of the market. 
The aggregate weight of presence of small and medium
category investors in the market has in fact been
continually a limited one, and as such it has never been 
able to Justify a greater pre-occupation by the 
legislator for such investors in a situation in which the 
trust of the system has been a matter of much more
primary importance. At the EC level, too, although the
Community has repeatedly asserted its commitment to the 
protection of investors, an increasingly
internationalised market has made wealth generation the 
sine qua non of securities markets. It seems that the
hybrid model, for simultaneously promoting market 
efficiency and investor protection, with an amalgam of
central intervention and provincial
self-regulation, and a bifurcated regulatory structure, 
strikes a balance between these aspects. Then, investor 
protection risks to be a flag more than a reality.
The present thesis makes no claim to completeness; 
rather, certain aspects were purposely selected and 
highlighted in an effort to contribute the task at hand.
:,-fr ; -.y'.
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Questions have been answered, but many more have been 
raised. In a scientific research (or paper) it is 
difficult to answer all the questions in a clear,
definitive manner. Much remains to be done.
_________
: CgmparativG Table on the 00J3 (France) and tho SEG (USA) 
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S.E.C. C.O.B.(pouvoirs résultant do lo loi du 2  août)
1, Dos pouvoir» d'onqufito 
compornblo»
L'enquÔta officieuse : les services de la 
S.E.C. peuvent agir do leur propre Initia­
tive mais n’ont pas lo pouvoir d 'exiger dos 
documents ou le comparution do témoins.
L'enquête officielle ; décision formelle do 
lo S.E.C. qui désigne les agents chargés 
do mener l’enquéto. Ces agents peuvent 
exiger tours documents et entendre dos 
témoins.
La C.O.B. peut désormais faire éppol aux 
commissaires aux comptes ou ô dos 
experts judiciaires, sans avoir ouvert 
d'enquôtos, pour procéder 6 dos vérifica­
tions.
Les enquêteurs do la C.O.B. peuvent so 
faire communiquer tous documents, 
convoquer toutes personnes et accéder 
aux locaux û usage professionnel, .
La C.O.B, peut, sous lo contrôle du jugo, 
procéder à des perquisitions et saisies on 
tous lieux, pour la recherche des infrac­
tions relatives aux délits d'Initlés et mani­
pulations des cours.
2 , Dos pouvoirs désormais Identiques on matière civile, 
pénolo et conservatoire
• AU CIVIL
La S.E.C. peut demander aux tribunaux 
civils une injonction pour faire cesser 
toute pratique Illégale ou pour faire ihtor- 
diro certains actes par dos personnes qui 
causent préjudice à d'outros.
Lo S.E.C. intervient auprès dos tribunaux 
civils en qualité à'anvous curiao.
• AU CIVIL
Le Président do la C.O.B. peut demander 
au président du tribunol do gronde instan­
ce do faire casser une Irrégularité ou d'on 
supprimer les effets.
La C.O.B, peut Intervenir h l'oppui devant 
les juridictions civiles.
Sourcos : Ministère des Finances.
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S.E.C.
• AU PÉNAL
La S.E.C, saisit le ministère de ia Justice, 
qui décide ou non d'intenter une action, 
des infractions relatives aux règles 
d'appei public à l'épargne, de tout délit 
d'initiés, de toute fausse information ou de tout délit d'entrave,
• Mesures conservatoires
La S.E.C. peut demander au juge de faire 
bloquer temporairement ies comptes 
bancaires ou les comptes-titres.
C.O.B.
(pouvoirs résultant de la lot du 2 août)
• AU PÉNAL
La C.O.B. peut saisir le Parquet, qui 
décide ou non de poursuivre, des infrac­tions relatives aux délits d'initiés, manipu­
lations de Cours, entrave au bon fonction­
nement du marché.
En outre, la C.O.B. peut exercer les droits 
réservés ô la partie civile. (Partie de la loi 
du 2 août jugée non constitutionnelle.)
• Mesures conservétoires
La C.O.B. peut demander au juge des 
mesures conservatoires : mise sous 
séquestre des fonds et titres et consigna­
tion de sommes d'argent.
3. Des pouvoirs organisés différemment en matière disciplinaire et administrative
* Les sanctions disciplinaires
La S.E.C, donne un agrément aux profes­
sionnels et peut le retirer ou le suspendre.
Elle peut prendre des sanctions discipli­
naires (blâme, suspension, révocation) à 
l'égard des professionnels (personnes 
physiques ou morales).
La S.E.C. peut juger en appel des sanc­
tions disciplinaires prises par lès orga­
nismes professionnels auxquels elle 
délègue son pouvoir.
• Le pouvoir de transactions
La S.E.C, n'a pas de pouvoir propre de 
sanction administrative, mais peut transi­
ger en matière pénale : elle peut obtenir 
du procureur l'Immunité è ('encontre d'un 
contrevenant moyennant versement 
volontaire d'une amende.
• Les sanctions disciplinaires
La C.O.B. donne des agréments è certains 
professionnels et peut les retirer 
(O.P.C.V.M. et gérants de portefeuille).
Le pouvoir disciplinaire reste exercé par 
les autorités profèssionnelles (Conseil des 
bourses de valeurs, Conseil du marché à 
terme. Conseil de discipline des 
O.P.C.V.M) mais la C.O.B. peut demander 
une seconde délibération aux instances 
disciplinaires.
La C.O.B. peut demander enfin au juge de 
prononcer l'interdiction temporaire de 
l'activité professionnelle,
• Le pouvoir de sanctions administratives
La C.O.B. n'a pas de pouvoir de transac­
tions mais elle a un pouvoir de sanctions 
pécuniaires qu'elle peut infliger à toute 
personne qui aura contrevenu à ses règle­ments.
f. STATUT OF LA C O.H.
Appendio B 370Copy of one of the earliest pros'.ectnses for Investment in 
Ijaly. soliciting pnblio funds in financial support of the
revolt against the Austrian authorities in the Italian 
provinces of Lombardy and .Venejsia in 1B48.
Un « pro.spcito » per I’ iiKSiirrczione
Dianio inizio con (incsio « pmiffaninia di preslilo » del Ooi’cnio Prov- 
visorio di Venezia del ÎS48  <dla pubblicazione di « pwspetli » sloncainenie 
hilereasanii o curiosi, riseivandod di dame siiccessivaineitle an conunento 
e iin ificfitadranienlo.
CoVUkNO PROVVISORIO DI VliNUZIA
Prograniina di predlto  
Si epre uii « Prcslilo Nnzionalc Ilaliano » di dicci mil ioni di Live Ualia-
nc.
Questa somma verra impicgata a spstcncre rinsurrezionc dejlc Provin- 
cie Lombardo-Venele e la difcsa di Venezia, c a conservare, colla indipen- 
dcnza di questa cilia, la libcrlà e i'onorc di In lia I'lla lia .
II debilo c assunto e garanlito dalle Provincic Lombardo-Vcnclc.
Per Venezia si obbligano 1 trium viri eletti con polcrc dittatoriale dal- 
PAsscmblea del 15 Agosto; per In Lombardia il cilladino Ces a re Corrcnli 
d ie , in I'orza del suo manda to degli 8 agoslo corr., rappresenla in Venezia il 
Comilalo di dilesa di Lombardia in cui si eonccnlrarono i poleri del Govcr- 
no Lombardo, il quale lino dal giorno 18 Luglio dicbiaro di assumere e di 
garant ire soHdariamcnlc col Vencto lu tti i dehili chc fosse necessario di 
conlrarre per la guerra della Indipcndenza Itnliaiia.
II prestito è diviso in 20,000 azioni al presenlalore d ’llaliane L, 500 
ciascuna fru llan lt il 5 per cento.
Chi si soltoscriverà per dicci azioni nc riccvcra iina graluilamenle, chi 
per vcnti, due, c cosl di scgiiilo.
GPinleressi del 5 per cento si paghcranno di sci in sci mesi, al quale 
effet to sa ran no uniti allc azioni i rclalivi coupons.
11 primo pagamcnto d ’liitcrcssi scmeslrali si fara il 50 giugno 1849 
dalla Cassa centrale di Venezia c nclle eitta principal I d 'It alia presse le 
D ilte bancaric chc verranno in scguilo designate. Saranno in quel giorno 
pagali contemporancamchte gPintercssi dccorsi dal giornoclel versa men lo 
dcll'im porlo  della azione a lu llo  il 31 Diccmbrc prossimo venturo. II capita­
le verra restituito agli azionisti in ciruiue rale annual! con due mihoni per 
ogni rata. 11 primo pagamcnto sara falto in Venezia il 31 Diccmbrc 1852. 
Verranno eslralle a sorte ai 30 novembre di ogni anno tiella Loggia di S.
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